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also – through these firms’ linkages to local actors – in the surrounding innovation systems. 
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Countries - what do the company case studies tell us? 
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1. Summary 
Objectives 
This study highlights the differences between domestic and foreign owned 
firms with respect to innovation, technology and productivity. The main 
question investigated is whether foreign takeovers imply benefits for the 
host country. The primary issue to be explored is if it is better for companies 
not to be taken over at all.  
The study also seeks to assess the importance of different corporate 
governance styles: is it better for a domestically owned Nordic firm to be 
taken over by a company from some of the neighbouring Nordic countries, 
or is it more preferable if the takeover is an Anglo-Saxon company or a 
continental European company?  
The fundamental research question is whether foreign-owned firms perform 
better than domestic firms ceteris paribus – every thing else being equal? If 
the ceteris paribus assumption is fulfilled, a reasonable conclusion is that a 
superior performance indicates possible welfare gains while inferior results 
in terms of innovation and productivity indicate the opposite..
Methodological issues 
There are several methodological difficulties in assessing the importance of 
foreign-owned firms in the context of gain or drain of productive resources. 
One is that we don’t know what would have happened with the acquired 
firms had they not been takeover.  
For comparison analysis domestic firms are commonly used as a control 
group. However, such a comparison requires that the control group firms 
really are representative of what would have happened to the acquired firms 
had they not been taken over. Otherwise we need to use different statistical 
 
.  
The fundamental research question  
The fundamental research question is whether foreign-owned firms 
perform better than domestic firms ceteris paribus, or every thing else 
equal? If the ceteris paribus assumption is fulfilled, a reasonable 
conclusion is that a superior performance indicates possible welfare 
gains while inferior results in terms of innovation and productivity 
signals welfare drain. 
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techniques in order to increase the comparability between domestically 
owned and foreign-owned firms.  
Furthermore, the difficulties to properly capture and measure knowledge 
spillovers is perhaps even more challenging than the issue of reliable control 
groups. 
This study attempts to solve the problem of comparing comparable firms by 
a combination of statistical and econometric analysis. The possible 
differences between domestic and foreign-owned firms are studied with 
respect to gaps regarding innovativeness, R&D and other innovation 
expenditures, embeddeddness in national innovation systems, R&D output 
and labor productivity. 
The study is based on a large sample of 5 293 firm level observations in a 
cross-country comparison over the five Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The five countries are all small economies 
with a large dependence on the international economy in terms of import 
and export and an extensive presence of foreign owned enterprises. 
The present study explores the issue of corporate ownership in three 
dimensions.  
First, domestic and foreign-owned firms are compared.  
Second, we investigate differences between three groups of foreign owned 
firms (i) firms owned by other Nordic companies, (ii) firms with Anglo-
Saxon owners, (iii) other firms which mostly have owners from other 
European countries.  
Third, we are comparing domestic multinationals (firms with foreign 
affiliates) and domestic uninational (firms belonging to a group with only 
domestic affiliates). In addition to the large number of observations the 
study is characterised by an extensive set of firm characteristics on internal 
and external aspects of innovation. 
Table 1.1  
Number of observed firms in the study 
 Domestic Foreign Total Foreign/Total 
Denmark 621 223 844 26,4 
Finland 634 184 818 22,5 
Iceland 80 27 107 25,2 
Norway 1,642 685 2,327 29,4 
Sweden 814 383 1,197 32,0 
Total 3,791 1,502 5,293 28,4 
 
The data used in the study is obtained from the internationally harmonised 
Community Innovation Survey III conducted by statistical agencies in the 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and a research institute in Denmark. 
 
 
 
 
The focus is on both manufacturing and service firms. In total the data 
consists of 3,501 uninational firms, 259 domestic multinationals, 540 not 
domestically owned Nordic multinationals, 339 Anglo-Saxon multinationals 
and 654 European and other multinationals. 
In Norway the survey is compulsory which explains the large number of 
observations. In the four other countries the rate of response was about 50 
percent. The proportion of foreign-owned firms has a range from 22,5% in 
Finland to 32.0% in Sweden. The average for the Nordic counties is 28,4%. 
See Table 1.1 
Table 1.2  
Average firm size in employees 
 Domestic  
uninationals 
Domestic  
multinationals 
Foreign 
multinationals 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Denmark 292 62 1 975 600 210 83 
Finland 316 85 1 835 407 180 89 
Iceland 75 36 181 181 81 29 
Norway 150 61 406 133 222 82 
Sweden 276 50 1 277 355 348 105 
Average 222 59 1 135 335 208 78 
 
A prominent feature in all Nordic countries, shown in Table 1.2, is that the 
domestic multinational firms are significantly larger than the domestic 
uninational firms and foreign owned firms. Domestic multinational firms 
are 4-5 times larger than the two other groups of firms regardless of the size 
being measured by the mean value or median value of the employment. 
Hypotheses and suggestions 
The main justification for the study is the growing importance of 
multinational firms and foreign direct investments (FDI) during recent 
decades. Between 1990 and 2001 production in enterprises located outside 
the country of residence of the owners increased from 6 to 11 percent of 
world output. Export from foreign affiliates of multinational corporations 
represents more than a third of world trade.  The United Nations (2000) 
reports that the cross-boarder share of total acquisition and mergers have 
been relatively constant since the late 1980s. 
Why are the firms investing in R&D abroad? Three different hypotheses can 
be distinguished in recent studies.  
• The first hypothesis is that firms invest in foreign countries in order 
to exploit technological activities created within home countries.  
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• The second is that due to weakness in the home country, 
multinational enterprises conduct R&D in foreign affiliates in order 
to exploit the technological advantage of the host country.  
• The third hypothesis is that due to increasing complexity of 
technology, firms need to monitor new technological developments 
worldwide to sustain the home-based competitive advantage.  
The different explanations might have varying impact on transmission of 
technology and knowledge in the host countries and by those means also on 
innovativeness and economic growth. 
Empirical regularities or stylized facts, which have emerged from a large 
number of comparison studies on domestic and foreign-owned firms, give 
some suggestions to the “gain or drain” discussion.  
• First, there is robust evidence that within countries, foreign owned 
firms almost always pay higher wages than domestically owned 
firms.  
• Second, foreign-owned firms generally have higher productivity 
then local firms.  
• Third, the evidence for knowledge spillovers from foreign-owned 
firms to domestic firms is mixed.  
• Fourth, the evidence for a general growth impact from foreign-
owned multinationals on the host-country is mixed.. 
The literature suggests some alternative explanations for the differences in 
performance between domestic and foreign-owned firms.  
• Some studies suggest that only firms with superior technology or 
superior productivity are candidates for acquisitions or mergers.  
• Other studies find that FDI investment is oriented toward high 
productivity sectors.  
 
.  
Stylized facts  
Empirical regularities or stylized facts, which have emerged from a large number of 
comparison studies on domestic and foreign-owned firms, give some suggestions to the 
“gain or drain” discussion. First, there is robust evidence that within countries, foreign 
owned firms almost always pay higher wages than domestically owned firms. Second, 
foreign-owned firms generally have higher productivity then local firms. Third, the 
evidence for knowledge spillovers from foreign-owned firms to domestic firms is mixed. 
Forth, the evidence for a general growth impact from foreign multinationals on the host-
country is mixed. 
 
 
 
 
 
• A third finding is that acquisitions and mergers have a positive 
impact on efficiency of firms per se.  
• Finally, if the hypothesis on FDI as a strategy to exploit 
technological activities created within home countries is correct, a 
higher productivity due to scale economics or other competitive 
advantages should be expected.  
Relevant indicators 
This present study attempts to explain differences in different categories of 
innovation and growth measures. The differences are referred to as 'gaps'. In 
particular we investigate the following indicators:  
• R&D and other innovation expenditures,  
• product and process innovation that are ongoing or carried out,  
• embeddedness in the innovation system horizontal and vertical 
innovation networks, scientific innovation network, 
• possession of patents and patent application,  
• radical innovations,  
• innovation sales,  
• labor productivity and  
• public R&D funding.  
Among the determinants of firms’ innovation and productivity performance 
we have different categories of ownership, capital intensity, export and 
market orientation, focus of the firms innovation activities, R&D history, 
human capital and sector classification.  
Research methodology 
The research methodology used can be separated into three sequential steps.  
• Initially a descriptive analysis is carried out on the basis of the 
extensive data.  
• Then a selection model and appropriate control variables are 
introduced. The objective is to control for large heterogeneity and 
selection:  
o First, the study takes into account that extensive differences 
in firm performance possibly can be explained by 
idiosyncratic factors such as firm size, market orientation or 
sector.  
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o Second, the study controls for the likelihood that R&D firms 
constitute a particular group of companies. Therefore, the 
comparison is focused only on innovative firms. However, 
information from the total sample is exploited in the analysis.  
• In a final step the study considers a four-equation model that relates 
various determinants to research, research to innovation output and 
innovation output to labor productivity. 
Raw data, main findings 
The descriptive statistics, not controlling for any firm specific or industry 
specific differences, shows a robust pattern on superiority of foreign owned 
firms for all five Nordic countries.  
The foreign owned firms in the Nordic countries are distinguished by having  
(i) larger proportion of innovative firms,  
(ii) higher R&D intensity,  
(iii) higher level of innovation sales per employee,  
(iv) larger proportion of firms applying for patents,  
(v) larger proportion if firms possessing patents,  
(vi) larger proportion of firms conduction R&D on regular basis,   
(vii) larger export intensity,  
(viii) stronger focus on global markets,  
(ix) more human capital in terms of well educated people as a share of 
total employment,   
(x) higher level of labor productivity,  
(xi) stronger dependence on sources of knowledge for innovation from 
other enterprises within the group. 
 
The findings on embeddedness in national innovation systems are more 
mixed.  
In Denmark, Finland and Norway, the domestically owned firms are more 
integrated in the national innovation system compared to foreign-owned 
firms.  
The integration is measured as share of the firms collaborating on 
innovation with domestic (host-country) innovation partners. Three 
innovation systems are considered: The scientific system, vertical partners 
in the value chain and horizontal partners in the value chain.  
Within Iceland and Sweden a lager proportion of foreign-owned firms are 
integrated in the innovation system than domestic firms. Within Iceland and 
Sweden a larger percentage of the foreign owned firms is found to 
collaborate on innovation with domestic (host-country) partners compare to 
other firms. 
 
 
 
 
Controlled data, main findings 
In the regression part of the analysis the heterogeneity within the five 
observed samples is taken into account. Here, the study control for 
differences in innovation and productivity that can be related to factors as 
firm size, sector, human capital, physical capital, market orientation, 
innovation focus etc.  
Moreover, the firms are separated into five different groups of owners, 
domestic uninational firms, domestic multinational firms, Nordic 
multinationals, Anglo-Saxon multinationals and European and other 
multinational firms. The main results are presented in tables 1.3 and 1.4. 
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Table 1.3: 
Corporate ownership and gap in engagement in innovation activities.  
Gap The importance of corporate ownership 
 DOM FOR Den Fin Ice Nor Swe 
-       The likelihood to carry out 
innovation projects.      -DM 
 
 
 
+++ + -DM +DM  +DM +DM Investment in R&D and other 
innovation activities per employee      -NM 
+ASM 
 
 
The probability of receiving 
public R&D support 
+++ --  +DM 
-NM 
 
-EOM 
 +DM +DM 
++++ + +DM +DM  +DM +DM The embeddedness in the 
domestic innovation system.     +NM 
 
 
   
++++ + +DM +DM  +DM +DM The embeddedness in vertical 
innovation system.    +NM 
 
 
   
The embeddedness in the 
horizontal innovation system. 
++   +DM   
 
 
 
+DM 
++++ ++ +DM +DM  +DM +DM 
       
+ASM 
The embeddedness in the 
scientific innovation system. 
      +EOM 
++++ +++ +DM +DM  +DM +DM 
 +++ +NM +NM  +NM +NM 
The utilization of knowledge for 
innovation from other 
enterprises within the group 
 +++ +ASM   +ASM +ASM 
      +EOM +EOM 
Notes:  Control group is uninational firms  
 + (-) indicates significant association at the 1% or 5% level of significance 
Uninational firms are the reference group. DM is domestic multinationals, NM Nordic 
multinationals, ASM, Anglo-Saxon multinationals and EOM is European and other 
multinational.  
 
 
 
 
Propensity to innovate:  
The top part of table 1.3 depicts the results from the estimated propensity to 
carry out innovations. The most interesting finding is that no differences can 
be found between foreign owned firms and domestically owned firms 
among the Nordic countries.  
Norway, however, deviate from the general Nordic pattern. Here domestic 
multinationals have a significantly lower likelihood of being innovative than 
other firms. 
R&D and other innovation expenditures:  
The evidence is compelling that domestic multinationals outperform 
foreign-owned firms in terms of R&D investments in Finland and Sweden, 
everything else being equal.  
In Norway domestic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon multinationals have 
significantly higher R&D intensity than the control group of domestic 
uninationals, and Nordic multinationals, and European and other 
multinationals. 
Public R&D support.  
Conditional on that firms can be classified as innovative, domestic 
multinationals have a significantly larger likelihood of receiving public 
R&D subsidies than other groups of firms in Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
For foreign owned firms the likelihood of receiving public funding in 
Finland is significantly lower than for domestically owned firms.  
For Denmark and Iceland no clear difference between the five groups of 
firms can be established. 
Embeddedness in the national innovation systems 
In this report we define national innovation systems (NIS) as an aggregate 
of vertical, horizontal and scientific innovation systems.  
NIS is normally understood as the system of firms, knowledge institutions 
and other institutions that influence the innovative capabilities of firms. The 
premise is that the competences developed in one part of the system, may – 
directly or indirectly – influence the learning process in the firms that are 
part of that system, by the way of collaboration, the acquisition of goods and 
services, and other forms of knowledge and technology diffusion. 
The evidence is very clear:  Domestic multinationals in the Nordic countries 
are more integrated in the national innovation system than any other type of 
investigated firms.  
The only group of firms that have the same presence in national innovations 
system as domestic multinationals is Nordic owned enterprises in Finland. 
12 
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Embeddedness in the vertical innovation system 
The result for the subset embeddedness in vertical innovation system is 
identical with the overall estimates for NIS. Vertical collaboration means 
collaboration with customers or suppliers in the same value chain. 
Domestic multinationals are significantly more integrated in vertical 
collaboration for innovation than other firms. In Finland this conclusion is 
valid also for Nordic multinationals.  
Embeddedness in the horizontal innovation system 
In Finland and Sweden we find that domestic multinationals have a 
significant larger propensity to conduct horizontal cooperation on 
innovation with firms within the same industry than other firms.  
In Denmark, Iceland and Norway no difference can be found between the 
five groups of firms. 
Embeddedness in the scientific innovation system 
The scientific innovation system is the part of the national innovation 
system that consists of knowledge institutions like universities, colleges and 
institutes. 
The domestic multinationals play a dominant role in the scientific 
innovation system in Denmark, Finland and Norway.  
This situation form a contrast to Sweden where foreign-owned firms with 
Anglo-Saxon or other owners show the same likelihood to participate in 
common research projects with universities and public R&D labs than 
Swedish multinationals.  
In Iceland domestic and foreign-owned firms have the same propensity to be 
involved in the scientific innovation system 
Knowledge sources from other enterprises within the group. 
Not surprisingly we find that knowledge sources from other enterprises 
within the same corporate group play an important role for domestic as well 
as foreign-owned multinationals. This is most evident in the case of Finland, 
Norway and Sweden.  
Conclusion: on possible gaps in engagement in innovation and 
technological activities 
The most striking finding from the analysis on corporate ownership and 
engagement in innovation and technological activities is the dominating role 
of domestic multinationals in all Nordic countries. As the analysis for the 
Icelandic data does not allow us to discriminate domestic multinationals 
 
 
 
 
from domestic uninationals the differences between domestically owned 
firms and foreign owned firms may be blurred.  
 
Table 1.4:  
Corporate ownership and gap in innovation and economic performance 
Gap The importance of corporate ownership 
DOM FOR Den Fin Ice Nor Swe 
++ +++  +DM   +DM 
 +++ +NM   +NM  
The probability to patent. 
  +ASM   +ASM 
+EOM 
+ASM 
+++ ++++ +DM 
 
+ASM 
+DM 
+NM 
  +DM 
 
+ASM 
Radical innovations 
      +EOM 
The return on innovation 
investments (innovation sales) 
+ 
+1
++ 
+++1 
++++1
 
 
+NM1
+ASM 
+DM 
 
+ASM1
  
+NM1
+ASM1
+EOM1
+DM1
+NM 
+ASM1
+EOM1
 +      The Economic performance 
(Labor productivity)  ++++1
+2
 +NM2
+ASM1
 
 +NM 
+ASM1
+EOM1
 
+ASM1
Notes:  Uninational firms are the reference group.  
 + (-) indicate significant association at the 1% or 5% level of significance 
DM is domestic multinationals, NM Nordic multinationals, ASM, Anglo-Saxon multinationals 
and EOM is European and other multinational. 1not significant in the multi-step analysis, 2not 
significant in the selection models.  
 
Patent application  
A large variation in the propensity to patent between different groups of 
firms can be found in the Nordic countries. See table 1.4.  
In both Denmark and Norway Nordic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon firms 
are significantly more likely to apply for patents than domestic uninational 
and multinational firms, and European and other foreign owned firms.  
In Finland domestic multinationals have a higher propensity to apply for 
patent than other firms.  
In Sweden domestic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon firms have lager 
patent intensity than other firms. 
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Radical innovations 
Radical innovation captures the company’s ability to launch products, 
processes or services that are new to the market, not only new to the 
company. 
The most interesting finding from the estimation on radical innovation is 
that no systematic differences between company groups can be established 
in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.  
The most interesting finding from the estimation on radical innovation is 
that no systematic differences between foreign owned and domestically 
owned companies can be established in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and 
Sweden.  
Domestic multinationals, however, exceed the domestic uninationals in their 
ability to launch products that are new to the markets in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden. Foreign ownership matters in different countries differently. 
Anglo-Saxon owned companies show a higher performance in launching 
radical innovations in Denmark and Sweden and Nordic owned companies 
do so in Finland.  
Norway is the odd man out as neither a domestic owned multinationals nor 
the foreign owned companies show a better performance in launching 
radical innovations.  
Innovation sales  
The ultimate goal with almost all innovation activities is to make profit. 
Innovation sales are a gross measure on the return on innovation investment, 
increasingly exploited in innovation studies based on Community 
Innovation Survey data.  
In the present report two alternative measures are used to investigate the 
relationship between innovation sales and corporate ownership, a two-step 
selection model and a multistep production function model.  
The summary results presented in Table 1.4 report the results of both 
models.  
In the selection models domestic multinationals in Finland and in Sweden 
have a higher gross return on innovation investments compared to their 
uninational counterparts. With few exceptions foreign owned firms also 
show higher returns to innovation than the domestic uninational firms. 
Especially the Anglo-Saxon owned firms have significantly higher returns 
to innovation. 
In Norway we observe the strongest influence of foreign ownership as 
foreign owned companies yield higher returns to innovation than domestic 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
When a more sophisticated multistep knowledge production function model 
was exploited the superiority of the foreign owned companies was reduced 
in Denmark and Sweden, while it vanished totally in Finland and Norway.  
Considering both models the robust results are quite mixed. Anglo-Saxon 
firms have the highest level of innovation productivity in Denmark. In 
Finland domestic multinationals reveals higher innovation sales per 
employee than other firms. In Sweden Nordic multinationals are superior to 
other firms. For Iceland and Norway no robust difference can be found.  
Labour productivity 
Previous research suggests that foreign-owned firms generally have higher 
productivity than domestic firms.  
Looking at the selection models we find that Anglo-Saxon firms almost 
exclusively have higher labour productivity, which, however, vanishes when 
employing the more sophisticated multi-step models. Then Nordic owned 
firms are more productive in the case of Finland and Norway.  
A possible explanation to these divergent results is the extensive set of firm 
characteristics and the exploitation of econometric methods appropriate for 
the peculiarities in the data set. A complementary explanation can be found 
in our method of distinguishing between uninational domestic firms and 
multinational domestic firms.  
Is should, however, be noted that we find some indication (at the 5% level 
of significance in Norway, at the 10% level in Finland, and just outside the 
10% level in Denmark) that Nordic multinationals are more productive than 
other firms in these three Nordic countries. 
Concluding findings on possible gaps in innovation output and 
economic performance 
Contrary to our finding on superiority of domestic multinationals in 
innovation engagement, no robust pattern can be established when 
innovation performance is considered for the Nordic area as a whole.  
In Denmark and Norway foreign firm outperform domestic firms. In Iceland 
and Sweden no systematic differences can be found while the Finnish 
multinationals reveals a better innovation performance than other firms.  
Regarding economic performance our study does not confirm the hypothesis 
that there is a gap between foreign and domestic firms among the Nordic 
countries.  
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Summary 
To summarize, recent debate has focused on the importance of corporate 
governance, localization of headquarters, foreign direct investments, 
externalities and key actors in national innovation systems and productivity.  
This study explores whether foreign-owned multinational firms differ 
systematically from domestic firms in terms of R&D-investments, 
transmission of technological knowledge and economic performance.  The 
econometric analysis is based on a sample of 5 293 firm-level observations 
in the five Nordic countries, of which approximately 30 percent from firms 
with foreign owners. 
Our investigation whether foreign-owned firms perform better or worser 
than domestic firms, every thing else being equal, has yielded the following 
overall results: 
No robust difference in the propensity to be innovative can be established. 
Among the group of innovative firms, foreign-owned multinationals are 
generally outperformed by domestic multinationals in R&D and innovation 
engagement.  
Considering the results of innovation activities in terms of innovation 
output, however, the findings are somewhat mixed.  
Finally, our results on labor productivity are at variance with the findings in 
a large number of previous comparison studies. No systematic difference 
can be found in productivity between foreign and domestic-owned firms.  
The general pattern for the Nordic countries is that domestic multinational 
firms are distinct from Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and European and other groups 
of corporate owners in terms of R&D investments and embeddedness in 
scientific, vertical and horizontal innovation systems.   
However, the advantage of higher R&D intensity and possible knowledge 
technological knowledge spillover does not manifest itself in superior 
innovation output or productivity performance. A tentative explanation is 
that domestic multinationals are using the home country for developing 
technological capacity that is subsequently exploited in affiliates abroad. 
Correspondingly, the innovation and productivity performance in foreign-
owned multinationals are partly returns on activities created in their home 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
Part I: Analysis for all the Nordic countries 
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2. Introduction 
The objective of the research here is to investigate the impact of foreign 
takeovers on the innovation activities of the companies which have been 
taken over. The impact of foreign acquisition on innovative activities can be 
seen as the difference between the companies' innovative activities in two 
scenarios or “states”:  
1. In the case where there has been a takeover 
2. In the case of no takeover. 
For companies that have been taken over we can not observe their 
innovative activities in the counterfactual state: "What would the innovative 
activities have been had the companies not been taken over?" So we have to 
approximate the counterfactual state by companies which are not foreign 
owned.  
The domestically owned companies serve as a proxy for the companies in 
the state of no takeover. We estimate the impact of foreign takeover by 
estimation of the difference as the difference between foreign owned firms 
and domestically owned firms.  
Hence, the fundamental research question is whether foreign-owned firms 
perform or behave differently than domestic firms ceteris paribus, or every 
thing else being equal? If the ceteris paribus assumption is fulfilled, a 
reasonable conclusion is that a superior performance indicates possible 
welfare gains while inferior results in terms of innovation and productivity 
indicate the opposite..
This study attempts to solve the counterfactual problem when assessing the 
importance of foreign ownership in the Nordic countries by a combination 
of statistical and econometric analysis. The possible differences between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms are studied with respect to gaps 
regarding innovativeness, R&D and other innovation expenditures, 
embeddeddness in national innovation systems, R&D output and labor 
productivity. 
 
.  
The fundamental research question  
The fundamental research question is whether foreign-owned firms perform better than 
domestic firms ceteris paribus, or every thing else being equal? If the ceteris paribus 
assumption is fulfilled, a reasonable conclusion is that a superior performance indicates 
possible welfare gains while inferior results in terms of innovation and productivity signals 
welfare drain. 
 
 
 
 
 
The study is based on a large sample of 5 293 firm level observations in a 
cross-country comparison over the five Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The five countries are all small economies 
with a large dependence on the international economy in terms of export 
and export and an extensive presence of foreign owned enterprises 
The present study explores the issue of corporate ownership in three 
dimensions. First, domestic and foreign-owned firms are compared. Second, 
we investigate differences between three groups of domestic firms (i) firms 
owned by other Nordic companies, (ii) firms with Anglo-Saxon owners, (iii) 
other firms that mostly have owners from other European countries. Third, 
we are comparing domestic multinationals (firms with foreign affiliates) and 
domestic uninational (firms belonging to a group with only domestic 
affiliates). In addition to the large number of observations the study is 
characterised by an extensive set of firm characteristics on internal and 
external aspects of innovation. 
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3 briefly 
reviews some important theoretical and empirical paper on knowledge 
diffusion and the university/industry link. Section 3 delineates the data. 
Section 4 introduces the methodological approach. Section 5 states the 
empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. In Section 7-11 the individual 
country studies are  
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3. Brief review of the literature 
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of ownership on the 
firms´ innovation performance and productivity. We differentiate between 
domestic and foreign owned firms and between multinational and 
uninational companies (i.e. domestic firms with no foreign subsidiaries). 
The study in restricted to firms belonging to a group. 
Foreign owned firms are by definition multinational firms and ownership in 
another country is a result of foreign direct investments, FDI. Over the last 
decades FDI flows have increased dramatically (see, for example, Barrios et 
al 2004).  
Lipsey (2002) gives quantitative data for this development: between 1990 
and 2000 production from foreign direct investment (production in 
enterprises located outside the country of residence of the owners) increased 
from 6 percent to a little over 10 per cent of world total output.  
Statistics from UNCTAD (2002) indicate that this process – which Antràs 
and Helpman (2003) identifies as a growing specialization of the production 
– is continuing. It had reached 11 percent of world GDP in 2001. Export 
from foreign affiliates of multinational corporations represent more than a 
third of total word trade (Grossman et al 2003). 
FDI, which are distinguished from portfolio investment in that it implies a 
greater degree of foreign control, can be divided between acquisitions and 
investment in new companies or units (greenfield investments). There are 
indications in the literature that the rising trend of FDI to a large extent 
reflects increasing trends in acquisition and mergers in general, rather than a 
more internationalized economy.  
Citing United Nations 2000, Lipsey (2002) reports that the cross-border 
shares of total acquisition and mergers in the world economy have been 
relatively constant since the late 1980s. Moreover, the literature suggests 
that foreign acquisitions by far exceed the new establishments.  
U.S. data (Feliciano and Lipsey 2002) show that between 1988 and 1998, 
outlays for acquisitions accounted for 83% of outlays for acquisitions and 
new establishments. Swedish Institute for Growth and Policy studies (ITPS) 
presents more or less identical figures: During 1996 and 2000 acquisition 
accounted for 77% of the establishment of foreign ownership in Sweden and 
additional 6% was the result of mergers.  
Investigating determinants to foreign direct investments Helpman et al 
(2003) and Melitz (2003) suggest that low-productivity firms serve only the 
domestic market while high-productivity firms also serve foreign markets; 
less productive firms export while the more productive ones engage in 
foreign direct investment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
Multinational firms have pursued a multitude of strategies for international 
expansion, as described in the Word Investment Report (UNCTAD, 1998) 
and cited by Yaeple (2003). Firms have opened foreign affiliates to perform 
activities ranging from R&D to after-sales services, production of parts and 
components, assembly work, wholesale and retail distribution and more. 
There is in particular an increased interest for foreign direct investments in 
R&D activities among academics and policy makers. One hypothesis is that 
foreign-owned firms possess superior technology and that some of that 
technological knowledge spills over into the economy of the host country 
(Lipsey, 2002). Indeed, Serapio and Dalton (1999) report that the growing 
FDI investments are closely associated with growing multinational 
involvement in R&D in foreign affiliates.  
In recent literature large multinationals are characterized as the main drivers 
for the globalization of R&D and innovation activities (see for example 
Garybadze and Reger, 1999). However, Patel (1995) has shown that one of 
the main mechanisms for this globalization of R&D is merger and 
acquisitions. 
Archibugi and Immarino (1999) suggest that the most evident changes 
implied by the increasing globalization of innovation and technology due to 
FDI are tougher and increased competition and grater collaboration between 
actors, both across and within national boundaries. 
3.1 Theoretical discussions on foreign ownership 
Lipsey (2002) notices that much of the earlier economic literature on foreign 
direct investment, but not the business literature, treated it as a part of the 
general theory of international capital movements, based on the differences 
among countries in the abundance and cost of capital.  
In more recent literature, however, the transmission of technology and 
knowledge dominates, and partly following Dosi (1988), Porter (1990), 
Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1992) several authors discuss the relationship 
between multinational firms, national innovation systems, geographical 
proximity, industrial clusters and global networks.1  
In his survey of literature on home and host country FDI, Lipsey (2002) 
suggest that theoretically there are two more or less competing explanations 
for the sources and directions of the direct investment inflow.  
One is that foreign-owned firms wish to gain access to location advantages 
of the host country, based on the host country endowments or the host 
country’s technological skills – i.e. skills that are specific to the host country 
 
1 See for example Jaffe et al (1993), Feldman and Audretch (1995), Pavitt and Patel (1999) 
and Cantwell and Janne (1999). 
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in general. In that case, we would expect to find that investment would be 
attracted to industries in which the host country had some comparative 
advantage in trade. 
The second explanation is that foreign-owned firms have built up firm 
specific advantages in their countries, based on their home countries’ 
current or past comparative advantages, and wish to exploit these in the host 
country, where firms have lost, or never acquired, these skills. In that case, 
we would expect to find that investment would flow to industries with 
comparative disadvantages of the host country, and would come from firms 
in industries in which their own home country had comparative advantages 
in trade. 
3.2 Empirical findings  
Many empirical studies on role of FDI and foreign ownership are dealing 
with the effect of possible superior technology. If a technology gap exists 
between domestic and foreign owned firms we would expect to find some 
differences in productivity or innovativeness. However, even if foreign 
owned firms are shown to be superior in terms of efficiency or 
innovativeness, this doesn’t necessarily confirm the gap-hypothesis. Foreign 
owned firms can outperform domestic firms only because foreigners have 
taken over more efficient domestic firms. This possibility points to the 
importance of using panel data and follow firms before and after the 
acquisition. 
Other empirical studies are attempting to explain observed differences 
between foreign and domestic firms, analyze spillover effects from 
multinational firms to the host country or taking the dynamics into account 
and examining not only firms that can be observed over a period but also 
firms that enter and exit.  
The literature on internationalization of business suggests a number of 
different reasons for companies undertaking technological activities outside 
their home country.  
Vernon (1966), for example, suggested that the main reason for foreign 
R&D activities is to exploit technological activities created within the home 
country.  
More recent analyzes (for example Cantwell 1995, Dunning and Narula 
1995) suggest that two other factors have become increasingly important. 
These are the need to monitor new technological developments and the 
ability to generate entirely new technologies and products from foreign 
locations.  
Both of these have been attributed to increasing complexity of technology 
and the resulting rise in the cost of R&D. In the former case a company 
would be active abroad in technologies where the complimentarily between 
(i) the strength of the host country and (ii) its own domestic strength. In the 
 
 
 
 
latter case a company is simply interested in exploiting the technical 
advantage of the host country in order to alleviate technological weakness at 
home. 
Pavitt and Patel (1999) find that most MNCs tend to locate their R&D 
activities at home and that therefore the national systems of innovation of 
the home country affect their pattern of innovation. Moreover, a comparison 
of the technological advantage of the company at home and the advantage 
of the location shows that in a large majority of cases, firms tend to locate 
their technology abroad in their core areas where they are strong at home. 
Comparing the technology advantage of the company at home and the 
advantage of the location abroad Patel and Vega (1999) find that firms are 
active outside their home countries in those areas of technology where there 
have been big increases  and where they have formed strategic alliances. In 
a large majority (more than 75%) of cases, firms tend to locate their 
technology abroad in their core areas, i.e. areas where they are strong at 
home. In a small minority of cases (10%), firms go abroad in their areas of 
weakness at home to exploit the technological advantage of the host 
country.  
Based on an investigation of 345 multinational companies Le Bas and Sierra 
(2001) confirm the Patel and Vega results. They find that nearly 70% of 
MNC locate their activities abroad in technological areas or fields where 
they are strong at home. In terms of policy implications Le Bas and Sierra 
suggest that the national system of innovation, and in particular the system 
of academic research, should strengthen the technological advantages of 
local firms and enable them to successfully locate a part of their R&D 
activities abroad. 
Barrios et al (2004) is an example of a study trying to account for the 
dynamic aspect of foreign ownership. The focus is on two likely effects of 
FDI: a competition effect, which deters entry of domestic firms and positive 
markets externalities such as knowledge spillovers, which foster the 
development of local industry.  
Using plant-level data for the manufacturing sector in the Republic of 
Ireland over the period 1972 to 2000 the authors find that increasing 
presence of foreign owned firms may initially harm the development of 
domestic firms due to increasing competitive pressure. However, after 
reaching a certain threshold value, the positive benefits of foreign owned 
firms due to technological spillover outweigh the negative factors and 
contributed to the development of domestic firms. 
There are still a small but growing literature on foreign ownership and 
innovation relying on CIS-data. See for example Tether 2000, Tether 2001, 
Baclet and Evangelista 2003 and Sadowski and Van Beers, 2003. A 
common research topic is innovativeness of foreign owned firms versus 
domestically owned firms. Using a dataset of 1,115 observations from CIS 
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2, Balcet and Evangelista (2004) show that foreign owned firms were more 
innovative than domestic firms in Italy during the period 1994-1996.  
The authors explain the grater innovativeness of foreign-owned firms by a 
larger concentration in science-based sectors and by being in larger in size 
when compared to domestic firms. However, in the majority of 
technologically intensive sectors domestic firms outperform domestically 
owned firms, especially in terms of R&D intensity, while an opposite 
pattern characterize the medium and low innovative industries.  
Based on their results Balcet and Evangelista suggest that the innovation 
strategies of foreign owned firms are strongly affected by strengths and 
weakness of the innovation systems in the Italian host country. In the case 
of most science-based and scale intensive sectors, the attractiveness if Italy 
is low while the foreign owned firms seems to be attracted by the 
competencies and know-how accumulated in all traditional and mechanical 
engineering industries, where Italy holds a clear competitive advantage. 
Frenz and Ietto-Gillies (2004) are using a U.K. data set containing 679 
observations from CIS 2 and CIS 3 for testing the hypothesis that 
multinationality per se affects the propensity to innovate. Comparing 
domestic and foreign owned firms being part of a multinational versus firms 
being part of a uninational company they find that those CIS enterprises that 
belongs to a multinational corporation are more likely to engage in 
innovation activities and that this engagement is on continuous basis rather 
than only occasionally. 
The largest branch of comparison studies concerning ownership of firms is 
dealing with efficiency in terms of productivity. The underlying assumption 
is mainly that productivity differences indicate a technological gap.  
Doms and Jensen (1998) concluded that foreign- owned plants were 
superior to U.S.- owned plants of non-multinational firms, even large firms, 
in both labor productivity and TFP2, but that they were behind plants owned 
by U.S. multinationals. Girma et al (2001) found in their data set that among 
firms with no change in ownership, foreign-owned firms in the United 
Kingdom had labor productivity about 10 per cent above that for 
domestically-owned firms and total factor productivity about 5 per cent 
higher. Conyon et al (1999) fond that the acquisition of UK firms by 
foreigners led to increases in their productivity. 
One might suspect that foreign-owned firms choose to acquire plants with 
high productivity, and that this may explain the differences.  A study by 
Harris and Robinson (2002) on what kind of companies foreign firms 
choose, does indeed suggests that foreign-owned firms selected plants with 
a relatively high productivity. Each group of plants were compared with a 
reference group consisting of plants belonging to UK multiplant firms that 
did not sell any plants to foreign-owned firms during 1982-1992.  
 
2 Total factor productivity 
 
 
 
 
Investigating foreign ownership in the Swedish manufacturing sector 
between 1990 and 2000, Lundberg and Karpaty (2004) rejected the 
hypothesis that foreign owned companies had a relatively higher 
productivity before the takeover. 
The evidence on innovation and productivity in the literature is quite strong 
on more innovative and more productive foreign owned firms, but the 
attempts to explain differences between domestic and foreign-owned firms 
are less unanimous.  
Some recent studies have analyzed the importance of the innovation systems 
in the host country for the performance of subsidiary business. Furu (1999) 
suggests that the general competitiveness of  foreign owned firms requires 
two things:  
• first that the subsidiary has to establish business relationship with 
local counterparts as well as suppliers, competitors, customers, 
government agencies, in order to be able to absorb meaningful 
knowledge from the local competitive environment; and  
• second, that investment in R&D is needed to support the 
development of new competence an learning.  
The results presented by Furu confirm previous finding by Andersson 
(1997) that the performance of foreign owned firms is largely dependent on 
its embeddedness in the network of local firms, e.g., local customers, 
suppliers, research institutes, and competitors. 
4. Research questions and methodology 
Our fundamental research problem is to measure the influence of foreign 
ownership on firms’ innovation performance among the five Nordic 
countries. In addition we are also interested in the economic impact in terms 
of productivity. A main challenge is what in the statistics literature is 
discussed as the lack of counterfactual evidence: We do not know what 
would have happened with the foreign owned firms’ innovation and 
productivity performance in the absence of acquisition or mergers.  
If the domestic firms are not representative of what would have happened to 
the foreign-owned firms in the counterfactual situation of no takeover we 
must try to solve the sample selection problem. 
The research methodology used can be separated into three sequential steps. 
Initially a descriptive analysis is carried out on the basic of the extensive 
data. Then a selection model and appropriate control variables are 
introduced. The objective is to control for large heterogeneity and selection: 
First, the study takes into account that extensive differences in firm 
performance can possibly be explained by idiosyncratic factors such as firm 
size, market orientation or sector. Second, the study control for the 
likelihood that R&D firms constitute a particular group of companies. 
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Therefore, the comparison is focused only on innovative firms. However 
information from the total sample is exploited in the analysis. In a final step 
the study considers a four-equation model that relates various determinants 
to research, research to innovation output and innovation output to labor 
productivity. 
In this section we will introduce the research questions in terms of a number 
of gap-hypotheses. Then the appropriateness and quality of the data is 
discussed. A description of the research methodology and the data 
concludes. 
4.1 Research questions 
Table 4.1 shows the 12 hypotheses that are raised in the study. The upper 
part of the table considers hypotheses on various aspects of engagement in 
innovation activities.  
First we ask if foreign owned firms have a lager probability to carry out 
innovation activities, every thing else being equal. We are then interested in 
whether domestic governments systematically discriminate between 
domestic and foreign ownership when subsidising R&D investments. The 
subsidy variable is also used as a control variable when we compare the 
amount of investments in R&D and other innovation activities between 
firms with respect to the ownership issue.  
Furthermore, the potential differences in embeddedness in various nation 
(host-country) innovation systems are analysed. We are also interested in 
how foreign-owned firms differ from domestic firms when the utilization of 
sources for knowledge for innovation from other enterprises within the 
group are considered. 
The lower part of Table 4.1 presents the four hypotheses on possible gaps in 
the results of innovation activities.  The first hypothesis considers the 
propensity to apply for patents, the second the degree of novelty 
characterising the innovations, and the third hypothesis has reference to 
innovation productivity. It measures innovation sales per employee between 
the five categories of firms in the study.  
Finally, we are comparing levels of labor productivity between the 
innovative foreign and domestic firms in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Sweden and Norway. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1:  
Gap-hypotheses 
Hyp Engagement in Innovation. Foreign ownership influences: 
1. The likelihood to carry out innovation projects. 
2. The probability of receiving public R&D support 
3. The amount of R&D and other innovation investments 
4. The embeddedness in the domestic innovation systems (scientific. vertical, horizontal). 
5. The utilization of knowledge from up and down the value chain (vertical innovation 
system) 
6. The utilization of knowledge from within the same industry (horizontal innovation system) 
7. The utilization of the domestic science base (scientific innovation system) 
8. The utilization of sources of knowledge for innovation from other enterprises within the 
group 
 Results of Innovation Activities. Foreign ownership influences: 
9. The probability to patent 
10. The ' focus of innovation (radical innovation=new for the market) 
11. The return on innovation investments (innovation sales) 
12. The Economic performance (Labor productivity) 
4.2 Data 
The research questions relate to innovation activities and foreign ownership, 
and most of the data sources relating to the internationalization of corporate 
R&D contain some information about the questions at stake. Table 4.2 
contains a brief assessment of the available data sources, their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
As the core of this analysis is to obtain a common view on all Nordic 
countries, comparability is important when selecting data sources. As the 
analysis also looks at innovation activities as such, the analysis heavily 
depends on the comprehensiveness of the items covered in the data sets. The 
Community Innovation Survey represent such as data sources.3
Community innovation survey data is increasingly being used as a key data 
source in the study of innovation at the firm level in Europe. Data based on 
the homogenized CIS questionnaire is not only available for the EU member 
states. Also Norway and Iceland participate in the CIS initiative. Table 4.3 
summarizes the details of the CIS 3 methodology for each of the Nordic 
countries. Within Europe, CIS surveys are usually conducted every five 
years. The third and most recent wave of the CIS was carried out in 2001. It 
covers the years 1998 to 2000. CIS surveys follow the ‘subject-oriented’ 
approach because they ask individual firms directly whether they were able 
                                                 
3 CORDIS has more information on the Community Innovation Survey: http://www.cordis.lu/innovation-
smes/src/cis.htm 
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to produce an innovation. The CIS is widely piloted and tested before 
implementation and, since it was first used in the early 1990s, the 
questionnaire has been continuously revised. The CIS bases on previous 
experience with innovation surveys, including the Yale survey and the 
SPRU innovation database (Klevorick et al, 1995; Pavitt, Robson and 
Townsend, 1987). It provides an opportunity to investigate patterns of 
innovation across a large number of industrial firms. 
Table 4.2  
Data sources for analysis of internationalization of innovation activities  
Data source  Measure Strength Weaknesses Sources 
R&D surveys 
 
Innovation 
expenditure 
Regular and 
recognised data on 
main source of 
technology, large 
samples 
Lacks detail, no 
output measure, no 
indicators for 
motives etc.  
OECD 
R&D surveys  
Patents counts 
 
Patenting 
activity 
Regular detailed & 
long-term data 
available by firm, 
location, industry, 
technical fields 
Uneven propensity 
to patent amongst 
countries, sectors 
and companies; 
misses software 
US PTO EPO 
 
Innovation Surveys 
(CIS) 
 
Innovation 
input, 
innovation 
output, 
innovation 
process 
characteristics, 
firm 
characteristics 
Systematic data on 
innovative 
activities of foreign 
owned & domestic 
firms, homogenous 
across countries 
Cross section, no 
panel, sample size, 
subjective answers  
 
National Sources,  
Other Ad Hoc 
Surveys  
 Detailed data, e.g. 
on motivations for 
conducting foreign 
R&D 
Uneven coverage 
across countries 
Various 
Source: based on Patel (2004) 
 
Although far from being perfect, CIS data does provide a useful supplement 
to the traditional measures of innovation, such as patent statistics, as it 
covers the innovative efforts of firms, their innovation strategies, their 
innovation success and to a certain degree it allows to assess the innovation 
induced performance changes of firms. As compared the R&D and patent 
data, innovation output indicators in the CIS have the advantage of 
measuring innovation directly (Kleinknecht et al 2002). The new indicators 
in CIS capture the market introduction of new products and services and 
their relative importance for the innovators sales.  
In addition to the new set of innovation output variables the CIS data offers 
internationally comparable data, a feature which – with few exceptions such 
as Janz et al. (2003), Lööf and Heshmati (2002) or Czarnitzki et al (2004) – 
has not been utilized, yet.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 
 Methodology for each of the Nordic countries4
Country Survey method Participation Sampling frame 
Denmark Postal +Telephone Voluntary Private Business Register 'NewBiz'.  
Finland Postal Voluntary Finnish Business Register 
Iceland Postal + Telephone Voluntary The register of Enterprises 
Norway Postal Mandatory Statistics Norway's Central Register 
of Establishments and Enterprises 
Sweden Postal Voluntary Swedish Business Register 
Note: Taken from Götzfried (2003) 
4.3 Methodology and variables used 
Although the CIS data set contains sampling weights for the whole data set 
we choose not to use the weights for two reasons.  
First, the sampling weights stratify the sample according to size, industry 
and innovativeness. They do not refer to foreign ownership. So using the 
sampling weights we may even include a larger distortion of the sample.  
Second, it is argued that not weighting the observations is closer to their 
economic significance (cf. Tether 2001). So, fundamentally, when we speak 
about, say, Finland or the Finnish firms, we mean the firms in the data set. 
Regrettably, being restricted by the available data we have to leave it open 
whether or not our findings are representative for the whole economy. 
However, as suggested by Tether (2001) looking at the economic weight of 
firms, rather than looking at their sampling weight, we would argue that the 
findings of this analysis do represent the differences between foreign owned 
and domestically owned firms.  
As this analysis endeavours to establish the difference between foreign 
owned and domestically owned firms, we restrict the firms in our sample to 
the firms belonging to a corporate group. Had we not done so, all foreign 
owned firms would, by definition be part of a foreign owned corporate 
group. Only a fraction of the domestically owned firms, are part of a 
corporate group, though. Observing a difference between foreign owned 
firms and domestically owned firms would in this case also include the 
effect of group membership. To eliminate this effect, we only analyze firms 
that are part of a corporate group. Hence, talking about firms we implicitly 
mean firms belonging to a corporate group.  
                                                 
4 The size of the Icelandic economy required and enabled Statistics Iceland to carry out a special sampling 
procedure. Statistics Iceland collected all 798 Icelandic companies above with 10 employees or above and 
conducted a telephone survey on whether or not they carry out innovation activities. Subsequently the 
CIS questionnaire was sent to the 471 innovation active companies with a response of 223 companies. 60 
of the responding companies turned out to be not innovation active, although having claimed to carry out 
innovation activities in the telephone survey. 
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We try do give a most comprehensive picture of the effects foreign 
ownership has on the innovation activities of firms. We do so by analysing 
the CIS data sets by means of two econometric setups. First, we employ 
sample selection models; second we employ a complete production model 
in the vein of Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998). 
Selection models 
To analyze the hypothesis given in section 0 above, depending on the type 
of the exogenous variable, we use two different, yet quite comparable 
econometric models. The common idea of the econometric models is that it 
takes account of the fact that the dependent variable, say, the innovation 
effort, is only observed for innovative companies, companies, that is, which 
have decided to engage in innovation activities. The decision to be 
innovative, however, is not independent of certain firm characteristics such 
as size, investment activities, foreign ownership, etc. Both the decision 
about the innovation effort and the decision about the innovation activity 
have to be modeled simultaneously. If the dependent variable k is a 
continuous variable we use a Heckman selection model described in 
equations (1) and (0). If the dependent variable is a dummy variable k we 
use a Heckman probit model.  
0000
0
* ε+β+β= ∑ nnn xg  (0) 
1111
0 εββ ++= ∑ mmm x  k  
…with k being a continuous variable (1) 
…with k being a dichotomous variable (2) 
 
where g* is a latent innovation decision variable, k represents innovation 
input. x are the exogenous variables and ε are the error terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous variables 
A description of the endogenous variables can be found in table 4.4 used to 
test the hypothesis. For the selection models each gap hypothesis will be 
tested in a separate regression model. Each hypothesis hence relates to an 
equation in the regression models.  
Table 4.4: 
Endogenous variables 
Hyp   
1 Innovation activity Product innovation or process innovation 
or ongoing R&D project (dummy) 
2 Innovation input Innovation effort per worker (log) 
3 Funding Public funding (dummy) 
4. Embeddedness in the domestic 
innovation system 
Aggregate of 5, 6 and 7 below. 
5 Utilization of domestic 
knowledge up and down the 
value chain 
Domestic vertical innovation 
collaboration (dummy) 
6 Utilization of domestic 
knowledge from within the same 
industry 
Domestic horizontal innovation 
collaboration (dummy)1
7. Embeddedness in the domestic 
science base 
Collaboration with domestic universities 
or research institutes (dummy) 
8. Utilization of domestic 
knowledge from within the group 
Dummy variable for sources of 
knowledge for innovation from other 
enterprises within the group 
9 Patent behaviour Patent application (dummy) 1
10 Quality level of innovation Product new to the market (dummy) 
11 Innovation output Sales from new / modified products per 
worker (log) 
12 Productivity Sales per worker (log) 
Note: 1 not used for the analysis of the Icelandic data. 
 
Exogenous variables  
Based on the literature about corporate governance styles reviewed above, 
we suspect that the home country of the corporate group matters for 
determining the innovation activities of the firms. Hence, we include 
information about the home country of the corporate group in the analysis.  
Ex ante we build country groups that are supposed to yield similar corporate 
governance styles, or that are of particular interest in this analysis. We 
group companies together that are part of Anglo-Saxon owned corporate 
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groups, including UK-owned, US-owned, Irish, Canadian and South African 
corporate groups.  
Of particular interest in this study are the Nordic countries; so we group, 
Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish5 owned companies into 
this category.  
All other home countries in the sample are grouped into the category 
European and others, where European countries clearly prevail.6  
In estimating the selection equation and in the descriptive statistics below 
we differentiate between foreign owned and domestically owned companies.  
Within the domestically owned companies we differentiate the domestically 
owned companies and companies which are a part of a domestically owned 
multinational group.  
All companies in the sample belong to corporate groups. Companies, which 
are not part of a domestically owned multinational, are supposed to be part 
of groups with only domestic facilities.7  
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 summarize the exogenous variables used in the 
selection models.  
 
5 Of course, for each analyzed country the foreign owned country group labelled 'Nordic' consists only of 
the four non-domestic Nordic countries. 
6 Due to the small sample size in the Icelandic data set we cannot maintain the country group 
differentiation for Iceland. We use the foreign owned / domestically owned dichotomy instead. 
7 Details about the generation of the grouping variables can be found in Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5:  
Exogenous variables for the selection equation (0) 
Variable  DK FI IS NO SE 
Foreign ownership X X X X X 
Size (log employment) X X X X X 
Productivity (log labor productivity) X1 X1 X1 X 1 X 1
Significant market area - local (dummy)l / / / / / 
Significant market area - National (dummy) X X X X X 
Significant market area - global (dummy) X X X X X 
Established X X X X X 
Merged X X X X X 
Human capital X X X X X 
Tangible investment (log) X X X X X 
High technology manufacturing sector X X X X X 
Medium high technology manufacturing sectors X X - X X 
Medium low technology manufacturing sectors X X - X X 
Low technology manufacturing sectors / / - / / 
Knowledge intensive services X X X X X 
Other services X X X X X 
Processing and preserving of food (dummy) - - X - - 
Manufacturing (dummy) - - / - - 
Note: X variable in regression, / variable used as reference category, - variable not in regression, 
1variable not in regression for the hypothesis 9 
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Table 4.6  
Exogenous variables for the regressions of equation (1) and (2) 
Variable  DK FI IS NO SE 
Foreign ownership - - X - - 
Domestic non multinational (dummy) / / - / / 
Domestic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Nordic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Anglo-Saxon multinational (dummy) X2 X - X X 
European multinational or other (dummy) X X - X X 
Size (log employment) X X X X X 
Innovation input per worker (log) X1 X1 X1 X X 
Significant market area – local (dummy) / / / / / 
Significant market area – national (dummy) X X X X X 
Significant market area – global (dummy) X X X X X 
Product oriented innovation strategy (dummy) X X X X X 
Process oriented innovation strategy (dummy) X X X X X 
Continuous R&D (dummy) X X X X X 
Public funding (dummy) X X X X X 
High technology manufacturing sector (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium high technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium low technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Low technology manufacturing sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Knowledge intensive services (dummy) X X X X X 
Other services (dummy) X X X X X 
Processing and preserving of  food (dummy) - - X - - 
Manufacturing (dummy) - - / - - 
Note: X variable in regression, / variable used as reference category, - variable not in regression. 
1variable not in regression for the hypothesis 1, 2variable not in regression for hypothesis 8 as no 
Anglo-Saxon owned companies had horizontal domestic collaboration,  
 
Models a la Crepon Duguet & Mairesse  
The theoretical model we consider is a modified version of the standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function. The approach used can be simplified by 
the following relationship: 
 
 εγβα +++= KY logXloglog  (3) 
 
where Y is productivity at the firm level, X is a vector of standard inputs, 
and K is knowledge capital capturing the transformation process from 
innovation input to innovation output, and α and ε represent systematic and 
random fluctuations, respectively, in productivity. Here, the focus is on 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
estimation of γ, the elasticity of productivity with respect to knowledge 
capital.  
The empirical model in the study is a modified version of the production 
function model introduced by Pakes and Griliches (1984) and further 
developed by Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse. (1998). The model, referred to 
as the CDM model, includes four equations and three established 
relationships including the innovation input linked to its determinants, so 
called knowledge production function relating innovation input to 
innovation output, and the productivity equation relating innovation output 
to productivity.  
The basic econometric problems that the empirical model aims to solve are 
selectivity and simultaneity biases. When only R&D investing firms are 
considered, which is most common in innovation studies, a selection bias 
may arise. And when several links in the process of transforming innovation 
investment to productivity is considered in a simultaneous framework, one 
possible problem emerging is that some explanatory variables often are 
determined jointly with the dependent variable, i.e. they are not exogenously 
given and there will be simultaneity bias in the estimates. 
The first two equations in our version of the CDM-model are estimated 
separately as a generalized tobit model where observations on both 
innovative and non-innovative firms are included. It should be noted that the 
first two steps of the model are econometrically identical with the Heckman 
selection model presented in section above. The last two equations are 
estimated in a simultaneous equation system where the endogenous 
innovation output variable is limited only to strictly positive values in the 
last step. More specifically, we have the following equations: 
0000
0
* ε+β+β= ∑ nnn x  g
1111
0 εββ ++= ∑ mmm xk  (5) 
2222
0 ε+β+β+β+β= ∑ lllMRk xMRkt  (6) 
εβββ +++= 33330 ∑ j jjt
where g
input,  
t is innovation output, q is productivity, MR is th inverted Mill’s ratio 
introduced to correct for possible selection bias, 3210 and,, xxxx  are N, M, 
L and J vectors of variables explaining investment decision, innovation 
input, innovation output and productivity including em ent, human 
capital and various innovation indicators variables. The coefficients 
10 and ββ are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated refle
xtq  (7) 
* is a latent innovation decision variable, k represents innovation 
e 
cting the 
ploym
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& nd 
tual level on these investments, 
the  is parameters associated with the level of innovation output while 
tial 
n and the 
tage 
e stage least square. In this report we are utilizing the 
ator. 
nous variable of the individual 
 for the selection equatio ) 
DK NO SE 
impact of certain factors on the probability of being engaged in R D a
other innovation investments and on the ac
2β
3β  is associated with the level of productivity.  
The 3210 and,, εεεε  are random error terms. We assume that the two error 
terms in the selection model are correlated and the two error terms in the 
simultaneous equation system are correlated. In addition, due to the 
predicted Mills’ ratio and the predicted innovation input estimate in 
equation (6), both generated from the selection model there is also a par
correlation between the error terms in the selection equatio
simultaneous equation. The two last equation can be estimated by two s
least square or thre
2SLS estim
Tables 4.7 to 4.10 summarize the exoge
country analysis.  
Table 4.7:  
Exogenous variables n (4
Variable  FI IS 
Foreign ownership X X X X X 
Size (log employment) X X X X X 
Significant market area - local (dummy)l / / / / / 
Significant market area - National (dummy) X X X X X 
Significant market area - global (dummy) X X X X X 
Established X X X X X 
Merged X X X X X 
Human capital X X X X X 
Tangible investment (log) X X X X X 
High technology manufacturing sector X X X X X 
Medium high technology manufacturing sectors X X - X X 
Medium low technology manufacturing sectors X X - X X 
Low technology manufacturing sectors / / - / / 
Knowledge intensive services X X X X X 
Other services X X X X X 
Processing and preserving of food (dummy) - - X - - 
Manufacturin (dummy) - - / - - g 
Note: X variable in regression, / variable used as reference category, - variable not in regression, 
1variable not in regression for the hypothesis 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8  
Exogenous variables for the regressions of equation (5)  
Variable  DK FI IS NO SE 
Foreign ownership - - X - - 
Domestic non multinational (dummy) / / - / / 
Domestic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Nordic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Anglo-Saxon multinational (dummy) X2 X - X X 
European multinational or other (dummy) X X - X X 
Size (log employment) X X X X X 
Innovation input per worker (log) X1 X1 X1 X X 
Significant market area – local (dummy) / / / / / 
Significant market area – national (dummy) X X X X X 
Significant market area – global (dummy) X X X X X 
Continuous R&D (dummy) X X X X X 
Public funding (dummy) X X X X X 
High technology manufacturing sector (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium high technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium low technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Low technology manufacturing sectors (dummy) / / - / / 
Knowledge intensive services (dummy) X X X X X 
Other services (dummy) X X X X X 
Processing and preserving of  food (dummy) - - X - - 
Manufacturing (dummy) - - / - - 
Note: X variable in regression, / variable used as reference category, - variable not in regression. 
1variable not in regression for the hypothesis 1, 2variable not in regression for hypothesis 8 as no 
Anglo-Saxon owned companies had horizontal domestic collaboration,  
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Table 4.9  
Exogenous variables for the regressions of equation (6)  
Variable  DK FI IS NO SE 
Foreign ownership - - X - - 
Domestic non multinational (dummy) / / - / / 
Domestic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Nordic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Anglo-Saxon multinational (dummy) X2 X - X X 
European multinational or other (dummy) X X - X X 
Size (log employment) X X X X X 
Innovation input per worker (predicted) X1 X1 X1 X X 
Predicted labour productivity X X X X X 
Inverted Mill's ratio for the selection equation (4) X X X X X 
Collaboration diversity X X X X X 
Human capital X X X X X 
Continuous R&D (dummy) X X X X X 
Public funding (dummy) X X X X X 
High technology manufacturing sector (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium high technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium low technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Low technology manufacturing sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Knowledge intensive services (dummy) X X X X X 
Other services (dummy) X X X X X 
Processing and preserving of  food (dummy) - - X - - 
Manufacturing (dummy) - - / - - 
Note: X variable in regression, / variable used as reference category, - variable not in regression. 
1variable not in regression for the hypothesis 1, 2variable not in regression for hypothesis 8 as no 
Anglo-Saxon owned companies had horizontal domestic collaboration,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9  
Exogenous variables for the regressions of equation (7)  
Variable  DK FI IS NO SE 
Foreign ownership - - X - - 
Domestic non multinational (dummy) / / - / / 
Domestic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Nordic multinational (dummy) X X - X X 
Anglo-Saxon multinational (dummy) X2 X - X X 
European multinational or other (dummy) X X - X X 
Size (log employment) X X X X X 
Innovation input per worker (predicted) X1 X1 X1 X X 
Predicted labour productivity X X X X X 
Inverted Mill's ratio for the selection equation (4) X X X X X 
Process innovation X X X X X 
Investment per employee X X X X X 
Public funding (dummy) X X X X X 
High technology manufacturing sector (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium high technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Medium low technology manuf. Sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Low technology manufacturing sectors (dummy) X X - X X 
Knowledge intensive services (dummy) X X X X X 
Other services (dummy) X X X X X 
Processing and preserving of  food (dummy) - - X - - 
Manufacturing (dummy) - - / - - 
Note: X variable in regression, / variable used as reference category, - variable not in regression. 
1variable not in regression for the hypothesis 1, 2variable not in regression for hypothesis 8 as no 
Anglo-Saxon owned companies had horizontal domestic collaboration,  
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5. Results 
The following section delivers a synopsis of the country analysis of all five 
Nordic countries. Consequently it will lack some aspect with can be found 
in the more detailed country analysis, which can be found in part 2 of this 
study. When discussing the exploratory analysis in the sections below we 
confine ourselves to report only the figures for domestic firms (DOM) 
which we split up into domestic uninationals (DU), domestic multi-nationals 
(DM). We also report the results for foreign owned firms (FOR).  
5.1 Preliminary findings from the descriptive statistics 
In this section we describe the distribution of the total sample of 5 293 
observed firms with respect to ownership, sectors firm size and market 
orientation. 
5.11 Distribution of all companies and innovative companies 
Table 5.1 
 Distribution of domestically owned and foreign owned firm 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 Total Innov. Total Innov. Total Innov. Total Innov. Total Innov. 
DOM 73.6 73.5 77.5 76.9 74.8 71.4 69.2 71.6 68.0 64.3 
    DU 92.4 86.4 85.3 76.5 97.5 95.0 96.6 93.1 92.4 86.1 
    DM 7.6 13.6 14.7 23.5 2.5 5.0 3.4 6.9 7.6 13.9 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
FOR 26.4 26.5 22.5 23.1 25.2 28.6 30.8 28.4 32.0 35.7 
    NM 37.2 36.8 39.1 39.5 29.6 25.0 33.4 34.3 36.0 34.3 
    ASM  22.9 24.0 29.3 33.6 37.0 43.8 16.6 22.6 27.4 28.2 
    EOM 39.9 39.2 31.5 26.9 33.3 31.3 50.0 43.1 36.6 37.5 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Distribution of domestic and foreign owned companies; numbers are percent. Total indicates the whole sample 
of companies being part of a corporate group. Innov. indicates the sub-sample of innovation active companies. DOM= 
Domestically owned firms; FOR= foreign owned firms; DU= Domestic uninational firms; DM= domestic 
multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and other multi-
nationals. 
 
Table 5.1 summarize the distribution of domestically owned and foreign 
owned firms in the sample. We display the distribution of the total sample 
of companies and the sub-sample of innovative companies in terms of 
foreign vs. domestically owned firms. The domestically owned firms are 
subdivided into domestic groups and domestic multinationals. For the 
foreign owned companies we display the distribution across Nordic owners, 
Anglo-Saxon owners and European owners. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
Although we use an unweighted sample of companies for each country 
some distributional pattern are striking here.  
Across Denmark, Finland, Iceland the share of foreign owned companies 
seems to be quite constant around 25 % – slightly less in Finland, though. 
Norway and Sweden host a larger fraction of foreign owned companies.  
Also among the innovation active companies the share of foreign owned 
companies seems to be quite constant with Norway being comparable to 
Denmark, Finland and Iceland. Also here, Finland hosts the lowest fraction. 
In Sweden we find the largest share of foreign owned companies among the 
innovation active companies.  
Interestingly, the share of foreign owned companies is higher among the 
innovation active companies than it is among the whole sample of 
companies, roughly indicating that innovation activity is slightly less 
frequent among domestically owned firms than it is among foreign owned 
firms. 
Among the foreign owned Icelandic companies the Anglos-Saxon 
ownership is strongest with the US representing 80% of this country group.  
In Denmark the strongest group among the foreign owned firms are both the 
Nordic as well as the European countries, where the neighbouring countries 
such as the Germany, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands clearly prevail.  
The foreign owned companies in Sweden are also to a large degree 
controlled by firms in neighbouring countries. In the study 36 percent are 
Nordic multinationals. This share is about the same is reported by official 
statistics for enterprises with 10 or more employees.8   
With its rather peripheral location Finland's foreign owned companies tend 
to be owned by Nordic firms. Anglo-Saxon and European ownership is 
equally likely, however, although not as likely as Nordic ownership.  
The largest share of foreign owned companies in Norway is under European 
ownership.   
This brief analysis suggests two findings: Although the institutional and 
local conditions in the Nordic countries vary, internationalization in the 
shape of foreign ownership is a ubiquitous phenomenon.  
The sketchy analysis above reveals some variation in the degree of foreign 
ownership. The analysis also suggests that the location of the country 
matters in terms of attractiveness for investment. Proximity and cultural 
similarity seems to play a role on the companies’ selection. Iceland being 
closest to the US shows the highest rate of US American ownership. 
 
8 ITPS statistics on foreign owned firms in Sweden 2001 showed at 34.1% of  the enterprises were 
controlled by Nordic firms. In our CIS-sample the corresponding share was 36.0%. The percentage of 
Anglo-Saxon firms was 24.5% on the official statistics and 27.4% in the CIS sample.  For the European 
and other ITPS reported a share of 41.3% compared with 36.6% in the Swedish CIS sample. 
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Finland, being furthest from the centre of Europe and being close to all the 
other Nordic countries shows a high Nordic ownership rate among the 
foreign owned companies. So does Norway. Denmark with its location 
between the centre of Europe and the Nordic countries reveals a fairly even 
distribution between Nordic and European owned companies.  
Sectoral distribution 
Table 5.2 
Sectoral distribution with ownership categories in percent 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR 
Manuf. 49.0 61.8 37.3 53.2 75.4 63.5 38.5 50.0 37.0 53.7 69.1 44.1 55.3 85.5 65.8 
    HI M 6.9 7.0 4.8 7.9 12.9 9.4 6.8 0.0 10.0 4.8 18.4 8.3 10.3 17.0 10.3 
    HM M 28.8 51.6 39.7 27.4 55.7 46.9 3.4 100 30.0 13.9 42.1 32.8 28.9 43.4 38.9 
    LM M 27.8 20.7 31.4 37.6 18.6 15.4 20.0 0.0 30.0 29.3 7.9 28.1 34.4 24.6 28.9 
    LO M 36.5 20.7 24.1 27.1 12.9 28.2 69.9 0.0 30.0 52.0 31.6 30.8 26.4 15.1 21.9 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Services 51.0 38.3 62.8 46.8 24.7 36.4 61.5 50.0 62.9 46.3 30.9 55.9 44.6 14.5 34.2 
    KIS 35.1 66.6 34.2 47.9 82.6 35.7 58.4 0.0 64.7 41.8 58.8 44.6 50.9 66.9 43.6 
    OS 64.9 33.4 65.8 52.1 17.4 64.3 41.6 100 35.3 58.2 41.2 55.4 49.1 33.1 56.4 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 5.2 displays the sectoral distribution of the companies based on their 
ownership and their multinationality. For all countries we observe that 
domestic multinationals are more concentrated in manufacturing sectors 
than in service sectors.  
In Finland more than 75% of all domestic multinationals in the sample are 
in manufacturing sectors. In Sweden this share is larger than 85%.  
Apart from this pattern, we also find a common pattern across the Nordic 
countries, if we investigate the distribution of companies within the 
manufacturing sectors. Domestic multinationals are more concentrated on 
high technology sectors (including medium high technologies) than they are 
in low technology sectors.  
Within the service sectors multinationality seems to be a phenomenon being 
more concentrated among knowledge intensive services.  
Although we observe a common pattern as regards the distribution of the 
domestically owned multinational firms, the pattern for the foreign owned 
firms is less clear across the Nordic countries. What stands out is, that 
foreign owned firms are less concentrated in manufacturing than the 
domestic multinationals are. A common pattern can also be found in the 
 
 
 
 
distribution of foreign owned firms across the manufacturing sector. Across 
all Nordic countries foreign ownership in manufacturing is most 
concentrated in the medium high technology sectors. In the service sectors, 
however, with the exception of Iceland, the foreign owned companies are 
most concentrated in the sectors not classified as knowledge intensive.  
In the manufacturing sector the domestically owned (uninational) 
companies are mostly concentrated in the low technology manufacturing 
sectors or the medium low technology manufacturing sectors.  
Size of the companies 
Table 5.3  
Firm size 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR 
Size 
Mean 
292 1975 210 316 1835 180 75 181 81 150 406 222 276 1277 348 
Size 
Median 
62 600 83 85 407 89 36 181 29 61 133 82 50 355 105 
Sales      
Log 
9.9 11.2 10.0 9.4 11.3 9.7 8.8 10.1 5.1 11.4 12.4 11.8 11.4 13.2 12.2 
Note: Sales is reported in logs. Norwegian sales are in 1,000 Norwegian Kroner, all others are 1,000 euros.  
 
As reported in Table 5.3 we observe differences in the average size and the 
median size9 of the companies across the Nordic countries. The mean of the 
size is larger than its median. This suggests that a small number of very 
large companies influence the mean. Hence, the median gives a more robust 
picture of the sample.  
Although we observe a large difference in the size of the companies across 
the countries, a common picture emerges for all Nordic countries, except 
Iceland, domestic multinational companies are larger than the foreign 
owned companies, which are in turn larger than the domestically owned 
uninational companies. In Iceland the foreign owned companies are smaller 
than the domestically owned uninationals. 
 
                                                 
9 The median gives the size where 50% of the companies in the sample are larger and 50% of the 
companies are smaller.  
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Market focus 
Table 5.4  
Firms' most significant market 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR 
Local 21.1 10.6 12.6 25.4 1.1 3.8 55.1 50.0 40.7 39.4 5.5 28.3 27.4 6.5 8.9 
Nation 43.4 31.9 52.9 47.9 21.5 53.3 24.4 00.0 18.5 40.4 23.6 47.0 42.3 24.2 41.5 
Global 35.5 57.5 34.5 26.6 77.4 42.9 20.5 50.0 40.7 20.2 70.9 24.7 30.3 69.4 49.6 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
When investigating what firms reported as their most important market 
(Table 5.4) we find expected as well as unexpected similarities. The 
companies, which we classified as domestic multinationals, are least 
focused on domestic markets. More than 50% of them – in the case of 
Finland, Norway and Sweden close to 70% or more – state that their most 
important markets are international markets. 
 
The orientation of the foreign owned companies towards the domestic 
markets is surprisingly high. More than half of the foreign owned 
companies in all Nordic countries report that their most important market is 
domestic. In Norway this fraction is even larger than three quarters. In 
Denmark and in Norway foreign owned companies focus on domestic 
markets as intensively as domestic uninational firms do. In Finland, Iceland 
and Sweden we observe that foreign ownership goes along with a more 
global market focus. Compared to domestic uninational companies foreign 
owned ones are less focused on domestic markets.  
The rather high fraction of foreign owned companies focusing on domestic 
markets suggests that a large fraction of foreign investment in the Nordic 
countries is at least partially motivated by an asset exploiting strategy.  
A strategy of foreign investment is asset exploiting, if assets such as 
knowledge, brands, and business models are created elsewhere and 
exploited in the host country. On the contrary a strategy may be called asset 
seeking if valuable resources including knowledge are sought for in the host 
country. A clear distinction between both strategies is of course impossible. 
However, the strong focus of foreign owned companies on the domestic 
market suggests that the owner, at least partially, follows the asset 
exploiting strategy. This does not exclude, however, that simultaneously an 
asset seeking strategy may be present.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5  
5.12 Innovative firms  
Sample distribution. Firm size and share of innovative firms. 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 Obs Inno Obs Inno Obs Inno Obs Inno Obs Inno 
DOM 621 55.7 % 634 62.5 % 80 50.0 % 1 642 49.6 % 814 54.8 % 
FOR 223 56.1 % 184 64.7 % 27 59.2 % 685 44.7 % 383 64.8 % 
 
In the previous sections we focused on all companies in the data sets. As the 
data sets contain some pieces of information only for companies that have 
carried out innovation activities, in the following we focus on companies 
that have carried out innovation activities in the year 1998 to 2000. In total 
55 percent of the domestic firms were classified as innovative, and 65 
percent of the firms with foreign owners. Se Table 5.5 
Innovation activity  
Table 5.6 
 Innovation activity 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR 
Inno. 
expen. 
79.2 91.5 69.6 96.7 98.9 97.5 97.4 100.0 100.
0 
93.7 98.2 89.9 95.3 96.7 95.5 
Inno. sales 87.3 97.9 91.2 73.6 94.6 83.2 100.
0 
100.0 100.
0 
82.1 90.9 80.1 57.6 85.4 71.3 
Product 
inno. 
84.9 97.9 91.2 75.2 94.6 84.9 92.1 100.0 87.5 83.7 92.7 80.1 60.1 91.9 73.7 
Process 
inno. 
69.6 85.1 60.8 49.2 77.4 49.6 68.4 100.0 68.8 68.1 72.7 63.4 48.4 61.2 50.8 
Cont. R&D 21.4 59.6 27.2 61.4 95.7 71.4 52.6 100.0 68.8 33.3 70.9 42.5 48.4 85.4 61.2 
Note: Table gives the share of firms in percent where the respective innovation activities can be observed. 
 
In Table 5.6 we depict the fraction of innovation active companies that have 
reported certain types of innovation related characteristics. The first row 
gives the percentage of companies reporting positive innovation 
expenditure.  
The definition of innovation expenditure goes beyond R&D expenditure. 
Amongst others, it also contains expenditure for ordered research and 
development, for the acquisition of innovation related machinery, for market 
introduction of new products and for training.  
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The most striking, yet not unexpected, feature is that domestic 
multinationals have the largest share of innovation active companies 
reporting positive innovation expenditure.10
The second row in Table 5.6 gives the percentage of firms with positive 
sales generated by new or significantly modified products. Except for the 
Icelandic firms – where the figures may be distorted due to the small 
number of observations – the Danish firms show the highest fraction of 
companies with innovative sales. Swedish firms reveal the lowest share of 
companies with positive sales from new or significantly modified products. 
This observation coincides with the fraction of product innovators reported 
in row three of the table. Also the fraction of process innovation follows the 
same pattern. In a way the high fraction of product and process innovators 
in Denmark is surprising as the fraction of firms continuously carrying out 
R&D activities is the lowest across the board as depicted in row five of 
Table 5.6.  
Whereas we observe a higher fraction of product innovators among the 
foreign owned firms than among the domestic uninational firms in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, we see no difference in Iceland and 
Norway. Across all Nordic countries domestic uninational companies do not 
perform differently a compared to the foreign owned firms when process 
innovation is considered.  
A common pattern across the Nordic countries emerges for the persistence 
of carrying out innovation activities. Domestic multi-national companies 
have the highest fraction of companies continuously carrying out innovation 
activities. Foreign owned firms lag behind. However, the share of foreign 
owned firms is larger than the share of domestic uninationals. Foreign 
owned companies are more involved in continuous R&D.  
Cooperation on innovation 
Table 5.7  
Domestic external cooperation for innovation  
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
 DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR 
Collab. 29.4 89.4 29.6 59.1 98.9 65.8 63.2 50.0 68.8 41.2 85.5 36.6 32.8 93.5 45.5 
Vertical 24.8 70.2 24.0 46.5 91.4 53.8 42.1 50.0 43.8 27.2 65.5 28.1 23.4 82.2 34.6 
Horizontal 6.4 12.8 3.2 11.9 34.4 9.2 21.1 0.0 0.0 4.7 7.3 5.6 5.9 20.9 4.8 
Scientific 15.7 59.6 16.0 41.9 95.7 49.6 29.0 50.0 38.0 18.3 65.5 22.5 17.9 69.3 29.9 
 
                                                 
10 On the average the Danish fraction of companies with positive innovation expenditure seems rather low 
both in absolute terms and compared to the other Nordic countries. As the Danish date revealed that 
Danish firms are quite reluctant to report sales figures in the innovation survey, we suspect that the low 
figures here are also due to the high share of missing values in the data.  
 
 
 
 
Analysing the companies' propensity to collaborate with domestic partners 
reveals their embeddedness in the local and national innovation system.  
Table 5.7summarizes the percentage of innovative companies, which 
collaborate with domestic partners. The first row reports the share of 
companies collaborating with a domestic partner disregarding the type of 
partner.  
Domestic multi-national firms tend to collaborate more frequently with 
domestic partners than any other type of company. The qualification of the 
Icelandic results applies here due to the small number of observations. In 
Finland, Iceland and Sweden foreign owned companies collaborate with 
domestic partners more frequently than their domestic counterparts. In 
Denmark we do not observe a difference. In Norway, however, foreign 
owned firms collaborate less frequently with domestic partners than 
domestic uninational firms do. 
Innovation collaboration with domestic vertical partners such as suppliers 
and customers is most frequent in the domestic multi-national firms. Only in 
Finland and Sweden foreign owned companies exhibit a stronger propensity 
to collaborate vertically than their domestic counterparts. We do not observe 
this in Denmark, Iceland and Norway.  
Horizontal collaboration for innovation involves competitors as 
collaboration partners. Among the different types of collaboration 
summarized in Table 4-6 horizontal collaboration is the least frequent one. 
As in all other collaboration types the propensity of domestic multi-national 
companies to collaborate is the strongest, although there appears to be a 
strong difference across countries in the frequency of collaborative 
innovation activities with competitors.  
Scientific innovation collaboration that involves universities and research 
institutes indicates the embeddedness in and the utilization of the scientific 
environment. Domestic multinational firms reveal a higher frequency of 
collaboration than all other types of firms. In Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden foreign owned companies tend to collaborate more frequently with 
domestic universities and research institutes than domestic uninational 
companies do.  
However, it should be mentioned that the sheer size of the company could 
account for the finding. The larger a company the more likely it is to carry 
out innovation activities in collaboration with any particular partner.  
Even considering the above caveat we can summarize the findings here:  
Domestic multinationals do not only maintain production and/or R&D 
facilities abroad they are also more locally embedded than the domestic 
uninational firms. They show a higher propensity to collaborate for 
innovation with any type of domestic collaboration partner, regardless of 
whether the partners are from industry or from science.  
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Foreign owned firms in the Nordic countries do not differ significantly from 
domestically owned companies. When they do, they show a somewhat 
deeper embeddedness than domestically owned firms.  
Table 5.8 shows the utilization of knowledge for innovation from other 
enterprises within the group. For each country we find that the domestic 
multinationals is the category of companies that use the network within the 
group most extensively. Companies being owned by national groups utilize 
this particular source of innovation the least. For each country we observe 
that foreign owned companies more often draw information and inspiration 
from companies within the group. Although we have no precise information 
about the nationality of the companies that are being used as an information 
source, we may however conjecture that it is the multinationality of the 
companies' network that drives the sourcing process.  
Table 5.8  
Utilization of knowledge for innovation from other enterprises within the group  
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR DU DM FOR 
26.1 54.3 40.4 19.1 49.4 28.6 18.8 0 35.7    44.2 75.8 64.9 
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
This section summarizes the findings of the regression analysis. Although 
we found some indication for differential innovation behaviour between 
domestically owned companies and foreign owned companies and their sub 
groups in particular, an analysis is required that controls for firm specific 
characteristics.  
When everything else is equal – such as firm size, industrial sector, physical 
capital investment, human capital, R&D investment, process innovation and 
product innovation – we get quite different results compared to the 
descriptive statistics.  
The detailed results of the regressions can be found in the country specific 
studies in part II of this report. 
Due to a limited number of observations in the Icelandic survey the foreign-
owned firms are not separated on five different groups of ownership. For the 
other four Nordic countries estimates are reported for domestic enterprises, 
domestic multinationals (DM), Nordic multinationals (NM), Anglo-Saxon 
multinationals (ASM) and European and other multinational (EOS) 
enterprises. Domestic uninational firms (UN) are the control group when 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are considered. In the case of 
Iceland we have domestic multinationals and uninational firms as reference. 
 
 
 
 
Ownership and innovation 
The first issue we are investigating is whether foreign ownership influences 
the likelihood of carrying out innovation (see Table 5.8).  
The simple descriptive statistics indicate that a lager share of foreign-owned 
firms are innovative compared to domestic firms in Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland and Sweden, but not in Norway. 
The adjusted results show two different patterns within the Nordic area: In 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden foreign ownership has no influence 
on the likelihood of a company to be innovation active. In Norway, 
however, foreign owned companies are less likely to be innovation active 
compared to domestically owned firms 
 
Table 5.8 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of engagement in innovation activities 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
DOM Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
FOR -0.104 -0.115 0.066 -0.238*** 0.049 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
 
In the following equation we only consider subsamples with innovative 
firms.  
Starting with hypothesis 2, Table 5.9 presents the estimated association 
between investment in innovation activities per employee, and its 
determinants.  
When looking at the importance of corporate ownership we find that in 
Finland and Sweden domestic multinationals invest significantly more in 
R&D and other innovation expenditures. At the 5% level of significance no 
differences can be established between foreign controlled firms and 
domestic uninational firms.  
In Norway domestic and Anglo-Saxon firms are superior in terms of 
innovation input. The Icelandic regression reveals no difference between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms. Denmark is the outlier in this analysis. 
The table shows that domestic multinational invest significantly less than 
other firms, ceteris paribus. There is weak evidence (10% level of 
significance) that Anglo-Saxon firms invest more than the firms in the 
control group, and that Nordic firms invest less.  
Public R&D subsidies and ownership 
Equation 3 depicts the relationship between public R&D subsidies and 
ownership. Unambiguously it is found that governments in the Finland, 
Norway and Sweden have a bias in the R&D subsidy policy towards 
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domestic multinationals. Notable is that the estimated association is 
negative and significant for Nordic firms and European and other firms in 
Finland, and negative and significant at the highest acceptable level of 
significance for Nordic multinationals in Norway. 
Table 5.9 
Hypothesis 2: Log innovation investment expenditures per employee 
Hypothesis 3: The probability of receiving public R&D subsidies 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
UN Reference Reference - - Reference Reference 
DM -0.08***  0.35  0.51***  0.53*** - -  0.61***  0.38** 0.69***  0.55***
NM -0.32* -0.47  0.23 -0.21** - - -0.31** -0.33* -0.02 -0.12 
ASM  0.33* -0.34  0.47  0.07 - -  0.53*** -0.30 0.10  0.03 
EOM  0.01  0.30  0.44* -0.54*** - -  0.25 -0.12 0.14 -0.23 
DOM - - Reference - - 
FOR - - - -  0.45  0.05 - - - - 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
 
Collaboration within the national innovation system 
Equations 4-7 in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 consider collaboration on innovation 
with partners within national innovation systems. Some main conclusion 
can be drawn.  
First, equation 4, an aggregate of vertical, horizontal and scientific systems 
shows that domestic multinationals in the Nordic countries are more 
integrated in the national innovation systems than other firms. Deviating, 
however, is Finland where firms controlled by the Nordic neighbours are as 
embedded as Finnish multinationals. In Iceland no differences between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms can be found. In Iceland we find no 
difference between domestic and foreign-owned firms.  
The result for the subset embeddedness in vertical innovation system is 
identical with the overall estimates for NIS. See equation 5. Domestic 
multinationals are significantly more integrated in vertical collaboration on 
innovation than other firms. In Finland this conclusion is valid only of we 
add Nordic multinationals to Finnish multinationals.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.10 
Hypothesis 4: Embeddedness in the national innovation systems 
Hypothesis 5: Embeddedness in the vertical innovation system 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 
UN Reference Reference - Reference Reference 
DM  1.43***  0.67***  1.52***  1.02***    0.93***  0.76***  1.33***  1.24***
NM  0.28  0.03  0.56***  0.55***   -0.21* -0.01  0.16  0.23 
ASM -0.20 -0.07  0.02  0.07    0.16  0.22  0.21  0.28 
EOM -0.22 -0.16 -0.05  0.10   -0.03 0.18*  0.24  0.32 
DOM - - Reference - - 
FOR - - - - 0.09 -0.32- - - - - 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
 
In Finland and Sweden we find that domestic multinationals have a 
significant larger propensity to conduct horizontal cooperation on 
innovation with firms within the same industry than with other firms. In 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway no difference can be found between the five 
groups of firms. See equation 6.  
Equation 7 shows that the domestic multinationals play a dominant role in 
the scientific innovation system in Denmark, Finland and Norway. This in 
contrast to Sweden where foreign-owned firms with Anglo-Saxon or other 
owners show the same likelihood to participate in common research projects 
with universities and public R&D labs as Swedish multinationals. In Iceland 
domestic and foreign-owned firms have the same propensity to be involved 
in the scientific innovation system 
Table 5.11 
Hypothesis 6: Embeddedness in the horizontal innovation systems 
Hypothesis 7: Embeddedness in the scientific innovation system 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 
UN Reference Reference - Reference Reference 
DM -0.22  0.53**  0.61***  1.50***    0.26  0.90***  0.53**  0.90***
NM -0.19  0.22 -0.25  0.22    0.03 -0.01 -0.24 0.23 
ASM ??  0.32  0.15  0.38    0.17 0.14 -0.04 0.38***
EOM -0.07 -0.51  0.07  0.34    0.12 0.17  0.01* 0.42**
DOM - - Reference - - 
FOR - - - - -  0.09- - - - - 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
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In Table 5.12 the analysis of hypothesis 8, is presented. It shows that the 
group the company is part of is more important as a source of information 
for innovation among multinationals compared to uninational firms.  
In Norway and Sweden all four categories of multinational firms are relying 
significantly more on knowledge from the corporate group than uninational 
firms. In Denmark this finding is relevant for domestic, Nordic and Anglo-
Saxon multinationals. In the case of Finland, however, only Finnish and 
Nordic multinationals exploit group knowledge more than uninational firms. 
 
Table 5.12 
Hypothesis 8: Source of knowledge for innovation from enterprises within the group. 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 8  8  8  8  8  
UN Reference Reference - Reference Reference 
DM 0.78***  0.72***    0.76***   0.61***  
NM 0.50**  0.38**    0.54***   0.28**  
ASM 0.52***  0.33    0.81***   0.31**  
EOM 0.32  0.21    0.33**   0.53***  
DOM - - Reference - - 
FOR - - - - 0.064  - - - - 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
Patents 
A large variation in the propensity to patent between different groups of 
firms can be found in the Nordic countries. See the analysis of hypothesis 9 
in Table 5.13.  
In both Denmark and Norway Nordic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon firms 
have a significantly lager likelihood to apply for patents than domestic 
uninational and multinational firms, and European and other foreign owned 
firms. In Finland domestic multinationals have a higher propensity to apply 
for patent than other firms. In Sweden domestic multinationals and Anglo-
Saxon firms have lager patent intensity than other firms. 
Radical innovations 
The most interesting finding from the estimation on radical innovation,11 
presented in Table 5.13 (hypothesis 10) is that no systematic differences 
between can be established in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.  
Only in Norway one group of foreign owned firms, namely the firms owned 
by Anglo-Saxon mother companies, have a significant lager propensity to 
                                                 
11 Radical innovations are new to the market and not only to the firm. 
 
 
 
 
launch radical innovation than other firms. In Denmark no difference in this 
respect can be found between Domestic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon 
enterprises. In Finland, domestic multinationals and Nordic multinationals 
have the same propensity to introduce innovations new to the market. 
Finally, in Sweden domestic multinationals and European and other firms 
are distinguished from other firms by a larger propensity to launch radical 
innovations. 
Table 5.13 
Hypothesis 9: Patenting 
Hypothesis 10: Radical innovations (Products new to the market). 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 10 9 10 
UN Reference Reference - Reference Reference 
DM  0.18  1.41***  0.90***  0.41***    0.36*  0.34*  0.62***  0.78***
NM  0.82***  0.09  0.10  0.37***    0.32** -0.15  0.07  0.22 
ASM  0.61***  0.87**  0.16  0.08    0.71*** 0.16  0.36***  0.26 
EOM  0.43  0.04  0.17 -0.12    0.45*** 0.07  0.49***  0.34***
DOM - - Reference - - 
FOR - - - - -0.26 0.01 - - - - 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
Innovation sales 
The ultimate goal with almost all innovation activities is to make profit. 
Innovation sales is a gross measure on the return on innovation investment 
(hypothesis 11), increasingly exploited in innovation studies based on 
Community Innovation Survey data.  
In Table 5.14 we present two alternative measures to investigate the 
relationship between innovation sales and corporate ownership, a two-step 
selection model (a) and a multistep production function model (b).  
The summary results are mixed between the Nordic countries. In Finland 
domestic multinationals have a higher gross return on innovation 
investments compare to other firms. In Sweden domestic multinationals and 
Nordic multinationals have significantly higher innovation sales than 
uninational firms, Anglo-Saxon firms and European and other firm. In 
Denmark, however, it is found that foreign-owned firms (Anglo-Saxon) 
outperform domestic firms in innovation productivity. Regarding Norway 
and Iceland we find no difference between the five groups if firms. 
Using a two-equation selection model it is found that Anglo Saxon firms 
have significantly higher innovation sales per employee, everything else 
equal, in Sweden. Anglo-Saxon firm and Nordic multinationals are superior 
to other firms in Denmark. Anglo-Saxon firms and domestic multinationals 
have the highest innovation sales in Finland. All three groups of foreign 
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multinational firms have higher innovation sales than domestic firm in 
Norway. For Iceland no difference between domestic and foreign-owned 
firms can be established.  
When a more sophisticated multistep knowledge production function model 
was exploited the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon companies was reduced in 
Denmark and Finland, while it diminished totally in Norway and Sweden. 
Considering both models the robust results are quite mixed. Anglo-Saxon 
firms have the highest level of innovation productivity in Denmark. In 
Finland domestic multinationals reveals higher innovation sales per 
employee than other firms. In Sweden Nordic multinationals are superior to 
other firms. For Iceland and Norway no robust difference can be 
established.  
Table 5.14 
Hypothesis 11a: Log innovation sales per employee (Selection equation) 
Hypothesis 11b: Log innovation sales per employee (Multistep model) 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 11a 11b 11a 11b 11a 11b 11a 11b 11a 11b 
UN Reference Reference - Reference Reference 
DM  0.33  0.29  0.53**  0.50**    0.19 -0.47  0.92***  0.52*
NM  0.58**  0.28  0.39  0.30    0.54**  0.49  0.61***  0.59***
ASM  1.10***  0.68**  0.68**  0.55*    0.49***  -0.48  0.59**  0.36 
EOM 0.38  0.19  0.54*  0.24*    0.63*** - 0.02  0.48**  0.31 
DOM      
FOR - - - - -0.01 -0.26- - - - - 
Notes:   *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
Productivity 
Previously research suggests that foreign-owned firms generally have higher 
productivity than domestic firms. In the case of Norway our study confirms 
this finding. But more interesting, when looking at the five Nordic countries 
as a group, the general conclusion is that no difference in productivity 
between foreign and domestic firms can be found.  
In Table 5.13 the estimates are presented for both the selection model (a) 
and the multistep production function model (b). The significant estimates 
for foreign-owned firms in the Finnish and the Swedish samples produced 
by the selection model disappear when the multistep model is used. Only in 
Norway the estimated influence on productivity from foreign-owned firms 
is robust in both models. 
A possible explanation to our divergent results is the extensive set of firm 
characteristics and the exploitation of econometric methods appropriate for 
the peculiarities in the data set. A complementary explanation is out method 
of distinguishing between uninational domestic firms and multinational 
 
 
 
 
domestic firms. Is should, however, be noticed, that we find some indication 
(at the 5% level of significance in Norway, at the 10% level in Finland, and 
just outside the 10% level in Denmark) that Nordic multinationals are more 
productive than other firms in these three Nordic countries. 
Table 5.13 
Hypothesis 12a: Log value added per employee (Selection equation) 
Hypothesis 12b: Log value added per employee (Multistep model) 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Equat 12a 12b 12a 12b 12a 12b 12a 12b 12a 12b 
UN Reference Reference - Reference Reference 
DM -0.09 -0.07  0.13 -0.08     0.06 -0.06  0.02 -0.10 
NM  0.50  0.48  0.14  0.17*    0.37***  0.20**  0.10  0.01 
ASM  0.55  0.21  0.31**  0.12    0.21* 0.07  0.26**  0.16 
EOM  0.47  0.27  0.16 0.11    0.23** 0.09  -0.06 -0.05 
DOM      
FOR - - - - -0.11- 0.32- - - - - 
 
6. Concluding discussion 
This study investigates whether foreign takeovers imply benefits for the five 
Nordic countries in terms of transmission of technological knowledge and 
economic performance at the firm level. These questions are important 
because a recent debate has focused on the importance of domestic owners, 
the localization of headquarters, cross-border moves of jobs, externalities 
and the roles of various key actors in national innovation systems. 
The theoretical literature suggests some alternative and complementary 
hypotheses why firms invest in R&D activities abroad. One bears upon the 
opportunities to exploit technological activities created within home the 
country, the second concerns the exploitation of technological advantages of 
the host country and the third emphasizes the increasing complexity and 
specialization of technology. 
Recent empirical findings on the importance of foreign-owned firms 
indicate that they generally have higher productivity and pay higher wages 
than local firms, but no robust evidence has been found on knowledge 
spillover from foreign-owned firms to domestic firms or whether foreign 
takeovers imply a net contribution for the general growth rate or level of 
employment in the host country. 
Some main candidates for explaining differences in productivity between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms are that foreign companies focus their 
investment on firms with superior technology or productivity, sectors with 
high productivity, the positive effects of mergers and acquisitions per se, or 
efficiency due to scale production, specialization or global coordination. 
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There are several methodological difficulties in assessing the importance of 
foreign-owned firms in the context of gain or drain of productive resources.  
One is that we don’t know what would have happened with the acquired 
firms had they not been takeover. For comparison analysis commonly 
domestic firms are used as control group. However, only if we can assume 
that they really are representative of what would have happened to the 
acquired firms had they not been taken over, are we comparing comparable 
groups. Otherwise we need to use different statistical techniques in order to 
increase the comparability between domestically owned and foreign-owned 
firms. Moreover, the difficulties to properly capture and measure knowledge 
spillovers, is perhaps even more challenged than the issue of reliable control 
groups. 
This study contributes to the assessment studies of foreign-owned firms in 
several respects.  
First, the analysis is one of the first attempts ever to use original data from 
the international harmonized Community Innovation Survey for a cross-
country study comparing innovation behaviour in foreign and domestic 
firms at the firm level.  
Second, applying an identical econometric approach of data sets of identical 
nature in five different countries with a large degree of cultural homogeneity 
increases the possibility of identifying systematic and robust patterns.  
Third, the analyses are based on an extensive set of data from approximately 
5 300 Nordic firms and they constitute about half the population of 
manufacturing and service firms in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden 
with 10 or more employees. In Norway data are based on a compulsory 
survey meaning that almost all existing firms are covered by the study.  
Finally, the present study explores the issue of corporate ownership in three 
dimensions. Basically, domestic and foreign-owned firms are compared. A 
distinction is then made between (i) firms owned by other Nordic 
companies, (ii) firms with Anglo-Saxon owners, (iii) other firms which 
mostly have owners from other European countries and (iv) domestic 
multinationals (firms with foreign affiliates) and domestic uninational (firms 
belonging to a group with only domestic affiliates). 
When not controlling for any firm specific or industry specific differences, 
the initial descriptive statistics show a robust pattern on superiority of 
foreign owned firms for all five Nordic countries.  
The foreign owned firms in the Nordic countries are distinguished by having 
(i) larger proportion of innovative firms, (ii) higher R&D intensity, (iii) 
higher level of innovation sales per employee, (iv) larger proportion of firms 
applying for patents, (v) larger proportion of firms possessing patents, (vi) 
larger proportion of firms conduction R&D on regular basis,  (vii) larger 
export intensity, (viii) stronger focus on global markets, (ix) more human 
capital in terms of well educated people as a share of total employment,  (x) 
 
 
 
 
higher level of labor productivity, (xi) stronger dependence on sources of 
knowledge for innovation from other enterprises within the group. 
The findings on embeddedness in national innovation systems are more 
mixed. In Denmark, Finland and Norway, the domestic-owned firms are 
more integrated than foreign-owned firms in the national innovation system. 
The integration is measured as the share of the firms that collaborate with 
host-country partners on innovation activities.  
Three parts of the national innovation system are considered: The scientific 
system, vertical partners in the value chain and horizontal partners in the 
value chain. Within Iceland and Sweden a lager proportion of foreign-
owned firms are integrated in the innovation system than domestic firms. 
Within Iceland and Sweden a larger percentage of the foreign-owned firms 
is found to collaborate on innovation with domestic (host-country) partners, 
compared to other firms. 
In the regression part of the analysis the heterogeneity within the observed 
five samples was taken into account. The study was divided into two parts: a 
possible gap in engagement in innovation and technological activities 
between foreign and domestic firms, and a possible gap in the results of 
economic activities.  
The concluding finding from the first part was that no systematic differences 
in the propensity to be innovative could be found. However, among the 
innovative firms, multinationals invest more than other firms. Here we 
controlled for sector, firm size, market orientation (local, national or global), 
innovation orientation (product or process), the firms’ R&D-history, 
probability of receiving governmental R&D and R&D support.  
The business literature, and various branches of economic literature stress 
the importance of embeddedness in the local network of suppliers, 
competitors, customers research institutes, government agencies, for the 
development, dynamics and competitiveness of individual firms.  
In the study we utilize several indicators in an attempt to capture the extent 
of embeddedness (and possible knowledge spillovers) in the domestic 
national innovation system. The evidence on collaboration with actors in the 
national innovation system, whatever measure, is close to unanimous on the 
higher degree of embeddedness of domestic multinational firms. Not 
surprisingly domestic multinational firms have a larger propensity of 
receiving public R&D support than other firms. However, more research 
needs to be conducted to find the underlying mechanism leading to the large 
differences in funding between firms. 
When the results of engagement in innovation activities are considered, for 
the Nordic area altogether, we cannot find that the foreign-owned firms 
engage systematically differently in innovation than their domestic 
uninational counterparts. Note that the ceteris paribus assumption means 
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that we control for differences in size, sector, persistence in RD 
engagement, public R&D support etc.  
Considering the innovation output in terms of the firms' propensity to 
patent, we find quite strong evidence that Anglo-Saxon owned firms tend to 
patent more than domestically owned firms. The evidence for all other 
groups of companies is mixed.  
In terms of radical innovations, domestic multinationals outperform the 
domestic uninationals. In Denmark and Sweden also the Anglo-Saxon 
owned companies tend to market radical innovations more frequently. The 
analysis of the returns to innovation shows a quite strong superiority of 
foreign owned firms.  
In Norway and Denmark they even outperform the domestic multinationals. 
The result of the impact of foreign ownership on the labor productivity 
depends somewhat on the methodology employed. We find that domestic 
multinationals do not exhibit a higher labour productivity than the domestic 
uninationals do. By and large foreign owned firms seem to have a higher 
labour productivity, everything else equal.  
Improving the integration of foreign multinational firms in the domestic 
national innovation systems, and eliminating the bias in R&D support 
towards domestic-owned firms seems to promise two things: (i) a larger 
absorption of ideas with origin outside the own country, and (ii) increase in 
the rate of the return to innovation efforts 
Give and take 
We see that the foreign owned firms do not invest more in RD than the 
domestically owned uninational firms do. However, by and large foreign 
owned firms yield higher returns to innovation. Also foreign owned firms 
make more use of the group internal knowledge sources.  
The combination of these findings gives rise to the specific advantage 
hypothesis: Multinational firms possess specific assets that can be 
transferred within the firm at no or low cost. In the study utilization of the 
specific assets is proxied by group-internal knowledge sources. These are 
important for the innovation performance and productivity performance of 
the firm. 
Also the fact that we do not find superior innovation performance of the 
domestic multinationals points in this direction – firms specific assets can 
not be thought of flowing from the subsidiaries to the headquarter, we rather 
imagine they flow from the headquarter to the subsidiaries. So the Nordic 
owned foreign owned firms show a superior performance, although their 
mother companies - the domestic multinationals in the Nordic countries - do 
not.  
We observe that foreign owned companies do not collaborate less frequently 
with domestic partners than domestic uninational firms. This can suggest 
 
 
 
 
two different lines of reasoning. First, if collaboration for innovation is part 
of the routinized innovation behaviour of firms it is not very likely to 
change after companies changed the ownership from domestic to foreign.  
The second line of reasoning builds on the assumption that collaboration is 
in fact subject to optimization considerations. We see that foreign owned 
firms do utilize other firms in the corporate group more often than domestic 
uninational firms do. Yet, they do not show a lower rate of collaboration 
with domestic partners. Domestic collaboration partners seem to offer 
knowledge, which does by and large not lead to substitution out of domestic 
knowledge sources. This finding would lend some support for the asset-
seeking hypothesis of internationalization of corporate activity.  
The last finding, however, does by no means suggest that foreign ownership 
is bad, because local assets are sought and exploited. Looking at the 
previous finding we would argue rather for the contrary. Firm specific assets 
are supplied to the foreign owned firms, where they certainly spill over into 
the immediate environment. Our analysis here suggests that foreign 
ownership leads to a situation of give and take rather than to a situation of 
being exploited. It seems that the utilization of the incoming knowledge and 
the capabilities depends on a vivid exchange with the foreign owned firm. 
Collaboration seems to be the crucial determinant.  
Our final remark concerns only a comparison between domestic and foreign 
multinational firms. Based on the literature we would a priori expect that 
the foreign-owned firms would outperform domestic firms in terms of 
productivity and that no robust evidence could be found on knowledge 
spillover from foreign-owned firms to domestic firms. 
The main finding is that domestic multinational firms are distinct from 
Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and European and other groups of corporate owners 
when R&D investments and embeddedness in scientific, vertical and 
horizontal innovation systems are considered.  However, the advantage of 
higher R&D intensity and possible technological knowledge spillover does 
not translate into superior innovation output or productivity performance.  
We do not find any systematic significant difference in productivity 
between foreign and domestically owned firms in the study. The finding is 
with the conclusions of a majority of previous empirical studies.  
Possible explanations for our divergent results are:  
(i) the extensive set of firm characteristics and the exploitation of 
econometric methods appropriate for the peculiarities in the data set 
is better able to help us select comparable firms   
(ii) our research methodology with a production function model captures 
the relations between the decision to invest and R&D-investments, 
between R&D investments and innovation output, and between 
innovation output and productivity,  
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(iii) our method highlights differences between uninational domestic 
firms and multinational domestic firms, and between different 
categories of foreign owned firms  
(iv) our inclusion of small firms in the analysis (the lower limit is 10 
employees) adds a dimension that better reflects the economy as a 
whole, and  
(v) the cross-sectional nature of our data may mask variations in firm 
behaviour over time. 
Our results support the findings by Pavitt and Patel (1999), Patel and Vega 
1999 and Le Bas and Sierra (2001) suggesting that domestic multinationals 
are using the home country for developing technological capacity exploited 
in affiliates abroad. Correspondingly, the innovation and productivity 
performance in foreign-owned multinationals are partly returns on activities 
created in their home countries. 
 
 

  
 
 
Part II: Analysis for All Nordic countries 
 
 
 
7. Denmark 
This section reports the basic analysis of the Danish CIS data. The Danish 
Community Innovation Survey is conducted by Analyseinstitut for 
Forskning in Århus. The third wave of the CIS, which this analysis bases 
on, is launched in 2001 and refers to the years 1998 to 2000. The survey was 
sent to 5,133 firms, which yielded a response rate of 31% (Analyseinstitut 
for Forskning 2003) 
7.1 Descriptive statistics for all firms 
The descriptive statistics in this section includes all firms in the sample 
regardless of their carrying out innovative activities.  
Table 7.1  
Sample distribution  
 Observations 
Total 
Innovative 
firms1
Percent 
 Total observations 844 471   55.81 
DU:  Domestic uninational 574 299   52.09 
DM:  Domestic multinationals   47   47 100.00 
NM:  Nordic multinationals   83   46   55.42 
ASM:  Anglo-Saxon multinationals   51   30   58.82 
EOM:  European multinationals and other multinat.   89   49   55.06 
DOM:  Domestically owned firms 621 346   55.72 
FOR:  Foreign ownership 223 125   56.05 
Note: This table reports only about firm that are a part of a corporate group. Innovative firms are firms reporting 
a product and/or process innovation and/or report ongoing innovation activities. The innovators share of 100% of 
the domestic multinationals is due to the construction of the domestic multinational indicator. 
 
Table 7.1 shows composition of the data. The Danish data consists of 844 
observations 26% of which are foreign owned firms. The proportion of 
innovative firms is almost identical for domestic and foreign owned firms. 
Table 7.2 shows summary statistics of firm characteristics and behavior for 
all five national groups and the foreign owned and domestically owned 
groups.  
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Table 7.2  
Firm characteristics and innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Size 292 1975 187 297 182 419 210 
Sales     9.89   11.24     9.96     9.87   10.06   10.02     9.98 
Labour prod.     5.18     4.97     5.33     5.03     5.38     5.16     5.27 
Exports     1.03     1.77     1.51     1.97     1.54     1.09     1.63 
Investment     0.57     0.72     0.78     0.81     0.77     0.58     0.78 
Innov. input     0.59     1.76     0.56     0.84     0.46     0.68     0.58 
Innov. output     1.05     2.98     1.52     2.11     1.43     1.20     1.62 
Human. cap.     0.08     0.12     0.11     0.19     0.14     0.09     0.14 
Note: The table reports the averages of innovation activities and firm characteristics. Size is measured by 
employment. Sales, labor productivity, exports and investments in tangible goods are given in logs. Innovation 
input is the log of innovation expenditure per employee. Innovation output is the log of sales from new or 
significantly modified products per employee. The share of highly educated employees approximates human 
capital.  
 
The average Danish firm is about twice as large as the average foreign 
owned firm. (See Table 7.2).  This is mainly explained by the Danish 
multinational firms which have about 2000 employees in average, compared 
to 200-300 for the other categories of firm.  
Even among the foreign owned firms we detect some striking differences 
and similarities. Anglo-Saxon owned firms are identical to non-
multinational Danish firms. Nordic owned and European owned firms are 
strikingly smaller, though. On the average they employ more than 100 
people less than the Anglo-Saxon owned firms.  
The descriptive statistics shows that sales per capita is about the same for 
domestic and foreign owned firms. The aggregate figures in the right part of 
the table show that foreign owned firms have a slightly larger productivity, 
higher exports and slightly higher gross investments, than Danish owned 
firms.  
Looking at innovation input and innovation output we find that Danish 
multinational firms are separated from other firms by a considerable lager 
degree of innovativeness. Foreign owned firms and in particular Anglo-
Saxon firms are more human capital intensive when compared to the 
average Danish firm.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3  
Sectoral distribution with ownership categories 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
HI M     3.3     4.3     3.6     2.0     0.0     3.4     1.8 
HM M   14.1   31.9   16.9   13.7   13.5   15.5   14.8 
LM M   13.6   12.8   10.8   9.8   13.5   13.5   11.7 
LO M   17.9   12.8     7.2   15.7     6.7   17.5     9.0 
KIS   17.9   25.5   21.7   25.5   19.1   18.5   21.5 
OS   33.1   12.8   39.8   33.3   47.2   31.6   41.3 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: The figures are in percentage. The sectors are defined along the lines of the OECD classification of 
knowledge intensity: high technology manufacturing (HI M), high medium technology manufacturing (HM M), 
low medium technology manufacturing (LM M), low technology manufacturing (LO M), knowledge intensive 
services (KIS) and other services (OS). See Hatzichronoglou (1997). 
 
Table 7.3 summarizes the sectoral distribution in the Danish economy. The 
most striking pattern is the high concentration in the service sector when 
Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and European and other multinational firms are 
considered. For all three categories of ownership six in 10 firms are in the 
service sector. Also the uninational Danish firms have their largest 
concentration in services, together with low technology manufacturing. On 
the contrary the domestic multinational firms have their largest 
concentration in high medium technology followed by knowledge intensive 
services. 
Table 7.4  
Firms' most significant market 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Local   21.0   10.6   19.3     7.8     9.0   20.3   12.6 
National   43.4   31.9   50.6   37.2   64.0   42.5   52.9 
Global   35.5   57.4   30.1   54.9   27.0   37.2   34.5 
 100 100. 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: The table reports the share of firms in percentages.  
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics for the innovative firms 
This section discusses the characteristics and the behaviour of innovative 
firms in Denmark. Innovativeness here relates more to carrying out 
innovation related activities rather than being successful in introducing new 
processes or new products. It gives a more detailed picture of the firms' 
innovative strategies and the related activities. 
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Table 7.5  
Innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Innovation expenditure 72.9 91.5 71.7 76.7 63.3 75.4 69.6 
Innovation sales 87.3 97.9 82.6 100.0 93.9 88.7 91.2 
Product innovation 84.9 97.9 82.6 100.0 93.9 86.7 91.2 
Process innovation 69.6 85.1 60.9 66.7 57.1 71.7 60.8 
Continuous R&D 21.4 59.6 15.2 46.7 26.5 26.6 27.2 
Public Funding for R&D 27.7 45.7 9.3 21.4 12.8 31.0 13.6 
Note: Table gives the share of firms in percent where the respective innovation activities can be observed. 
 
The indicators depicted in Table 7.5 revels no salient differences in 
innovativeness between the average domestic and the average foreign firm 
in Denmark. Somewhat higher shares of the Danish firms are process 
innovators and a slightly higher percentage of the foreign-owned firms are 
product innovators.  
It is notable that the largest share of firms conducting continuous R&D can 
be found in the Danish and Anglo-Saxon owned firms. The difference 
compared to other firms is considerable. About three in 10 Danish firm 
received public R&D subsidies compared to a little more than one in 10 
foreign owned firms. As could be expected the largest share of R&D 
subsided firms can be observed within the Danish Multinational firms 
(46%). 
Table 7.6  
Methods of protection  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Patent (Valid) 18.4 40.4 26.1 40.0 30.6 21.4 31.2 
Patent (Application ) 13.7 44.7 30.4 36.7 22.4 17.9 28.8 
Design patterns 17.6 29.7 18.4 32.1 23.7 19.6 24.0 
Trademarks 49.2 59.5 31.6 67.9 52.6 50.9 49.0 
Copyright 12.8 29.7 10.5 46.4 21.1 15.6 24.0 
Secrecy 34.2 70.3 34.2 42.9 52.6 40.2 43.3 
Complexity of design 19.3 40.5 31.6 35.7 31.6 22.8 32.7 
Lead-time advantage 46.5 64.9 50.0 57.1 63.2 49.6 56.7 
Note: The table gives the share of firms indicating the use of the respective methods of protection. 
Danish and Anglo-Saxon multinational companies are more likely to utilize 
all the eight different methods of protection listed in Table 6-6 than other 
firms. No large differences are found between Danish uninational firms, 
Nordic and European and other multinational firms. In aggregate figures the 
 
 
 
 
right part of Table 7.6 shows that foreign-owned firms are more likely to 
possess valid patents, design patterns and copyright, and apply for patents. 
In addition, the share of foreign-owned firms reporting complexity of design 
and lead-time advantage is also larger among foreign owned firms. 
Table 7.7 
 Innovation Input and Innovation Output  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Input        
Mean 8.6 14.1 8.5 13.5 5.9 9.4 8.8 
St.dev 21.3 24.9 20.3 28.0 15.5 21.9 21.0 
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100 100 89.1 100 82.7 100 100 
Output        
Mean 24.8 27.0 27.2 31.8 20.1 25.2 25.7 
St.dev 27.0 25.8 29.6 20.0 18.8 26.8 24.0 
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100 100 100 80.0 75.0 100 100 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the innovation expenditure (input) as a fraction of sales and the fraction of 
turnover generated by new or significantly modified products (output). All values are percentages. For the 219 observations 
with missing sales it is projected for this table using the sectoral mean labour productivity. 
 
Table 7.7 reports the summary statistics of the innovation input and the 
innovation output. Innovation input is measured by the innovation 
expenditure relative to sales. The innovation output is measured by the share 
of sales generated by new and significantly modified products.  
As mentioned in the note to the table the sales for 219 observations had to 
be imputed as they are missing in the original data. The innovation output 
also seems particularly high when compare to for instance the innovation 
output of Finland (see Section 7) and Sweden (see Section 11). One could 
suspect that companies intentionally overestimated the innovation output or 
that companies with no or low innovation return choose not to report the 
share of sales generated by new or significantly modified products. What we 
can deduce from the summary, though, is that Anglo-Saxon owned 
companies are most similar to Danish multinationals. The European owned 
companies are most similar to the Danish owned uninational companies.  
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Table 7.8 
Cooperation on innovation 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
  DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the group  D 13.4 42.6 17.4 0.0 4.1 17.3 8.0 
 G 0.0 100.0 32.6 43.3 20.4 13.6 30.4 
Suppliers  D 17.1 59.6 21.7 23.3 14.3 22.8 19.2 
 G 11.4 44.7 21.7 23.3 16.3 15.9 20.0 
Customers D 17.7 57.4 17.4 16.7 16.3 23.1 16.8 
 G 10.4 51.1 17.4 20.0 8.2 15.9 14.4 
Competitors D 6.4 12.8 4.3 0.0 4.1 7.2 3.2 
 G 6.0 19.1 6.5 6.7 0.0 7.8 4.0 
Consultancies D 13.7 57.4 15.2 20.0 10.2 19.7 14.4 
 G 5.0 38.3 15.2 13.3 6.1 9.5 11.2 
Priv. R&D Labs D 9.7 36.2 8.7 3.3 2.0 13.3 4.8 
 G 6.7 31.9 6.5 16.7 2.0 10.1 7.2 
Universities D 11.7 57.4 10.9 23.3 8.2 17.9 12.8 
 G 6.0 48.9 10.9 20.0 2.0 11.8 9.6 
Public R&D Org. D 12.0 38.3 8.7 20.0 4.1 15.6 9.6 
 G 3.7 19.1 4.3 3.3 2.0 5.8 3.2 
Domestic          
- collaboration  29.43 89.36 34.78 33.33 22.45 37.57 29.60 
- vertical coll.  24.75 70.21 23.91 30.00 20.41 30.92 24.00 
- horizontal coll    6.35 12.77 4.35   0.00   4.08   7.23   3.20 
- scientific coll.   15.72 59.57 15.22 30.00 8.16 21.68 16.00 
Note: This table gives the fraction of companies reporting collaborative innovation efforts with the respective 
partners. D denotes domestic partners and G denotes international partners. The diversity index is the number of 
partners currently used relative to the number of potential partners. For the diversity index the table reports the 
means. 
 
The upper part of Table7.8 shows that the evidence is unanimous as regards 
a complex and intensive cooperation network on innovation of Danish 
multinational firms in both domestic and global dimension. Only a minor 
difference in the pattern of domestic (in Denmark) cooperation on 
innovation between uninational firms and foreign owned firms is observed. 
In aggregate terms a somewhat larger share of the Danish firms are 
cooperating for innovation with vertical, horizontal and scientific partners 
within the Danish innovation system than foreign owned firms do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.9  
Sources of information for innovation.  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the firm 54.7 71.7 58.5 60.7 55.0 57.8 57.8 
Within the group 26.1 54.3 39.0 42.9 40.0 31.3 40.4 
Suppliers 28.6 21.7 22.0 10.7 22.5 27.3 19.3 
Customers 50.7 60.9 53.7 46.4 47.5 52.6 49.5 
Competitors 19.2 26.1 22.0 10.7 22.5 20.5 19.3 
Universities 8.4 17.4 4.9 3.6 7.5 10.0 5.5 
Government 3.4 4.3 0.0 3.6 2.5 3.6 1.8 
Prof conferences 10.8 32.6 14.6 7.1 2.5 14.9 8.3 
Fairs, exhibitions 8.4 23.9 22.0 3.6 5.0 11.2 11.0 
Note: The table report the fraction of companies reporting a high or medium importance of the information sources 
for their innovation activities. . 
 
The general pattern depicted above is confirmed by the descriptive statistics 
given in Table 7.9. A closer association with a broad network collaboration 
partner characterizes the Danish multinational firms.  
This broader approach translates into a broader utilization of knowledge 
sources for the innovation process. In particular differences are observed 
between Danish multinational firms and other firms when scientific 
knowledge (universities and professional conferences) are considered as 
well as and sources of knowledge within the group and within the firm. 
Comparing foreign-owned firms and domestically owned firms we find that 
their own firms and customers are the most importance sources of 
knowledge for both categories. The percentage of firms reporting this is 
nearly the same for both categories of firms. Notable is the low share of 
Nordic owned firms (5%) and Anglo-Saxon firms (4%) which regard to 
Danish Universities as an important source of information for innovation. 
7.3 Regression results 
This section reports the results of the multivariate analysis. 
7.3.1 Selection models  
As discussed in Section 4, we first estimate the effect of foreign ownership 
and the effects of different underlying governance styles by means of 
sample selection models, which allow us to distinguish the decision to be 
innovation active, i.e. to carry out innovation activity at all, from the 
decision about the level and the characteristic of the innovation activities. 
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Table 7.10 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models (selection equation) 
 Innovation  
activities 
Equation (0) 
Foreign ownership -0.104   
Size 0.164 *** 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.174   
Global markets 0.274 ** 
Labor productivity 0.050 ** 
Recently established -0.182   
Recently merged 0.462 ** 
Human capital 0.984 *** 
 Investment 0.046   
Constant -1.013 *** 
Note: This table reports the results of the selection equation for innovation activities when estimating 
equation (1) and (0) simultaneously. *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level 
 
Innovation decisions 
The selection equation12 reported in Table 7.10 estimates how the 
innovation decision depends on exogenously given firm characteristics and 
firm behaviour. The most interesting result here is that neither foreign nor 
domestic ownership influence on the decision to innovate.  
However, we see that innovators command a higher endowment of human 
capital and that investment in intangible capital is associated with tangible 
investments.  On the average, recent events in the firm history such as 
mergers or establishment affect the decision to be innovation active as well 
as the profit of the firm, approximated by labour productivity. In addition, 
and not surprisingly companies focusing on global markets are more likely 
to carry out innovation activities than companies focusing on local and 
national markets. Confirming evidence from the literature we find that the 
propensity to be an innovative firm is an increasing function of firm size. 
                                                 
12 We exemplarily report the selection equation of the selection model regressing the innovation input 
(hypothesis 1). The findings here hold for the selection equations in all other regression models testing 
hypothesis 2 to hypothesis 10.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7.11 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models 
Dependent 
variable 
Innovation input 
per worker 
Domestic 
collaboration 
Domestic 
vertical 
collaboration 
Domestic 
horizontal  
collaboration  
Utilization of 
domestic 
science system
Est. method HR HP HP HP HP 
DU  
Reference 
-0.077 *** 1.433 *** 0.668 *** -0.220   0.535 ** DM 
(0.009)  (0.322)  (0.228)  (0.282)  (0.258)  
-0.322 * 0.282   0.032   -0.193   0.220   NM 
(0.189)  (0.224)  (0.225)  (0.335)  (0.284)  
0.336 * -0.196   -0.066   -  0.321   ASM 
(0.176)  (0.299)  (0.277)  -  (0.333)  
EOM 0.011   -0.217   -0.163   -0.070   -0.515   
 (0.174)  (0.245)  (0.236)  (0.311)  (0.367)  
Innov. input -  0.084   0.009   -0.067   0.148 ** 
Size 0.056   0.267 *** 0.192 *** 0.153   0.347 *** 
Local markets Reference 
Reg. markets 0.237   -0.242   -0.215   -0.256   -0.124   
Glob. markets 0.478 ** -0.122   -0.111   -0.060   0.009   
Product orient. 0.315 *** 0.229   0.444 ** 0.282   0.658 *** 
Process orient. 0.165   0.211   0.091   0.141   0.048   
Contin. R&D  0.415 *** 0.643 *** 0.381 * 0.225   0.566 *** 
Public Funding 0.396 *** 0.912 *** 0.480 * 0.993 ** 0.979 *** 
Constant -1.534  -2.270  -1.811  -2.398  -3.703  
Wald test 124.9 *** 95.9 *** 70.2 *** 19.8  125.9 *** 
LR test 0.1  0.2 0.58  1.52  0.1 
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err are reported only for the nationality dummies). *** (**, *) 
Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic 
multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EUM= European and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies 
included in the regression, not reported here. The results of the selection equation are not reported here. The Wald 
statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not 
significantly different from 0, heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and 
a probit model for selection variable. 
Innovation behaviour 
Tables 7.11 and 7.12 report the result from the second step of the selection 
model.  Step one gives the determinants to innovation and step two 
estimates determinants to innovation indicators, innovation input, 
innovation output and productivity for innovative firms. Our main interest is 
to compare the five categories of firms: uninational Danish firms, 
multinational Danish firms, foreign owned firms by Nordic firms, Anglo-
Saxon firms and European and other firms. Uninational Danish firms are 
used as a reference. In addition nine control variables are used in the 
regressions. 
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Starting with (log) innovation input per worker, depicted in Table 6-11 
column 1, we find that the point estimate for Danish multinational firms is 
highly significant and quite unexpected as the sign of the estimate is 
negative with an order of magnitude of -0.07. The reference group is 
uninational Danish firms. Ceteris paribus, or everything else being equal, 
the innovation intensity is larger in Danish firms with no subsidiaries abroad 
than in multinational Danish firms.   
The sign on the point estimate is negative also for Nordic firms and the size 
of the estimate is -0.32, however only significant at the 10% level. The 
estimated association between the size of innovation input per employee and 
Anglo-Saxon firms, is positive, albeit only weakly significant. The 
estimated innovation input is not significantly different between European 
multinationals and uninational Danish firms. In addition we find that 
innovation input per employee is an increasing function of global market 
orientation and product orientation. Firms investing in R&D continuously 
have on the average higher R&D expenditures than firms only focusing on 
R&D periodically. Public R&D is positively associated with private R&D 
expenditures.  
In columns 2-5 four different classifications of collaborating on innovation 
are considered. We see that domestic collaboration in total, as well as 
domestic vertical collaboration and collaboration with the domestic 
scientific system is significantly more frequent among Danish multinational 
firms compare to other firms. 
Columns 6-7 present estimates on determinants to the probability to apply 
for patent and to launch radical innovations respectively. With domestic 
own firms as reference we find highly significant and positive estimates for 
Nordic firms and a positive albeit on weakly significant estimate for Anglo-
Saxon firms. Norwegian and Anglo-Saxon firms have significant lager 
likelihood of introducing radical innovation in the market than other firms. 
Column 8 gives the point estimate for innovation sales per capita. Using this 
monetary measure on innovation output it is shown that Danish 
multinational firms are significant more efficient in retrieving earnings (or 
more precisely sales income) from innovation than all other categories of 
firms with the exception of Anglo-Saxon multinationals. 
In column 9 we observe the determinants to labour productivity. Here we 
find no difference between the five groups of firms. Finally column 10 
presents the estimates for determinants to the probability to receive public 
funding for R&D. The most interesting finding here is that likelihood of 
receiving public funding is about the same for domestic and foreign-owned 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.12 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models (continued) 
Dependent 
variable 
Patent 
application 
Products new 
to the market 
Returns to 
innovation per 
worker 
Labor 
productivity 
Public funding 
Est. method HP HP HR HR HP 
 
Reference 
DU 
0.181   1.411 *** 0.331   -0.085   0.349   DM 
(0.263)  (0.448)  (0.301)  (0.304)  (0.224)  
0.818 *** 0.090   0.575 ** 0.499   -0.470   NM 
(0.252)  (0.179)  (0.287)  (0.320)  (0.295)  
0.606 * 0.866 ** 1.101 *** 0.552   -0.343   ASM 
(0.313)  (0.344)  (0.349)  (0.370)  (0.301)  
EOM 0.427   0.044   0.378   0.465   -0.506 * 
 (0.261)  (0.181)  (0.284)  (0.312)  (0.277  
Innov. input. 0.049   0.085 ** 0.141 ** -0.006     
Size 0.203 *** 0.118 *** 0.146 ** 0.132   (0.056   
Local markets Reference 
Reg. markets 0.165   0.025   -0.012   -0.342   0.144   
Glob. markets 0.150   -0.003   0.054   -0.084   0.389   
Product orient. 0.400   0.726 *** 0.931 *** 0.158   0.148   
Process orient. 0.394   0.210   0.485   0.131   0.364   
Contin. R&D  0.854 *** -0.056   0.353   0.198   0.824 *** 
Public Funding 0.685 *** -0.199   -0.085   0.185     
Const -3.186  0.000  1.449 *** 5.316 *** -1.836  
Wald test 72.8 *** 133.1 *** 118.4 *** 102.6 *** 62.0 *** 
LR test 0.1  22.5 *** 10.2 *** 29.5 *** 0.3  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err. are reported only for the nationality dummies) *** (**,*) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms; DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic 
multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies 
included in the regression, not reported here. The results of the selection equation are not reported here. The Wald 
statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not 
significantly different from 0, heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and 
a probit model for selection variable. 
 
7.32 Multi step production function model 
The purpose of using the multistep production model is to investigate the 
robustness of some of the results presented above by exploiting an 
econometric framework taking both selectivity bias and simultaneous bias 
into account. The results are presented in Tables 7.13 and 7.14
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Step 1. Selection equation: Dependent variable: Probability of being 
engaged in innovation 
As could be expected the probability of being innovative increases with firm 
size and with the share of employment with a university degree. See the 
upper part of Table 7.13. Contrary to the selection model used for the 10 
Heckman equations presented above we now don’t find that firms focused 
on global market have a larger propensity of being than other firms. 
Step 2. Innovation input equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation 
expenditure per employee. 
In the investigation of the importance of ownership the uninational Danish 
firms are used as a reference. The estimates given in the lower part of Table 
7.13, produce only weak evidence of Anglo-Saxon firms investing more in 
innovation expenditures than other firms, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the 
regression results show that innovation expenditures are an increasing 
function of global market orientation, public R&D funding and a continual 
R&D engagement.  
Step 3. Innovation output equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation sales 
per employee. 
The coefficient estimates presented in upper part of Table 7.14 indicate a 
positive relationship between innovation and sales, however the estimate is 
not significant at any acceptable degree of significance. Moreover, we find a 
positive feedback effect from labour productivity to innovation sales. In 
accordance with the findings from our selection above (Table 7.12) we find 
that the Anglo-Saxon firms have a significant larger innovation sales per 
employee compare to other firms. 
Step 4: Productivity equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm sale per employee. 
The results from the productivity equation are presented in the lower part of 
Table 7.14. The most interesting finding here is that is we still do not find 
any difference in labour productivity between domestic and foreign-owned 
firms when not only accounting for possible selection bias but also 
simultaneity bias.  
Hence, when controlling for sector, size, capital investment, human capital, 
product innovation and process innovation, neither of Nordic, Anglo-Saxon 
or European multinationals are on the average more productive than Danish 
firms. As could be expected, the results show that productivity is an 
increasing function of investment in tangible capital. Some evidence is also 
given that productivity is an increasing function of innovation output, 
however the estimated impact is not significant different from zero. On the 
contrary, the productivity amongst firm in Denmark is found to increase 
with firm size, which is at variance with most other studies using the CDM 
model.
 
 
 
 
Table 7.13 
 Multi step production function model 
Step 1: Selection equation 
Dependent variable: The probability to be an innovative firm 
 Coefficient  Std.err. 
Foreign ownership -0.078  0.094 
Size 0.183 *** 0.031 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.214 ** 0.126 
Global markets 0.276 * 0.126 
Recently established -0.093  0.137 
Recently merged 0.157  0.114 
Human capital 0.243 ** 0.114 
Investment per employee (log) 0.034  0.024 
Constant -0.906 *** 0.204 
Step 2:  Innovation input equation  
Dependent variable: Log innovation expenditures per employee 
DU Reference 
DM 0.089  0.158 
NM -0.203  0.207 
ASM 0.352 * 0.211 
EOM -0.091  0.195 
Size 0.068  0.054 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.155  0.213 
Global markets 0.418 ** 0.233 
Public funding for R&D  0.259 ** 0.116 
Process innovation -0.097  0.085 
Continuous R&D  0.513 *** 0.126 
Constant 1.245 *** 0.376 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here.  
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Table 7.14 
 Multi step production function model (continued) 
Step 3: Innovation Output equation 
Dependent variable: The log of innovation sales per capita 
 Coefficient  Std. error 
Predicted labour productivity 0.436 ** 0.194 
Predicted innovation input 0.276  0.310 
DU Reference 
DM 0.290  0.227 
NM 0.286  0.320 
ASM 0.673 ** 0.342 
EOM 0.192  0.252 
Size -0.034  0.126 
Inverted Mills’ ratio from the selection. eq. -0.707  1.393 
Public funding for R&D  -0.222  0.217 
Collaboration diversity 0.667  0.418 
Human capital 0.485  0.536 
Constant 0.881  1.736 
Step 4: Productivity equation  
Dependent variable: Log sales per employee  
Predicted innovation output 0.404  0.385 
Physical Investment per employee (log) 0.360 *** 0.109 
DU Reference 
DM -0.07  0.318 
NM 0.484  0.302 
ASM 0.209  0.476 
EOM 0.266  0.276 
Process innovation -0.072  0.168 
Size 0.352 *** 0.117 
Human capital 1.199 * 0.626 
Constant 1.555 *** 0.406 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here. 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Finland 
This section reports the basic analysis of the Finnish CIS data. The Finnish 
Community Innovation Survey is conducted by Statistics Finland. The third 
wave of the CIS, which this analysis bases on, is launched in 2001 and 
refers to the years 1998 to 2000. The survey was sent to 3,462 firms, which 
yielded a response rate of 50% (Statistics Finland 2002). 
8.1 Descriptive statistics for all firms 
The descriptive statistics in this section includes all firms in the sample 
regardless of their carrying out innovative activities or not.  
Table 8.1contains the distribution of the companies across the country 
groups. We also report the number of innovators. As innovators we define 
companies, which exhibit innovation activities such as having introduced a 
product or process innovation or companies, which are still committed to 
ongoing R&D projects. Companies having abandoned an R&D project and 
are not currently undertaking innovation activities or have not launched a 
product or process innovation is not considered as innovators.  
In the Finnish context we observe that well beyond 60% of the companies 
are innovative. Domestic non-multinationals and European multinationals 
contain the below average fraction of innovative companies, whereas the 
Anglo-Saxon owned companies show the highest rate of innovators. The 
fraction of innovation active companies among the foreign owned 
companies does not differ from the share of innovative companies among 
the domestically owned companies.  
Table 8.1 
Sample distribution 
 Observations 
Total 
Innovative 
firms 
Percent 
 Total observations 818 515 63.0 
DU:  Domestic non multinationals 541 303 56.1 
DM:  Domestic multinationals 93 93 100.0 
NM:  Nordic multinationals 72 47 65.3 
ASM:  Anglo-Saxon multinationals 54 40 74.1 
EOM:  European multinationals and other multinat. 58 32 55.2 
DOM:  Domestically owned firms 634 396 62.5 
FOR:  Foreign ownership 184 119 64.7 
Note: This table reports only about firm, which are a part of a corporate group. Innovative firms are firms 
reporting a product and/or process innovation and/or report ongoing innovation activities. The innovators share 
of 100% of the domestic multinationals is due to the construction of the domestic multinational indicator.  
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Table 8.2 
Summary statistics of firm characteristics and innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Size 316.481 1835.043 165.458 218.519 162.138 539.235 179.984 
Sales 9.356 11.308 9.458 10.065 9.640 9.642 9.694 
Labour prod. 4.846 5.245 5.121 5.496 5.242 4.905 5.269 
Exports 2.270 4.061 3.059 3.976 2.945 2.532 3.292 
Investment 1.519 1.989 1.117 1.747 1.030 1.588 1.275 
Innov. input 0.471 1.762 0.582 1.487 0.818 0.661 0.922 
Innov. output 1.164 3.270 1.623 2.391 1.511 1.473 1.813 
Note: The table reports the averages of the innovation activities. All categories except the size are in logs.  
 
Table 8.2 shows summary statistics of firm characteristics and behavior for 
all five national groups and the foreign owned and domestically owned 
groups.  
The summary shows that on the average domestically owned multinational 
companies are larger than any of the other companies. This is not surprising 
as the foreign owned multinationals are subsidiaries.  
Most probably the surveyed domestic multinational companies are 
headquarters, although there is no indicator in the data whether the surveyed 
company is a subsidiary or is the headquarter of a group. A large fraction of 
headquarters in this group explains the size difference. Domestic 
multinationals do not only excel in terms of size they also excel in terms of 
innovation input and innovation output. In terms of investment and exports 
domestic multinationals are quite similar to Anglo-Saxon owned firms.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.3 
Sectoral distribution with ownership categories in percent 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
HI M     4.2     9.7     1.4   16.7     1.7     5.1     6.0 
HM M   14.6   42.0   22.2   33.3   36.2   18.6   29.8 
LM M   20.0   14.0     8.3   11.1   10.3   19.1     9.8 
LO M   14.4     9.7   20.8   16.7   15.5   13.7   17.9 
KIS   22.4   20.4   23.6     7.4     5.2   22.1   13.0 
OS   24.4     4.3   23.6   14.8   31.0   21.5   23.4 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: The sectors are defined along the lines of the OECD classification of knowledge intensity: high technology 
manufacturing (HI M), high medium technology manufacturing (HM M), low medium technology manufacturing 
(LM M), low technology manufacturing (LO M), knowledge intensive services (KIS) and other services (OS). See 
Hatzichronoglou (1997). 
 
Table 8.3 ssummarizes the distribution of the companies across the classes 
of knowledge intensive sectors as defined by Hatzichronoglou (1997) and 
OECD (2001). Anglo-Saxon ownership is mostly concentrated in high 
technology manufacturing and less concentrated on services. With exception 
to medium low technology manufacturing and high technology 
manufacturing Nordic multinationals are equally spread across the sectors. 
Domestic multinational companies are predominantly concentrated in the 
medium high technology manufacturing. Generally, we observe that foreign 
owned companies are more concentrated in the high medium technology 
manufacturing than domestically owned companies are.  
Table 8.4 
 Firms' most significant market 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Local   25.5     1.1     4.2     0.0     6.9   21.9     3.8 
National   47.9   21.5   63.9   44.4    48.3   44.0   53.3 
Global   26.6   77.4   31.9   55.6    44.8   34.1   42.9 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: The table reports the share of firms in percentages.  
 
In Table 8.4 we summarize what companies report as their most significant 
market. The most striking, yet not unexpected, difference between foreign 
owned and domestically owned companies is that the former concentrate 
less on local markets as compared to the latter. The highest percentage of 
companies concentrating on global markets can be found in the Finnish 
subsidiaries of Nordic multinationals. From what we observe here, it seems 
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that Anglo-Saxon owned multinationals concentrate on supplying the 
National markets, rather than local.  
The comparably low fraction of companies reporting the global market as 
their most significant one suggests that, if it comes to market access, Anglo-
Saxon multinationals serve national markets such as the Finnish, Russian 
and Swedish markets from with their Finnish subsidiary. Almost three out 
of four domestic multinationals report the national market to be their most 
significant one, including Finnish as well as Russian and Swedish markets. 
8.2 Descriptive statistics for the innovative firms 
The descriptive statistics in this section only focus on innovative as defined 
above. It gives a more detailed picture of the firm's innovative strategies and 
the related activities. Table 8.5 gives the percentage of firms where the 
given activity can be observed. Hence, it summarizes how pervasive the 
activity is among the innovative companies; it does not give and indication 
about the intensity of the innovation activity.  
Table 8.5 
 Innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Innovation expenditure 96.7 98.9 93.6 100.0 100.0 97.2 97.5 
Innovation sales 73.6 94.6 80.9 87.5 81.3 78.5 83.2 
Product innovation 75.2 94.6 83.0 90.0 81.3 79.8 84.9 
Process innovation 49.2 77.4 46.8 57.5 43.8 55.8 49.6 
Continuous R&D 61.4 95.7 53.2 87.5 78.1 69.4 71.4 
Public Funding for R&D 52.5 87.1 38.3 70.0 34.4 60.6 47.9 
Note: Table gives the share of firms in percent where the respective innovation activities can be observed. 
 
Not surprisingly, almost all innovative firms, in our case here more than 
97% report innovation expenditure. However, on the average only less than 
80% of the companies report positive sales from new or significantly 
modified products. The fraction of companies reporting the introduction of 
new or significantly modified products almost equals the fraction of 
companies reporting positive sales generated by those products. Domestic 
multinationals report the by far largest fraction of process innovations, 
which can probably be explained by larger size of the average company in 
this category. Domestic non-multinationals and foreign owned companies 
have approximately a similar propensity to launch process innovations. 
Only Anglo-Saxon owned companies stand out with an above average 
fraction of process innovations.  
The domestic multinationals stand out as regards the propensity to carry out 
continuous R&D. More than three quarters of the firms report continuous 
 
 
 
 
R&D. Only about one in two Nordic owned company report continuous 
R&D.  
We also observe that the propensity to receive public funding differs 
between the country groups. Domestic multinationals receiving public 
funding for R&D is a quite a ubiquitous phenomenon. So is the case for the 
Anglo-Saxon owned multinationals. Nordic and European owned firms 
reveal a far lower propensity to receive public funding, which is 
considerably lower than the propensity of domestic non-multinationals to 
receive such support.  
The sectoral composition of the foreign engagement and the existence of 
technology programs targeted at fostering certain sectors may explain some 
of the variation observed here. However, it cannot account for the large 
differences between Anglo-Saxon on the one side and European and Nordic 
owned companies on the other.  
Table 8.6 
 Methods of protection  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Patent (Valid) 34.0 71.0 53.2 65.0 40.6 42.7 53.8 
Patent (Application ) 27.7 72.0 34.0 50.0 31.3 38.1 38.7 
Design patterns 13.9 34.4 31.9 22.5 15.6 18.7 24.4 
Trademarks 27.1 67.7 55.3 42.5 31.3 36.6 44.5 
Copyright 12.5 31.2 23.4 20.0 15.6 16.9 20.2 
Secrecy 55.1 84.9 66.0 72.5 50.0 62.1 63.9 
Complexity of design 34.3 49.5 34.0 47.5 15.6 37.9 33.6 
Lead-time advantage 59.1 74.2 66.0 67.5 46.9 62.6 61.3 
Note: The table gives the share of firms indicating the use of the respective methods of protection. 
 
The CIS questionnaires also inquire about the firms' assessment of certain 
methods to protect inventions and innovations. Also firms are asked about 
whether they already hold valid patents and whether or not they have 
applied for patents in the years 1998 to 2000. Table 8.6 contains the 
percentage of firms giving positive answers to the respective questions in 
the questionnaire.  
Here is shown that domestic multinationals are more likely to possess valid 
patents and to apply for patents. It also shows that domestic multinationals 
are more likely to use either of the given protection mechanisms. Informal 
protection methods such as lead-time advantages and secrecy are most 
favored, whereas formal protection mechanisms are least favored. Among 
the formal protection methods patenting plays a leading role. These 
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preferences do not differ between domestically owned and foreign owned 
companies. Neither does it differ between the country groups.  
Table 8.7 
Innovation Input and Innovation Output  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Input        
Mean     6.1     9.1     3.0   10.0     8.5     6.8     6.9 
St.dev   14.9   15.7     5.8   21.1   16.7   15.2   15.6 
Min     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.2     0.1     0.0     0.0 
Max 100 100   35.6 100   75.3 100 100 
Output        
Mean   16.2   25.6   15.6   25.9   18.8   18.4   19.9 
St.dev   23.6   27.5   20.1   27.8   21.7   24.9   23.6 
Min     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0 
Max 100 100   80.0 100   80.0 100 100 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the innovation expenditure (input) as a fraction of sales and 
the fraction of turnover generated by new or significantly modified products (output). All values are percentages.  
 
Table 8.7 summarizes the innovation input and the innovation output of the 
innovating firms. On average domestic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon 
owned firms seem to show a similar pattern of innovation input and 
innovation output. Both invest about 10 percent of the sales in innovation 
and fraction of sales both realize from selling new or significantly modified 
products amounts to more than a quarter.  
Domestic non multi-nationals as well as Nordic and European owned 
companies on the average show a similar behaviour. Although the Nordic 
owned companies reveal the lowest innovation expenditure relative to sales. 
Again the different sectoral distribution of the companies in the different 
country groups may account for the differences observed in the innovation 
input and the innovation output.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.8 
 Cooperation on innovation 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
  DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the group  D 41.9 74.2 21.3 15.0 12.5 49.5 16.8 
 G   0.0 -1 48.9 57.5 53.1 23.5 52.9 
Suppliers  D 37.0 77.4 40.4 37.5 31.3 46.5 37.0 
 G 22.4 64.5 40.4 35.0 21.9 32.3 33.6 
Customers D 35.0 81.7 55.3 37.5 31.3 46.0 42.9 
 G 16.8 78.5 23.4 40.0 25.0 31.3 29.4 
Competitors D 11.9 34.4 6.4 12.5   9.4 17.2   9.2 
 G   7.3 19.4 10.6 12.5   9.4 10.1 10.9 
Consultancies D 26.4 53.8 23.4 30.0 21.9 32.8 25.2 
 G   8.3 24.7 17.0 17.5   9.4 12.1 15.1 
Priv. R&D Labs D 24.4 59.1 17.0 32.5 28.1 32.6 25.2 
 G   6.9 32.3   6.4 10.0 15.6 12.9 10.1 
Universities D 38.0 92.5 31.9 55.0 40.6 50.8 42.0 
 G   6.3 38.7 10.6 22.5   6.3 13.9 13.4 
Public R&D Org. D 25.4 64.5 23.4 32.5 21.9 34.6 26.1 
 G   5.6 35.5   4.3   7.5   9.4 12.6   6.7 
Domestic          
- collaboration  59.1 98.9 70.2 70.0 53.1 68.4 65.5 
- vertical coll.  46.5 91.4 59.6 55.0 43.8 57.1 53.8 
- horizontal coll  11.9 34.4   6.4 12.5   9.4 17.2   9.2 
- scientific coll.   41.9 95.7 38.3 65.0 46.9 54.5 49.6 
Note: This table gives the fraction of companies reporting collaborative innovation efforts with the respective 
partners. D denotes domestic partners and G denotes international partners. The diversity index is the number of 
partners currently used relative to the number of potential partners. For the diversity index the table reports the 
means. 1The way we defined domestic multinationals causes the global cooperation rate to be 100 percent.  
 
Table 8.8 displays the collaboration pattern for innovation broken down by 
the country groups and the internationality of the collaboration partner. 
Regardless of company ownership Finnish domestic universities are among 
the most important collaboration partners. Only Nordic owned companies 
use Finnish universities less than vertical collaboration partners such as 
domestic supplies and domestic customers.  
International collaboration within the corporate group is a major part of the 
innovation activities for all foreign owned companies. The diversity of the 
set of collaboration partners does not differ for the foreign owned 
companies and the domestic groups. However, domestically owned 
multinationals seem to maintain a broader network of collaboration for 
R&D than the other firms do.  
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Table 8.9 
Sources of information for innovation.  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the firm 50.5 68.8 44.7 62.5 53.1 54.8 52.9 
Within the group 19.1 49.5 29.8 30.0 25.0 26.3 28.6 
Suppliers 12.5 14.0 8.5 5.0 12.5 12.9 8.4 
Customers 28.1 44.1 19.1 27.5 18.8 31.8 21.8 
Competitors 4.0 3.2 4.3 12.5 6.3 3.8 7.6 
Universities 4.3 6.5 12.8 15.0 3.1 4.8 10.9 
Government 6.3 5.4 4.3 2.5 3.1 6.1 3.4 
Prof conferences 5.0 5.4 4.3 2.5 3.1 5.1 3.4 
Fairs, exhibitions 5.0 5.4 6.4 2.5 3.1 5.1 4.2 
Note: The table report the fraction of companies reporting a high or medium importance of the information sources 
for their innovation activities. . 
 
In Table 8.9 we report a summary of sources of information for carrying out 
an innovation project. We can imagine this as giving a clue about where the 
inspiration for the innovation comes from. For all companies regardless of 
their ownership the major source of innovation is the firm itself. 
Additionally, customers and firms within the group play a leading role. 
Unfortunately, the data does not contain information on the role of the 
inspiring firms within the group; are they intra-group customers, are they 
intra-group suppliers? 
8.3 Regression results 
This section reports the results of the multivariate analysis.  
8.31Selection models  
As discussed in section 4 we first estimate the effect of foreign ownership 
and the effects of different underlying governance styles by means of 
sample selection models, which allow us to distinguish the decision to be 
innovation active, i.e. to carry out innovation activity at all, from the 
decision about the level and the characteristic of the innovation activities.  
Innovation decision 
The selection equation13 reported in Table 8.10 estimates how the 
innovation decision depends on exogenously given firm characteristics and 
                                                 
13 We exemplarily report the selection equation of the selection model regressing the innovation input 
(hypothesis 1). The findings here hold for the selection equations in all other regression models testing 
hypothesi 2 to hypothesis 10.  
 
 
 
 
firm behaviour. The most striking result here is that for Finnish firms 
foreign ownership does not have an influence on the decision to innovate.  
However, we see that innovators are larger and more focused on National 
and global markets. They command a higher endowment with human 
capital, maintain larger investments and enjoy higher labor productivity. On 
the average, recent events in the firm history such as mergers or 
establishment do not affect the decision to be innovation active.  
Table 8.10 
 Innovation decision (selection equation) 
 Innovation  
activities 
Hypothesis 
Estimation method 
0 
HR 
Foreign ownership -0.115   
Size 0.223 *** 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 1.144 *** 
Global markets 0.789 *** 
Labor productivity 0.167 *** 
Recently established -0.004   
Recently merged -0.125   
Human capital 0.361 * 
Investment 0.096 *** 
Constant -0.115   
Note: This table reports the results of the selection equation for innovation activities regression using a Heckman 
selection model. *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level 
 
Innovation behaviour 
The results of the regression the innovation activities are reported in Table 
8.11 and Table 8.12.  
The domestic multinationals, the Anglo-Saxon and the European owned 
firms have a significantly higher innovation effort per employee than firms 
in domestic or Nordic groups.  
Domestic collaboration is more likely among domestic multinationals and 
Nordic multinationals than among all the other foreign owned companies.  
A similar pattern is observed for vertical domestic collaboration. However, 
it is only the domestic multinationals that collaborate significantly more 
frequently with competitors.  
Also, everything else being equal, domestic multinationals are more 
embedded in the national science system than all the other companies. Yet, 
interpreting the collaboration decision of a company as a decision about its 
embeddedness in the national innovation system, we observe from the 
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regressions that the market focus is a more significant determinant than the 
nationality of their ownership.  
The more remote from local markets the most important markets are 
located, the smaller the propensity to collaborate with domestic partners is. 
This holds true for domestic collaboration as such as well as for all the 
collaboration types we look at.  
The product innovation strategy has also a significant impact on  vertical 
and horizontal collaboration. This again strengthens the point that strategy 
rather than foreign ownership matters for the utilization of the domestic 
national innovation system. At this stage of the discussion we see that 
headquarters as well as strategy matters to determine the innovation activity 
of firms.  
Nordic and domestic multinationals tend to patent more frequently than 
other companies. The more intensive patenting behavior of the domestic 
multinationals can be explained by a headquarter effect.  
We also find that public funding induces patenting.  
The likelihood to innovate on a higher level depends more on market 
strategy and innovation strategy than it depends on the ownership. Only 
domestic multinationals produce high-level innovations more frequently 
than domestic groups. Multinationality seems to foster the development of 
market novelties.  
Although foreign ownership does not matter for the development of high-
level innovation it does have an effect on the returns of innovation; 
especially the Anglo-Saxon owned and the European owned companies 
perform significantly better than companies owned by domestic groups. 
Again, we find that Nordic owned companies do not differ from 
domestically owned ones. For domestically owned companies 
multinationality does matter.  
Astonishingly the return to innovation decreases the more remote the 
companies' markets are from local markets. Product innovation strategy, 
however, has a large positive effect on the innovation return.  
Measuring performance by productivity we find the Anglo-Saxon owned 
companies outperforming all the other companies. Innovation input has a 
positive effect on the performance of the companies.  
The receipt of public funding for R&D is more likely for domestic 
multinationals than for companies, which are part of a purely domestic 
group. On the average, with exception of the Anglo-Saxon owned 
companies, foreign owned companies have a smaller likelihood to receive 
public funding than their domestic Finnish counterparts.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.11  
Innovation activities, two equation selection models 
Dependent 
variable 
Innovation 
input per worker 
Domestic 
collaboration 
Domestic 
vertical 
collaboration 
Domestic 
horizontal  
collaboration  
Utilization of 
domestic 
science system 
Est. method HR HP HP HP HP 
DU  
Reference 
0.510 *** 1.521 *** 1.023 *** 0.608 *** 1.493 *** DM 
(0.178)  (0.401)  (0.207  (0.205)  (0.277)  
0.234   0.560 *** 0.551 *** -0.244   0.220   NM 
(0.212)  (0.188)  (0.177  (0.328)  (0.209)  
0.471 ** 0.023   0.067   0.148   0.382   ASM 
(0.235)  (0.220)  (0.202  (0.288)  (0.236)  
EOM 0.445 * -0.048   0.095   0.071   0.337   
 (0.254)  (0.216)  (0.214  (0.349)  (0.251)  
Innov. input 0.000  0.140 *** 0.066 * 0.106 * 0.200 *** 
Size -0.413 *** 0.146 *** 0.088 *** 0.094   0.188 ** 
Local markets Reference 
Reg. markets -0.131   -0.527 *** -0.434 *** -0.646 ** -0.547 ** 
Glob. markets -0.232   -0.614 *** -0.694 *** -0.861 ** -0.884 *** 
Product orient. 0.723 *** 0.220   0.400 * 0.567 ** -0.088   
Process orient. 1.247 *** -0.109   0.450   -0.512   -0.532   
Contin. R&D  1.046 *** 0.346 ** 0.163   0.287   0.487 *** 
Public Funding 0.623 *** 0.429 *** 0.122   0.252   0.805 *** 
Constant 2.082 *** -  -  -1.129  -0.775   
Wald test 259.3 *** 226.63 *** 90.69 *** 52.87 *** 80.70 *** 
LR test 12.7 *** 0.31  15.43 *** 1.55 *** 1.73  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err are reported only for the nationality dummies). *** (**, *) 
Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The estimation methods are indicated as HR (regression model 
with sample selection) and HP (probit model with sample selection). DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and 
other multinationals. The 6 sector dummies included in the regression are not reported here. The results of the 
selection equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests the correlation of 
the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 0, Heckman's model is equivalent to the 
combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit model for selection variable. 
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Table 8.12 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models (continued) 
Dependent 
variable 
Patent 
application 
Products new 
to the market 
Returns to 
innovation per 
worker 
Labor 
productivity 
Public funding 
Est. method HP HP HR HR HP 
DU 
 
 
Reference 
DM 0.412 ** 0.900 *** 0.534 ** 0.131   0.528 *** 
 (0.178)  (0.251)  (0.223)  (0.108)  (0.176)  
NM 0.367 * 0.100   0.391   0.140   -0.211 ** 
 (0.210)  (0.183)  (0.257)  (0.128)  (0.107)  
ASM 0.079   0.159   0.675 ** 0.314 ** 0.069   
 (0.222)  (0.203)  (0.282)  (0.142)  (0.197)  
EOM -0.115   0.172   0.538 * 0.155   -0.542 *** 
 (0.272)  (0.227)  (0.295)  (0.153)  (0.199)  
Innov. input. 0.243 *** -0.006   0.150 *** 0.146 ***   
Size 0.137   0.067   -0.199 *** -0.029   0.001   
Local markets Reference 
Nat.. markets 0.171   0.643 *** -0.643 ** -0.257 * -0.281 *** 
Glob. markets 0.322   0.718 *** -0.577 * -0.238   -0.123   
Product orient. 0.091   0.596 ** 1.368 *** -0.214   -0.228   
Process orient. 0.065   0.213   0.275   -0.152   0.811 *** 
Contin. R&D  0.384 ** 0.167   -0.132   -0.082   0.370 *** 
Public Funding 0.410 *** 0.332   -0.164   -0.142 *   
Const -1.908  -1.718  4.453 *** 6.040 *** 0.505  
Wald test 44.1 *** 116.4 *** 90.5 *** 112.1 *** 56.1 *** 
LR test 1.1  3.7 ** 24.5 *** 27.6 *** 6.2 ** 
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err. are reported only for the nationality dummies) *** (**, *) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The estimation methods are indicated as HR (regression model 
with sample selection) and HP (probit model with sample selection).DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and 
other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here. The results of the selection 
equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two 
equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 0, heckman's model is equivalent to the combination 
of a regression for the outcome and a probit model for selection variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.32 Multi step production function model 
Our main interest in the multistep is to investigate the importance of 
ownership of the firms with respect to innovation and economic 
performance in an econometric framework taking both selectivity bias an 
simultaneous bias into account and controlling for factors suggesting in the 
innovation literature such as firm size, physical capital, human capital and 
various market indicators. 
Step1: Selection equation. Dependent variable: Probability of being engaged in 
innovation 
As could be expected and in line with the innovation literature (See Cohen 
and Klepper 1996 and Klette and Kortum 2002) the probability of being 
innovative increases with firm size. Moreover, the firms’ market orientation 
is an important determinant to product innovations. A firm with a global or 
national market orientation has a significantly higher probability of 
introducing new innovations compared to firms acting mainly on the local 
market.  
Not surprisingly the likelihood of being innovative is an increasing function 
of the level of human capital. Investment in R&D and other intangible 
capital is also closely associated with investment in tangible capital. See the 
upper part of Table 8.13  
Step 2:Innovation input equation. Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation 
expenditure per employee. 
Whereas the likelihood of being innovative is an increasing function of firm 
size, the amount of innovation engagement among the firms in Finland, 
defined as innovation expenditures per employee, decreases with firm size. 
See the lower part of Table 8.13. This finding is also consistent with the 
results presented by Janz et al (2004) and Lööf and Heshmati (2004).  
Looking at the importance of ownership, it is shown that domestic Finnish 
multinational firms invest significantly more than other firms. The reference 
group is domestic uninational firms. The estimate for Anglo-Saxon firms is 
significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the results depicted in tab in Table 
8.13 shows that public funding for R&D and continuously R&D 
engagement is positively associated with the size of R&D investments. 
Step 3: Innovation output equation. Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation sales 
per employee. 
A priori we would expect that innovation output is an increasing function of 
R&D-investment. Table 8.14 shows that the size of this estimate is 0.22, 
however non-significant. On the contrary we find a strong and significant 
association between Finnish multinationals and innovation output. For the 
four other groups of firms this relationship is non-significant (uninational 
firms, Nordic firms and European and other firms) or only significant at the 
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10% level. Interestingly the composite variable for collaboration diversity is 
highly significant, indicating the importance of networking in the Finnish 
innovation system. Somewhat unexpected, it is shown that R&D funding 
has a weakly (10% level) negative effect in innovation output. The latter is 
at variance with the finding by Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2004) and Lööf 
and Heshmati (2004) but can be explained by the formulation of the model. 
The subsidy effect is already incorporated in the R&D variable, which was 
estimated in step 2. 
Step 4: Productivity equation. Dependent variable: Logarithm sale per employee. 
The results from the productivity equation, presented in the lower part of 
Table 8.14, show that innovation output, expressed as innovation sales per 
employee, is an important contributor to productivity after controlling for 
sector, size, capital investment, human capital, process innovation. The 
effect is significant at the 5% level. The size of the estimate is within the 
range of what previously has been found in the literature. A 10% increase in 
innovation output increases the level of productivity by about 2 percent.  
Interestingly we find almost a non-relationship between productivity and the 
5 different corporate ownership variables. The Nordic firms are an 
exception, however only at the 10% level of significance.  
The important conclusion here is that foreign-owned firms are not more or 
less productive than uninational firms. Finally, in the Finnish sample 
consisting of both manufacturing firms and services it is found that labor 
productivity is a increasing function of not only knowledge capital 
(innovation output) but also, human capital and physical capital 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.13 
Multi step production function model 
Step 1:  Selection equation 
Dependent variable: The probability to be an innovative firm 
 Coefficient  Std.err. 
Foreign ownership -0.077  0.118 
Size 0.216 *** 0.038 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.869 *** 0.140 
Global markets 1.184 *** 0.158 
Recently established 0.046  0.170 
Recently merged -0.094  0.141 
Human capital 0.460 ** 0.199 
Investment per employee (log) 0.149 *** 0.033 
Constant -1.970 *** 0.236 
Step 2:  Innovation input equation Dependent variable  
Log innovation expenditures per employee 
DU Reference 
DM 0.532 *** 0.183 
NM 0.208  0.215 
ASM 0.454 * 0.238 
EOM 0.399  0.257 
Size -0.427 *** 0.050 
Local markets Reference 
National markets -0.110  0.250 
Global markets -0.164  0.278 
Public funding for R&D  0.634 *** 0.132 
Process innovation 0.189  0.123 
Continuous R&D  1.134 *** 0.150 
Constant 2.107 *** 0.453 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here.  
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Table 8.14 
Multi step production function model (continued) 
Step 3:  Innovation Output equation 
Dependent variable: The log of innovation sales per capita 
 Coefficient  Std. error 
Predicted labour productivity 0.328  0.278 
Predicted innovation input 0.225  0.175 
DU Reference 
DM 0.496 ** 0.224 
NM 0.294  0.259 
ASM 0.545 * 0.294 
EOM 0.238  0.31 
Size -0.153  0.111 
Inverted Mills’ ratio from the sel. equn. -0.873 * 0.742 
Public funding for R&D  -0.396 * 0.23 
Collaboration diversity 1.555 *** 0.349 
Human capital -0.553  0.371 
Constant 1.527  2.232 
Step 4:  Productivity equation  
Dependent variable: Log sales per employee per employee 
Predicted innovation output 0.202 ** 0.086 
Physical Investment per employee (log) 0.269 *** 0.038 
DU Reference 
DM -0.084  0.111 
NM 0.174 * 0.101 
ASM 0.122  0.159 
EOM 0.107  0.159 
Process innovation -0.101  0.070 
Size -0.009  0.035 
Human capital 0.639 *** 0.147 
Constant 4.261 *** 0.190 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here. 
 
 
 
 
9. Iceland 
This section contains the detailed country analysis of the Icelandic CIS data. 
The Community Innovation Survey was carried out by Statistics Iceland in 
early 2002. The reference period is 1998 to 2000.  
The size of the Icelandic economy required and enabled Statistics Iceland to 
carry out a special sampling procedure. Statistics Iceland collected all 798 
Icelandic companies above with 10 employees or above and conducted a 
telephone survey on whether or not they carry out innovation activities. 
Subsequently the CIS questionnaire was sent to the 471 innovation active 
companies with a response of 223 companies. 60 of the responding 
companies turned out to be not innovation active, although having claimed 
to carry out innovation activities in the telephone survey (Statistics Iceland 
2003).  
9.1 Descriptive statistics for all firms 
In the first step of the detailed analysis we present the descriptive statistics 
for all firms, which are part of a corporate group. All firms, not being part of 
a corporate group are disregarded for the analysis below.  
Table 9.1 
 Sample distribution  
 Observations 
Total 
Innovative 
firms1
Percent 
 Total observations 107 56 52.3 
DU:  Domestic non multinationals 78 38 48.7 
DM:  Domestic multinationals 2 2 100.0 
NM:  Nordic multinationals 8 4 50.0 
ASM:  Anglo-Saxon multinationals 10 7 70 
EOM:  European multinationals and other multin. 9 5 55.6 
DOM:  Domestically owned firms 80 40 50.0 
FOR:  Foreign ownership 27 16 59.2 
Note: This table reports only about firm, which are a part of a corporate group. Innovative firms are firms 
reporting a product and/or process innovation and/or report ongoing innovation activities. The innovators share 
of 100% of the domestic multinationals is due to the construction of the domestic multinational indicator. 
 
Table 9.2 summarizes the composition of the used data set. It gives the 
number of domestic and the number of foreign owned firms both in the 
whole sample and in the subsample of innovation active firms. Based on our 
procedure to single out domestic multinationals we only detect two 
companies which qualify for a domestic multinational among the 80 
domestically owned firms. According to Statistics Iceland's sampling and 
surveying methodology the 56 included in the analysis here are about one 
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third of the valid responses received from innovation active firms. Although 
the absolute number of observations for each country group, particularly the 
domestic multinationals and the Nordic multinationals are rather small we 
include them in the breakdown in the summaries below. Among foreign 
owned companies innovation activities seem to slightly more common then 
they are among all of the domestically owned companies in the sample.  
Table 9.2  
Summary statistics of firm characteristics and innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Size 74.58 180.50 55.25 150.80 27.56 77.23 81.41 
Sales 8.79 10.06 8.83 8.44 7.82 8.82 8.35 
Labour prod. 5.09 4.94 5.28 5.21 4.68 5.09 5.05 
Exports 0.90 2.44 2.98 2.04 0.89 0.94 1.94 
Investment 1.92 2.47 1.20 2.96 1.40 1.93 1.92 
Innov. input 0.63 2.00 0.92 2.10 1.07 0.66 1.41 
Innov. output 1.01 3.30 1.93 1.83 1.53 1.07 1.76 
Human cap 0.20 0.14 0.38 0.46 0.26 0.20 0.37 
Note: The table reports the averages of the innovation activities. All categories except the size are in logs.  
 
Table 9.2 displays the summary of the company characteristics for the 
domestic and the foreign owned firms. On the average the domestic 
multinationals are larger than all the other companies. The Anglo-Saxon 
owned firms however seem to be most similar to the domestic 
multinationals in terms of size. Both Anglo-Saxon and Nordic owned firms 
share the feature of high productivity. All other firms lag behind. In 
particular the domestic multinationals are on the average not more 
productive than the companies, which are a part of a domestic corporate 
group.  
Domestic multinationals, Nordic owned companies and Anglo-Saxon 
owned companies show exports, which by far exceed the exports of 
domestic and European owned firms. Measured by innovation input and 
innovation output the domestic multinationals are most similar to the Anglo-
Saxon owned firms. On the average Anglo-Saxon owned and Nordic owned 
companies are endowed with the highest human capital.  
Focusing on the domestic/foreign dichotomy we observe that domestically 
owned firms and foreign owned firms are comparable in size, turnover, 
investment and labor productivity. Foreign owned firms, however, have 
higher exports and larger human capital endowment than firms with 
Icelandic ownership. By and large, the summary statistics here support an 
innovation input gap and innovation output gap, as innovation spending per 
worker and innovation return per worker is higher in the foreign owned 
firms. Yet, the summary statistics would not support the hypothesis of a 
 
 
 
 
productivity gap. As the subsample of foreign owned firms contains a 
higher share of innovation active companies, the asserted gaps could be a 
result of the different shares of innovators. 
Table 9. 3 
 Sectoral distribution with ownership categories in percent 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
HI M 2.6 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.00 2.5 3.7 
HM M 1.3 50.0 12.5 0.0 22.2 2.5 11.1 
LM M 7.7 0.0 12.5 10.0 11.1 7.5 11.1 
LO M 26.9 0.0 25.0 10.0 0.00 26.3 11.1 
KIS 35.9 0.0 25.0 50.0 44.4 35.0 40.7 
OS 25.6 50.0 25.0 20.0 22.2 26.3 22.2 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
FOOD  15.4 0.0 25.0 10.0 0.00 15.0 11.1 
Note: The sectors are defined along the lines of the OECD classification of knowledge intensity: high technology 
manufacturing (HI M), high medium technology manufacturing (HM M), low medium technology manufacturing 
(LM M), low technology manufacturing (LO M), knowledge intensive services (KIS) and other services (OS). See 
Hatzichronoglou (1997). 
 
In Iceland the foreign ownership is more concentrated in certain sectors than 
in others. Four out of ten foreign owned firms in Iceland belong to the 
knowledge intensive service sector. Only two out of ten belong to the 
traditional services and only one out of ten is from high low technology 
manufacturing, low medium technology manufacturing and high medium 
technology manufacturing. Among the Icelandic owned companies the low 
technology manufacturing sectors and the traditional service sectors have a 
higher share, whereas the knowledge intensive services are represented less.  
More than 25% of the firms in Iceland with more than 10 employees belong 
to the food-processing sector (Nace 15) more than 50% of which are 
companies processing and preserving fish and fish products. About 14% of 
those companies are part of a corporate group and hence part of the analysis 
here. The food processing industry's fraction of the companies is displayed 
in the bottom row of Table 9.3. The food processing industry's share within 
the group of foreign owned and domestically owned firms does not differ 
from its share in the sample.  
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Table 9.4 
 Firms' most significant market 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Local 55.13 50.00 25.00 40.00 55.56 55.00 40.74 
National 24.36 0.00 37.50 0.00 22.22 23.75 18.52 
Global 20.51 50.00 37.50 60.00 22.22 21.25 40.74 
Note: The table reports the share of firms in percentages.  
 
Table 9.4 summarizes the most significant market for the companies in the 
sample. Icelandic owned companies focus more on local and national 
markets, whereas foreign owned put a stronger focus on global markets. The 
share of companies that regard global markets as their most significant ones 
are is twice as high among the foreign owned companies than it is among 
the Icelandic ones.  
9.2 Descriptive statistics for the innovative firms 
This section discusses the characteristics and the behaviour of innovative 
firms in Iceland. Innovativeness here relates more to carrying out innovation 
related activities than to being successful in introducing new processes or 
new products. It gives a more detailed picture of the firms' innovative 
strategies and the related activities.  
Table 9.5 gives the percentage of firms, where the given activity can be 
observed. Hence, it summarizes how pervasive the certain types of 
innovation related activity are among the innovative companies; it does not 
give and indication about the intensity of the innovation activity, though. 
Table 9.5 
Innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Innovation expenditure 97.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.5 100.0 
Innovation sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Product innovation 92.1 100.0 100.0 71.4 100.0 92.5 87.5 
Process innovation 68.4 100.0 75.0 57.1 80.0 70.0 68.8 
Continuous R&D 52.6 100.0 75.0 71.4 60.0 55.0 68.8 
Public Funding for R&D 22.2 50.0 50.0 33.3 20.0 23.7 33.3 
Note: Table gives the share of firms in percent where the respective innovation activities can be observed. 
 
Almost all companies reporting innovation projects also show positive 
innovation expenditure. Also all companies do indeed report positive sales 
generated by new or significantly modified products. Product innovation, 
 
 
 
 
defined as the introduction of new or significantly modified products is 
rather high. For Anglo-Saxon owned firms, however, we observe a lower 
likelihood to product innovate than for all the other companies. The average 
probability of product innovation of an average foreign owned firm in 
Iceland falls about 5 percentage points behind the probability of a 
domestically owned Icelandic company. In terms of process innovation we 
do not see a striking difference. Continuous engagement in R&D is more 
common among foreign owned firms than it is among Icelandic owned 
firms. Interestingly, relatively more foreign owned firms receive public 
funding for R&D than Icelandic owned firms do.  
At this stage, when measuring the output of innovative activities by product 
innovations, we find support for differences in the innovation output 
between foreign owned firms and Icelandic owned firms. The lower rate of 
product innovations among foreign owned firms is caused by the lack of 
product innovativeness of Anglo-Saxon owned companies. We do not find a 
clear difference in innovation input, though.  
 
Table 9.6 
 Methods of protection  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Patent (Valid) 11.1 50.0 25.0 42.9 20.0 13.2 31.3 
Patent (Application) 5.6 50.0 0.0 57.1 20.0 7.9 31.3 
Design patterns 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 5.4 6.7 
Trademarks 44.4 100.0 25.0 71.4 50.0 47.4 53.3 
Copyright 11.4 0.0 0.0 28.6 75.0 10.8 33.3 
Secrecy 44.4 50.0 75.0 66.7 80.0 44.7 73.3 
Complexity of design 22.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 21.1 14.3 
Lead-time advantage 38.9 50.0 50.0 33.3 50.0 39.5 42.9 
Note: The table gives the share of firms indicating the use of the respective methods of protection. 
 
In Table 9.6 we find that patenting and copyright plays a stronger role in the 
protection strategies of foreign owned firms than they do in the strategies of 
Icelandic owned firms. Foreign owned firms also rely more on secrecy than 
Icelandic owned firms do. More than 20% of the domestic rely on 
complexity of the design, as a protection mechanism; yet, none of the 
Nordic owned firms and none of the Anglo-Saxon owned firms do so.  
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Table9.7 
 Innovation Input and Innovation Output  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Input        
Mean 21.3 7.6 19.5 58.3 67.0 20.6 51.3 
St.dev 35.2 7.8 31.6 44.9 42.7 34.5 43.2 
Min 0.0 2.1 0.5 2.0 5.2 0.0 0.5 
Max 100.0 13.1 66.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Output        
Mean 23.1 20.0 47.5 56.6 61.3 22.9 55.2 
St.dev 25.0 7.1 38.0 34.1 34.7 24.2 32.9 
Min 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 
Max 100.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the innovation expenditure (input) as a fraction of sales and 
the fraction of turnover generated by new or significantly modified products (output). All values are percentages.  
 
The innovation input and the innovation output are summarized in Table 
9.7.  
In contrast to Table 9.6 we do not merely investigate the existence of 
innovation input and innovation output. Instead we investigate the level of 
input and output. Innovation input is measured here in innovation 
expenditure per worker.  
It is notable that the analysis above does not produce and conclusive 
differences between domestically owned companies and foreign owned 
companies. Looking at the level of innovation input we clearly see an 
innovation input gap. Foreign owned companies spend more on innovation 
than Icelandic owned companies. The summary of the innovation output 
measured by the per worker sales of new and significantly modified 
products, reveals an innovation output gap in favor of the foreign owned 
firm. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.8  
Cooperation on innovation 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
  DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the group  D 39.5 0.0 25.0 28.6 20.0 37.5 25.0 
 G 0.0 100.0 50.0 71.4 40.0 5.0 56.3 
Suppliers  D 34.2 0.0 25.0 28.6 40.0 32.5 31.3 
 G 23.7 50.0 50.0 28.6 20.0 25.0 31.3 
Customers D 28.9 50.0 25.0 14.3 0.0 30.0 12.5 
 G 13.2 50.0 25.0 28.6 20.0 15.0 25.0 
Competitors D 21.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 
 G 0.0 50.0 25.0 28.6 0.0 2.5 18.8 
Consultancies D 26.3 0.0 25.0 14.3 0.0 25.0 12.5 
 G 5.3 0.0 25.0 14.3 20.0 5.0 18.8 
Priv. R&D Labs D 5.3 0.0 50.0 14.3 0.0 5.0 18.8 
 G 7.9 0.0 25.0 14.3 20.0 7.5 18.8 
Universities D 13.2 50.0 50.0 28.6 0.0 15.0 25.0 
 G 7.9 50.0 0.0 28.6 20.0 10.0 18.8 
Public R&D Org. D 21.1 50.0 75.0 14.3 0.0 22.5 25.0 
 G 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 
Domestic          
- collaboration  63.16 50.00 75.00 85.71 40.00 62.50 68.75 
- vertical coll.  42.11 50.00 50.00 42.86 40.00 42.50 43.75 
- horizontal coll  21.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 
- scientific coll.   28.95 50.00 75.00 42.86 0.00 30.00 37.50 
Note: This table gives the fraction of companies reporting collaborative innovation efforts with the respective 
partners. D denotes domestic partners and G denotes international partners. The diversity index is the number of 
partners currently used relative to the number of potential partners. For the diversity index the table reports the 
means. 
 
Table 9.8 summarizes the collaboration for R&D. The summary of the 
collaboration pattern does not reveal any striking difference between 
Icelandic owned companies and foreign owned companies. From this we do 
not find support for the embeddedness hypothesis. 
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Table 9.9 
 Sources of information for innovation.  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the firm 71.4 50.0 75.0 42.9 60.0 70.3 56.3 
Within the group 18.8 0.0 25.0 33.3 50.0 17.6 35.7 
Suppliers 12.9 50.0 0.0 42.9 40.0 15.2 31.3 
Customers 46.9 50.0 100.0 33.3 40.0 47.1 50.0 
Competitors 12.1 50.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 14.3 14.3 
Universities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 6.7 
Government 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 
Prof conferences 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 8.6 6.7 
Fairs, exhibitions 12.5 50.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 14.7 6.7 
Note: The table report the fraction of companies reporting a high or medium importance of the 
information sources for their innovation activities. . 
 
Investigating the sources of information utilized by companies in their 
innovation efforts, Table 9.9 reveals a striking difference between foreign 
owned and Icelandic owned companies. The corporate group as a source of 
inspiration seems to play a larger role for foreign owned firms than for 
Icelandic owned firms. Firm internal information sources are utilized in 
Icelandic owned firms to a larger degree than they are utilized in foreign 
owned firms.  
The source of inspiration for Icelandic owned firms is therefore domestic, 
whereas the foreign owned firms seem to draw information for their 
innovation activities from abroad. This suggests that foreign owned firms 
function generate an inflow of knowledge or at least an inflow of innovative 
ideas into the Icelandic innovation system.  
 
 
 
 
9.3 Regression results 
 
This section reports and comments the regression results.  
9.31 Selection models  
Table 9.10  
Innovation activities, two equation selection models (selection equation) 
 Innovation  
activities 
Equation (0) 
Foreign ownership 0.066  
Size 0.676 *** 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.037  
Global markets 1.325 ** 
Labor productivity -0.392 *** 
Recently established 0.168  
Recently merged 0.616  
Human capital 0.116  
Investment -0.221 * 
Constant -0.538  
Note: This table reports the results of the selection equation for innovation activities when estimating 
equation (1) and (0) simultaneously. *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level 
 
Table 9.10 summarizes the results for the selection equation (0). Essentially 
it analyzes the determinants of the companies' decision to carry out 
innovation activities at all.  
The probability of companies to carry out innovation activities is about 
19.5%14 higher for companies which have recently merged; for companies 
which have been established in between 1998 and 2000 the probability to 
carry out innovation activities is 4.5% less, everything else equal.   
A company with a focus on global markets enjoy a probability of carrying 
out innovation activities which is about 36.8% higher than, everything else 
equal, a company with a focus on local markets. A company with a focus on 
national markets is about 10% more likely to carry out innovation activities. 
Although not being significant, we observe an innovation gap here, which is 
about 4.6%. Foreign owned companies, again everything else equal, enjoy a 
higher likelihood of carrying out innovation activities. 
                                                 
14 The marginal effects are not reported in the table above.  
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As none of the foreign owned companies has collaborated with domestic 
competitors a regression of the domestic horizontal collaboration does on 
foreign ownership does not make sense. Not collaboration is explained fully 
by foreign ownership.  
Table 9.11 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models 
Dependent 
variable 
Innovation 
input per worker 
Domestic 
collaboration 
Domestic 
vertical 
collaboration 
Utilization of 
domestic science 
system 
Est. method HR HP HP HP 
For. ownership 0.455  0.092 -0.323 0.085  
 (0.388)  (0.429) (0.477) (0.444)  
Innov. input -  -0.033 0.265 -0.102  
Size -0.356 ** -0.054 -0.282 -0.064  
Local markets Reference 
Reg. markets 0.738  0.207 -0.038 0.285  
Glob. markets 1.225 *** 0.239 -0.633 0.746  
Product orient. 1.278 ** 0.315 1.177 0.034  
Process orient. -0.625  -0.041 0.016 -0.263  
Contin. R&D  1.265 *** 0.249 -0.173 0.663  
Public Funding -0.732  0.356 0.263 0.063  
Constant 0.738  0.207 -0.038 0.285  
Wald test 83.54 *** 3.99 11.89 10.84  
LR test 21.73 *** 0.10 0.10 0.65  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err are reported only for the foreign ownership 
dummy). *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The estimation methods are 
indicated as HR (regression model with sample selection) and HP (probit model with sample 
selection). 4 sector dummies included in the regression, are not reported here. The results of the 
selection equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests 
the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 0, 
Heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit 
model for selection variable. 
 
Table 9.11summarizes the results of the regressions of equation (1) in the 
case of the innovation input per worker and of equation (2) in the case of the 
domestic collaboration. The regression of innovation expenditure per 
worker tests for the innovation input gap.  
The coefficient estimate, although not being significant, indicates that 
foreign ownership increases the innovation expenditure per worker by 57% 
relative to domestic ownership.15 We also observe that the innovation 
strategy as captured and the global market orientation are a strong 
determinant of innovation expenditure. They increase innovation 
expenditure per worker by more than 200%.  
                                                 
15 As we measure the innovation effort per worker in logarithm the multiplicative effect of foreign 
ownerhsip is quantified by exp(0.455).  
 
 
 
 
Here, as in other comparable studies such as Ebersberger, Lööf and Oksanen 
(2004) we find that strategy matters more in the determination of the 
innovation expenditure than ownership does.  
The regression of the domestic collaboration does not show any statistically 
significant indication of an embeddedness gap. As such it conforms to the 
observation in the exploratory analysis above. Yet, everything else being 
equal, foreign owned companies have a 3.5 percentage points higher 
probability of collaborating with partners in the Icelandic innovation 
system. We also note that – although the model is has joint significance for 
the innovation input – the variables used do not jointly determine the 
collaboration decision of the companies.  
Table 9.12 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models (continued) 
Dependent 
variable 
Products new to 
the market 
Returns to 
innovation per 
worker 
Labor 
productivity 
Public funding 
Est. method HP HR HR HP 
For. ownership -0.263  0.012  -0.105  0.046  
 (0.471)  (0.428)  (0.240)  (0.645)  
Innov. input 0.119  0.381 ** 0.013  -  
Size -0.189  0.013  0.115  -0.531 ** 
Local markets  
Reg. markets 0.435  -0.396 * -0.756 ** 2.374 ** 
Glob. markets 0.844  0.813 ** 0.099  2.026 ** 
Product orient. 1.290 * 1.175  -0.061  2.549 ** 
Process orient. 0.431  -0.034  -1.230 *** -1.303  
Contin. R&D  -0.230  1.472 *** 0.277  0.589  
Public Funding -0.796  0.024 *** -0.486  -  
Constant 0.435  -0.396  -0.756 *** -  
Wald test 12.93  204.81 *** 46.26 *** 10.86  
LR test 0.12  33.41 *** 0.06  0.35  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err are reported only for the foreign ownership 
dummy). *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The estimation methods are 
indicated as HR (regression model with sample selection) and HP (probit model with sample 
selection). 4 sector dummies included in the regression, are not reported here. The results of the 
selection equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests 
the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 0, 
Heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit 
model for selection variable. 
 
In Table 9.12 we investigate both the innovation output gap and the 
productivity gap. Foreign ownership has both a statistically and 
economically insignificant impact on the innovation output. Here again we 
find that the market strategy of the company has a strong influence on the 
innovation output.  
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We also observe that the persistence of innovation efforts translate into 
innovation output. Consistent with the evolutionary theory of the firm we 
find that for firm performance, measured by innovation output, not only 
does the presence matter – current innovation input, that is – but so does the 
firms' history.  
In regressing the productivity we find that the foreign ownership does not 
have a statistically significant impact on the labor productivity. Double 
checking the result in the production function model, we also find no 
significant impact of foreign ownership on the labor productivity of firms.  
9.32 Multi step production function model 
Step 1: Selection equation: Dependent variable: Probability of being engaged in 
innovation 
As could be expected and in line with the innovation literature (See Cohen 
and Klepper 1996 and Klette and Kortum 2002) the probability of being 
innovative increases with firm size.  
The firm s’ market orientation is not an important determinant to product 
innovations among firms in Iceland.  
Investment in R&D and other intangible capital is found to be closely 
associated with investment in tangible capital, see upper part of Table 9.13  
Step 2:Innovation input equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation 
expenditure per employee. 
At variance with the estimate in the selection equation presented in Section 
9.31, the multistep estimate is positive and significant for the elasticity of 
R&D expenditures with respect to foreign ownership. That is, innovative 
firms in Iceland invest significantly more than Icelandic owned firms, every 
thing else being equal.  
The results, presented in the bottom part of Table 9.13, also shows that 
innovation expenditures on Iceland is an increasing function of global 
market orientation and the firms history of previous R&D investments. 
Step 3:Innovation output equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation sales 
per employee. 
Using CIS databases and alternative versions of the so-called CDM-model a 
stable pattern between innovation sales and productivity has been found.  In 
a similar framework this literature also estimate the relationship between 
innovation input and innovation output. Kleinknecht and Mohnen (2003) 
survey this literature.  
A priori we would expect that innovation output is an increasing function of 
R&D-investment. This is also confirmed by the results presented in the 
bottom part of Table 9.14. The estimate for innovation input is highly 
significant and the order of magnitude is 0.85.  
 
 
 
 
It should also be noticed that the Mills’ variable is significant at the 10% 
level, indicating the importance of accounting for selectivity bias in the 
model. 
Step 4: Productivity equation. Dependent variable: Logarithm sale per employee. 
The results from the productivity equation presented in the lower part of 
Table 9.14 show that innovation output, expressed as innovation sales per 
employee, is an important contributor to productivity after controlling for 
sector, size, capital investment, human capital, process innovation. The 
effect is significant at the 5% level. The size of the estimate is within the 
range of what previously has been found in the literature. A 10% increase in 
innovation output increases the level of productivity by about 2 percent.  
Interestingly we find no impact from the ownership variables. The 
conclusion here is that foreign-owned firms are not more or less productive 
than uninational firms or domestic multinational firms at the margin when 
using the control variables suggested in the Schumpeterian literature. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Table 9.15 reports a negative relationship between 
human capital and labor productivity. 
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Table 9.13 
 Multi step production function model 
Step 1:  Selection equation 
Dependent variable: The probability to be an innovative firm 
 Coefficient  Std.err. 
Foreign ownership 0.135  0.361 
Size 0.732 *** 0.162 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.264  0.390 
Global markets 1.039 * 0.440 
Recently established 0.277  0.429 
Recently merged 0.395  0.354 
Human capital 0.677  0.780 
Investment per employee (log) -0.211 ** 0.106 
Constant -2.820  0.687 
Step 2:  Innovation input equation Dependent variable  
Log innovation expenditures per employee 
Foreign ownership 0.518 ** 0.340 
Size 0.374  0.155 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.287  0.432 
Global markets 1.032 ** 0.406 
Public funding for R&D  -0.254  0.402 
Process innovation -0.189  0.283 
Continuous R&D  1.628 *** 0.308 
Constant 1.202  0.826 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9.14  
Multi step production function model (continued) 
Step 3:  Innovation Output equation 
Dependent variable: The log of innovation sales per capita 
 Coefficient  Std. error 
Predicted labour productivity 1.328  1.153 
Predicted innovation input 0.854 *** 0.293 
Foreign ownership -0.260  0.460 
Size 0.443  0.281 
Inverted Mills’ ratio from the sel. equn. 1.808 * 0.920 
Public funding for R&D  -0.284  0.749 
Collaboration diversity 2.710  1.704 
Human capital 2.397  1.876 
Constant -8.354  6.357 
Step 4:  Productivity equation  
Dependent variable: Log sales per employee per  
Predicted innovation output 0.223 ** 0.101 
Physical Investment per employee (log) -0.134  0.111 
Foreign ownership 0.316  0.223 
Process innovation -0.015  0.283 
Size 0.149  0.090 
Human capital -1.320 *** 0.471 
Constant 4.176 *** 0.474 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here. 
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10. Norway 
10.1 Descriptive statistics for all firms 
The Norwegian data used in this study consists of a subsample of the 
observations from the third Community Innovation Survey. The current 
sample refers only to firms belonging to a group. The total number of 
observed firms is 2,327 of which of which approximately one in 3 is a 
foreign controlled firm. 
Table 10.1 
 Sample distribution  
 Observations 
Total 
Innovative 
firms1
Percent 
 Total observations 2 327 1 120 48.1 
DU:  Domestic non multinationals 1 556 747 48.1 
DM:  Domestic multinationals 55 55 100.0 
NM:  Nordic multinationals 239 109 45.6 
ASM:  Anglo-Saxon multinationals 119 72 60.5 
EOM:  European multinationals and other multin. 358 137 38.3 
DOM:  Domestically owned firms 1 642 814 49.6 
FOR:  Foreign ownership 685 306 44.7 
Note: This table reports only about firm which are a part of a corporate group. Innovative firms are firms 
reporting a product and/or process innovation and/or report ongoing innovation activities. The innovators share 
of 100% of the domestic multinationals is due to the construction of the domestic multinational indicator. 
 
Table 10.1 gives the sample distribution of the different category of owners 
considered: domestic non multinationals (1 556 observations), domestic 
multinationals (55), Nordic multinationals (239 firms with headquarter in 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland or Sweden), Anglo-Saxon (119) and European 
and other multinationals (358).  
Among the Norwegian firms 50 percent are classified as “innovative firms”; 
they have launched at least one process innovation or product innovation 
during the period 1998-2000, or they were reporting ongoing innovation 
activities in year 2000.  The corresponding figure for foreign controlled 
firms is 45 percent.  
Note the large differences in share of innovative firms among the 
domestically owned firms; while five in 10 of the observed non-
multinationals are innovative, all Norwegian multinationals are innovative.  
A large difference in share of innovative firms is observed among the 
foreign controlled firms. The Anglo-Saxon enterprises have the largest 
proportion (61%) and European and other multinationals the smallest 
 
 
 
 
proportion (38%). Firms controlled by Nordic neighbours are somewhat less 
innovative than Norwegian firms in this respect (46%). 
 
Table 10.2 
Summary statistics of firm characteristics and innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=1 556 N=55 N=239 N=119 N=358 N=1642 N=685 
Size 149 406 206 223 225 158 222 
Sales 11.393 12.356 11.823 11.907 11.718 11.432 11.785 
Labour prod. 7.223 7.415 7.429 7.499 7.220 7.234 7.332 
Exports 2.568 6.134 2.812 4.193 3.385 2.700 3.333 
Investment 3.046 3.722 2.991 3.302 3.120 3.065 3.117 
Innov. input 1.493 4.611 1.094 2.399 1.260 1.589 1.410 
Innov. output 2.092 5.441 1.990 2.807 1.715 2.202 1.989 
Human capital 0.243 0.423 0.298 0.399 0.276 0.249 0.305 
Note: The table reports the averages of the innovation activities. All categories except the size are in logs.  
 
Table 10.2 reports summary statistics of key economics and innovation 
variables. Starting with firm size the right part of the table shows that the 
average number of employees is about 160 in domestic compared to 220 
employees in foreign owned firms.  The average Norwegian multinational 
firm is 2.7 times larger than the average uninational firm. When size is 
expressed as sales a similar pattern is shown as in the case of employment. 
Expressed in intensity terms (per capita) the right part of the table shows 
that foreign-owned firms outperform Norwegian firms when labor 
productivity, export, physical investments and human capital are considered. 
The lower domestic mean values can all be explained by uninational 
Norwegian firms. The Norwegian multinational firms have considerable 
higher export figures for export other firms. They are also more productive 
and invest more than other firms.  
Unanimously Norwegian multinationals outperforms other firms as regards 
innovation input and innovation output. Among foreign controlled 
multinationals the Anglo-Saxon controlled firms are the most innovative. In 
aggregate figures the average Norwegian firm has invest more innovation 
activities and receive more sales income from new and significantly 
improved products than the average foreign firm.  
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Table 10.3 
 Sectoral distribution with ownership categories in percent 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=1 556 N=55 N=239 N=119 N=358 N=1642 N=685 
HI M 2.6 12.7 1.7 7.6 3.3 2.9 3.7 
HM M 7.5 29.1 8.4 23.5 15.4 8.3 14.4 
LM M 15.8 5,4 14.2 9.2 14.5 15.8 12.4 
LO M 28.0 21.8 15.9 5.9 15.1 27.6 13.6 
KIS 19.3 18.2 27.2 30.3 21.2 19.3 25.0 
OS 26.9 12.7 32.6 23.5 30.4 26.1 30.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: The sectors are defined along the lines of the OECD classification of knowledge intensity: high technology 
manufacturing (HI M), high medium technology manufacturing (HM M), low medium technology manufacturing 
(LM M), low technology manufacturing (LO M), knowledge intensive services (KIS) and other services (OS). See 
Hatzichronoglou (1997). 
 
Table 10.3 shows the distribution of manufacturing and service firms across 
technology intensity. About six in ten Norwegian and Anglo-Saxon 
multinational firms belong to high or high medium technology sectors or the 
knowledge intensive service sector. The corresponding share is 40 percent 
for European controlled firms, 37 percent for Nordic multinationals and 29 
percent for Norwegian uninational firms.   The conclusion here is that 
foreign controlled firms are evidently more oriented towards knowledge 
intense manufacturing and service production than the average Norwegian 
firm. 
Table 10.4 
Firms' most significant market 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=1 556 N=55 N=239 N=119 N=358 N=1642 N=685 
Local 39.4 5.5 32.2 16.8 30.7 38.3 28.3 
National 40.4 23.6 50.2 43.7 45.3 39.8 47.0 
Global 20.2 70.9 17.6 39.5 24.0 21.9 24.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: The table reports the share of firms in percentages.  
 
In Table 10.4 we summarize what companies report as their most significant 
market.  
The most striking finding is that 71 percent of the Norwegian multinationals 
are focusing on the global market compare to 18-40 percent for other 
multinational enterprises. For about eight in 10 Nordic and European firms 
 
 
 
 
Norway is the most significant market. The figure is more or less the same 
as for uninational firms. More than 60 percent of the Anglo-Saxon firms 
consider Norway as their most significant market. 
10.2 Descriptive statistics for the innovative firms 
This section discusses the characteristics and the behaviour of innovative 
firms in Iceland. Innovativeness here relates more to carrying out innovation 
related activities than to being successful in introducing new processes or 
new products. It gives a more detailed picture of the firms' innovative 
strategies and the related activities. 
Table 10.5 
Innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=747 N=55 N=109 N=72 N=136 N=813 N=305 
Innovation expenditure 93.7 98.1 84.4 93.0 92.7 93.9 89.0 
Innovation sales 82.0 90.9 78.8 81.9 81.0 82.8 80.0 
Product innovation 83.6 92.7 78.8 80.5 81.7 84.3 80.0 
Process innovation 68.1 72.7 66.0 69.4 60.5 68.7 63.3 
Continuous R&D 33.3 70.9 35.7 54.1 43.7 36.3 42.4 
Public Funding for R&D 23.8 54.5 16.5 23.6 25.7 25.8 22.2 
Note: Table gives the share of firms in percent where the respective innovation activities can be 
observed. 
 
Tables 10.5 to 10.9 give descriptive statistics only for innovative firms.  
Table 10.5 reports the percentage of firms where the given activity can be 
observed.   
As could be expected the vast majority of all firms defined as innovative in 
this study reported innovation expenditures and innovation sales in year 
2000. Product innovations are in general somewhat more common than 
process innovations.  
It is notable that only a minority of the innovative uninational Norwegian 
firms and the multinational Nordic and European firms are conducting R&D 
on a continuous basis. The share of regular R&D firms is also somewhat 
unexpectedly low among Norwegian multinationals (71%) and Anglo-
Saxon firms (54%).  
The propensity to receive public funding for R&D is about the same for 
foreign owned firms as for non-multinational domestic firms; however it is 
about two times higher for Norwegian multinational firms compared to 
other firms. 
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Table 10.6 
 Methods of protection  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=747 N=55 N=109 N=72 N=136 N=813 N=305 
Patent (Valid) 93.7 98.1 84.4 93.0 92.7 93.9 89.0 
Patent (Application ) 82.0 90.9 78.8 81.9 81.0 82.8 80.0 
Design patterns 83.6 92.7 78.8 80.5 81.7 84.3 80.0 
Trademarks 68.1 72.7 66.0 69.4 60.5 68.7 63.3 
Copyright 33.3 70.9 35.7 54.1 43.7 36.3 42.4 
Secrecy 23.8 54.5 16.5 23.6 25.7 25.8 22.2 
Complexity of design 93.7 98.1 84.4 93.0 92.7 93.9 89.0 
Lead-time advantage 82.0 90.9 78.8 81.9 81.0 82.8 80.0 
Note: The table gives the share of firms indicating the use of the respective methods of protection. 
 
The descriptive statistics on methods of protections, given in Table 10.6, 
reveals that the propensity to hold and to apply for patens is larger for 
foreign-owned firms. Interestingly, a larger share of both Nordic and Anglo-
Saxon firms possess patent than Norwegian multinationals.  
For the other six methods of protection investigated (design patterns, 
trademarks, copyrights, secrecy, complexity of design and lead-time 
advantage), the general picture is that a higher percentage of the Norwegian 
multinationals are using intellectual protection methods and methods of 
protection than other firms. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.7 
Innovation Input and Innovation Output  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Input        
Mean 7.1 16.7 4.7 13.9 9.3 7.8 8.8 
St.Dev. 16.8 26.3 12.2 23.1 21.6 17.7 19.7 
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100.0 100.0 22.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Output        
Mean 20.5 30.8 18.5 26.0 24.0 21.3 22.6 
St.Dev. 24.6 28.5 21.4 29.8 27.0 25.0 26.3 
Min 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the innovation expenditure (input) as a fraction of 
sales and the fraction of turnover generated by new or significantly modified products (output). All 
values are percentages.  
 
The innovation input and the innovation output is summarized in Table 
10.7. In contrast to Table 10.5 we do not merely investigate the existence of 
innovation input and innovation output. Instead we investigate the level of 
input and output. Innovation input is measured here as innovation 
expenditure per worker.  
Although the difference are small between the aggregate of foreign and 
domestic firms respectively (the right part of the table) some interesting 
gaps can be noticed. The level of innovation input as a share of sales is 
considerable higher for Norwegian multinationals than for Nordic and 
European and other multinationals. Looking at innovation output in the 
lower part of the table, it is shown that the average share for Nordic 
multinationals is 0.19 compare to 0.24-0.31 for other multinational firms in 
Norway. The proportion of innovation output for uninational firms is 0.25. 
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Table 10.8  
Cooperation on innovation 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
  D DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the group  D 20.7 43.6 7.3 6.9 15.3 22.2 10.4 
 G - - 11.0 36.1 25.5 - 23.2 
Suppliers  D 19.5 54.5 11.9 19.4 20.4 21.8 17.3 
 G 10.4 65.4 9.2 16.7 16.7 14.2 14.0 
Customers D 17.0 43.6 22.0 27.8 21.1 19.9 22.5 
 G 7.6 52.7 6.4 25.0 9.4 10.8 11.7 
Competitors D 4.7 7.3 5.5 5.5 5.8 4.9 5.5 
 G 2.7 14.5 7.3 5.5 4.4 3.4 5.9 
Consultancies D 16.0 43.6 10.1 18.0 10.9 17.8 12.4 
 G 2.4 21.8 5.5 9.7 5.8 3.8 6.5 
Priv. R&D Labs D 8.0 32.7 6.4 18.0 13.1 9.7 12.1 
 G 2.7 23.6 4.6 11.1 3.6 4.2 5.5 
Universities D 11.1 58.1 10.0 20.8 17.5 14.4 15.7 
 G 2.2 29.0 3.7 15.3 5.8 4.2 7.2 
Public R&D Org. D 14.1 50.9 13.8 22.2 19.7 16.8 18.0 
 G 2.9 21.8 2.8 8.3 1.5 4.3 3.3 
Domestic          
- collaboration  41.2 85.4 27.5 47.2 37.9 44.1 36.6 
- vertical coll.  27.2 65.4 22.9 33.3 29.9 29.8 28.1 
- horizontal coll  4.7 7.3 5.5 5.5 5.8 4.9 5.5 
- scientific coll.   18.3 65.4 16.5 26.4 25.5 21.6 22.5 
Note: This table gives the fraction of companies reporting collaborative innovation efforts with the respective 
partners. D denotes domestic partners and G denotes international partners. The diversity index is the number of 
partners currently used relative to the number of potential partners. For the diversity index the table reports the 
means. 
 
Recent literature, see for example Pavitt and Patel 1999, emphasize the 
importance of innovation systems for performance of individual firms. 
Table 10.8 gives indicators on domestic and global collaboration on 
innovation with eight different categories of partners.  
Norwegian multinationals are most involved in cooperative innovation 
activities both on the global and the national scene, and regardless of type of 
partner. Domestic uninational firms have a lower degree of domestic as well 
as global collaboration on innovation compared to foreign owned firms. The 
table depictures a large similarity in domestic (Norway) and global 
networking on innovation between the average uninational Norwegian firm 
and the average foreign controlled firm. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.9 
 Sources of information for innovation.  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=747 N=55 N=109 N=72 N=136 N=813 N=305 
Within the firm 53.0 70.9 49.5 66.6 50.7 54.4 53.4 
Within the group 15.8 40.0 32.1 43.0 25.0 17.9 30.8 
Suppliers 20.3 23.6 20.1 11.1 16.9 20.8 16.0 
Customers 36.0 47.2 37.6 37.5 36.7 36.9 37.0 
Competitors 12.0 10.9 10.0 11.1 6.6 12.0 8.5 
Universities 2.5 10.9 2.7 4.1 5.1 3.0 4.2 
Government 4.7 9.0 4.5 8.3 5.9 5.0 5.9 
Prof conferences 12.1 21.8 7.3 15.3 12.5 12.7 11.4 
Fairs, exhibitions 10.5 18.1 8.3 8.3 7.3 10.9 7.8 
Note: The table report the fraction of companies reporting a high or medium importance of the information sources 
for their innovation activities. . 
 
In Table 10.9 we report a summary of sources of information for carrying 
out an innovation project. For all companies regardless of their ownership 
the major source of innovation is the firm itself. Additionally, customers and 
firms within the group play a leading role. The aggregate figures in the right 
part of the table reveal only minor differences in the profile of knowledge 
sources between domestic and foreign owned firms. 
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10.3 Regression results 
10.31 Selection models  
Table 10.10 
 Innovation activities, two equation selection models (selection equation) 
Dependent variable: The probability to be engaged in innovation activities 
 Coeff Significance Std Err 
Foreign ownership -0.283 *** 0.061 
Size 0.165 *** 9.023 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.299 *** 0.063 
Global markets 0.503 *** 0.078 
Labor productivity 0.059 ** 0.025 
Recently established 0.094  0.079 
Recently merged 0.350 *** 0.082 
Human capital 0.994 *** 0.134 
Tangible investments 0.130 *** 0.014 
Constant -2.019 *** 0.209 
Note: This table reports the results of the selection equation for innovation activities when estimating 
equation (2) and (3) simultaneously. *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level 
 
 
The selection equation reported in Table 10.10 estimates how the innovation 
decision depends on exogenously given firm characteristics and firm 
behaviour. The most interesting result here is that foreign ownership is 
highly significant and negative associated with the decision to innovate 
when we control for sector, seize, market orientation, human capital, 
physical capital, labor productivity and the recent history of the firms in 
terms of establishment, mergers and acquisition.  Hence, every thing else 
equal, foreign controlled firms in Norway have a lower propensity to engage 
in innovation activities compared to Norwegian firms.  
 The parameter estimates from the selection equation shows that the 
decision to invest in R&D and other innovation activities is positively 
associated with (i) non local market orientation, (ii) the level of 
productivity, (iii) the level of human capital, (iv) the size of tangible 
investment and (v) the firm’s recent history in terms of mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10.11 
Innovation activities, two equation selection models 
Dependent 
variable 
Innovation 
input per worker 
Public 
 Funding 
Utilization of 
corporation sources 
Est. method HR HP HP 
UN Reference 
0.613 *** 0.376 ** 0.762 *** DM 
(0.215)  (0.191)  
-0.318 ** -0.329 * 0.541 *** NM 
(0.151)  (0.151)  
0.538 *** -0.298  0.812 *** ASM 
(0.186)  (0.175)  
EOM 0.257 * -0.117  0.331 ** 
 (0.142)  (0.146)  
Innov. input -  -  -0.032  
Firm size -0.472 *** 0.065  -0.052  
Local markets Reference 
Nat. markets -0.170  0.065  0.080  
Glob. markets 0.028  ***  0.108  
Product orient. 0.216  ***  0.193  
Process orient. 0.465 *** *** *** 0.228  
Contin. R&D  1.162 ***  *** 0.014  
Public Funding 0.448 *** *** *** -0.078  
Constant 5.303 ***  ** -1.252 * 
Wald test 482.6 *** *** ** 61.57 *** 
LR test 73.4 ***   0.021  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err are reported only for the nationality 
dummies). *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The estimation methods are 
indicated as HR (regression model with sample selection) and HP (probit model with sample 
selection). DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic 
multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and other multinationals. 6 
sector dummies included in the regression, are not reported here. The results of the selection 
equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests the 
correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 0, Heckman's 
model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit model for 
selection variable. 
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Table 10.12 
Innovation activities, two equation selection models 
Dependent 
variable 
Domestic 
collaboration 
Domestic 
vertical 
collaboration 
Domestic 
horizontal  
collaboration  
Utilization of 
domestic science 
system 
Est. method HP HP HP HP 
0.929 *** 0.761 *** 0.262  0.896 *** DM 
(0.213)    (0.204)  
-0.217 * -0.014  0.026  -0.011  NM 
(0.128)    (0.178)  
0.155  0.219  0.170  0.141  ASM 
(0.147)    (0.196)  
EOM -0.032  0.182 * 0.121  0.170  
 (0.111)    (0.146)  
Innov. input 0.053 ** 0.036  0.001  0.123 *** 
Firm size 0.013  -0.013  0.152 ** 0.199 *** 
Nat. markets -0.145 * -0.261 *** -0.221  0.046  
Glob. markets -0.407 *** -0.677 *** -0.447 ** -0.063  
Product orient. 0.164  0.272 ** -0.065  -0.080  
Process orient. 0.194  0.059  0.324  0.167  
Contin. R&D  0.182 ** 0.093  -0.051  0.245 ** 
Public Funding 0.570 *** 0.427 *** 0.633 *** 0.912 *** 
Constant -  -  -2.819  -2.444 *** 
Wald test 154.7 *** 99.7 *** 36.0 *** 148.6 *** 
LR test 116.2 *** 131.8 *** 0.9  0.422  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, (std.err. are reported only for the nationality dummies) 
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; 
EOM= European and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported 
here. The results of the selection equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint 
significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly 
different from 0, heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and 
a probit model for selection variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.13  
Innovation activities, two equation selection models (continued) 
Dependent 
variable Patent application 
Products new to 
the market 
Returns to 
innovation per 
worker 
Labor productivity 
Est. method HP HP HP HP 
0.361 * 0.339 * 0.192  0.059  DM 
 (0.253)   
0.315 ** -0.151  0.544 ** 0.370 *** NM 
 (0.215)   
0.713 *** 0.160  0.494 ** 0.213 * ASM 
 (0.247)   
EOM 0.449 *** 0.074  0.626 *** 0.234 ** 
  (0.208)   
Innov. input. 0.029  0.041 0.036  0.067 *** 
Size 0.009  -0.052 -0.589 *** -0.027  
Reg. markets 0.134   -0.299   0.517 
Glob. markets 0.242   -0.801 ***  0.618 
Product orient. 0.512  *** 1.037 ***  0.521 
Process orient.    -0.003   0.126 
Contin. R&D    *** 0.334 *** ** 0.545 
Public Funding    -0.130  *** - 
Const    9.351   -1.610 
Wald test *** 139.2 *** 153.9 153.9 *** *** 102.4 
LR test ** 0.9  217.6 217.6 *** *** 0.1 
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Tables 10.11 through 10.13 report the result from the second step of the 
selection model.  Step one gives the determinants to innovation and step two 
estimates determinants to innovation indicators, innovation input, 
innovation output and productivity for innovative firms.  
Tables 10.11-10.13 present the results from the second step of the selection 
model. Starting with Table 10.11, (log) innovation input per worker, 
depicted in column 1, we find that the point estimates for Norwegian 
multinational firms and Anglo-Saxon firms    are highly significant and the 
order of magnitude of the estimate is 0.6 and 0.5 respectively.  The 
reference group is the uninational Norwegian firms.  Interestingly, it is 
found the estimate is negative and significant for Nordic multinationals.   
It may seem that European and other multinationals invest more in R&D 
than the reference group, every thing else being equal. The indicator 
variables for process oriented innovations, continuous R&D engagement 
and receiver of public R&D funding are all highly significant and positive 
associated with the size of innovation input. On the contrary, the amount of 
innovation output per worker is a decreasing function of firm size. 
The main finding from the funding equation is that among firms classified 
as innovative, domestic multinationals have a significant larger likelihood of 
receiving public R&D subsidies than other groups of firms.  Next we see 
that knowledge flow from affiliates within the group is an important source 
of information for innovation for all multinational firms. This characteristic 
separates multinational firms significantly from uninational firms. 
In Table 10.12 four different classifications of collaborating on innovation 
are considered. We find that domestic collaboration in total, as well as 
domestic vertical collaboration, and collaboration on with the domestic 
scientific system is significantly more frequent among Norwegian 
multinational firms compared to other firms. For horizontal collaboration no 
difference between the five groups of firms can be established. 
Table 10.13, columns 1-3, present estimates on determinants to the 
probability of applying for patent, for launching radical innovations and the 
determinants for innovation sales.  The figures show that foreign-owned 
firms have a larger propensity to apply for patents and a larger return to 
innovation (innovation sales) compared to the Norwegian firms, ceteris 
paribus. No significant differences (at the 1% and 5% level respectively) 
between the groups can be found regarding the propensity to launch radical 
innovation.  
In column 4 we observe the determinants to labor productivity. Here we 
find evidence indicating that foreign owned firms, every thing else equal, 
are superior to Norwegian firms. The estimate for Nordic multinationals is 
highly significant and the order of magnitude is 0.4.  The size of the 
 
 
 
 
estimate is 0.2 for European and other multinationals and Anglo-Saxon, 
however at the 5% level of significance.  At the 10 percent level of 
significance it is shown that also the Anglo-Saxon firms are more 
productive than Norwegian firms. 
10.32 Multi step production function model 
Our main interest in the multistep is to investigate the importance of 
ownership with respect to innovation and economic performance in an 
econometric framework taking both selectivity bias an simultaneous bias 
into account and controlling for factors such as firm size, physical capital, 
human capital and various market indicators. 
Step 1 Selection equation: Dependent variable: Probability of being engaged in 
innovation 
The results presented in the upper part of table 10.14 confirms that foreign 
controlled firms have a significant lower propensity to be engaged in 
innovation than Norwegian when we control firm size, sectors, human 
capital, physical capital, market orientation and the recent history of the 
firms.  
Moreover, as could be expected and in line with the innovation literature 
(See Cohen and Klepper 1996 and Klette and Kortum 2002) the probability 
of being innovative increases with firm size. The firms’ market orientation 
is an important determinant of product innovations. A larger market is 
positively associated with innovation engagement.  
Not surprisingly the likelihood of being innovative is an increasing function 
of the level of human capital. Investment in R&D and other intangible 
capital is also closely associated with investment in tangible capital. We 
also find weak evidence that firms with a recent history of mergers or 
acquisitions have a larger probability of being innovative.  
Step 2 Innovation input equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation 
expenditure per employee. 
The estimated influence of corporate ownership show that all four groups of 
multinational firms have significant larger innovation input than the control 
group of uninational Norwegian firms, every thing else being equal.  
Consistent with the findings by Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) and 
Lööf, Heshmati, Asplund and Nås (2003) innovation expenditures per 
employee is a decreasing function of firm’s size. The coefficient estimates 
for public R&D funding and continuous R&D are both highly significant 
and positive.  See the bottom part of Table 10.14. 
Step 3 Innovation output equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation sales 
per employee. 
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In accordance with previous studies we find that innovation output increases 
significantly with innovation input. See the upper part of Table 10.15. The 
coefficient of the estimate indicates that a 10% increase in innovation 
expenditure per employee increases innovation sales by 7%. The size of the 
estimate is in the upper bound of what has been reported in the literature.  
The estimated elasticity of innovation output with respect to the four groups 
of firms reported in the selection equations, showed a larger return to 
innovation for foreign controlled firms.  However, when we exploit the 
CDM-model and control also for possible simultaneity bias the difference 
between domestic and foreign-owned firms disappear.  
I addition the results show that collaboration diversity has a positive impact 
on innovation output whereas R&D funding somewhat unexpected has the 
opposite effect. The latter is at variance with the finding by Czarnitzki and 
Ebersberger (2004) and Lööf and Heshmati (2004) but can be explained by 
the formulation of the model.  The subsidy effect is already incorporated in 
the predicted innovation variable.  
Step 4 Productivity equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm sale per employee. 
The results from the productivity equation are presented in the lower part of 
Table 10.15. Controlling for firm size, sector, physical capital, human 
capital, knowledge capital (innovation output) and process innovation we 
find that Nordic multinationals are significantly more productive than 
Norwegian firms as well as other foreign controlled firms. The elasticity of 
productivity with respect to physical capital is positive, however no 
significant association between innovation output and productivity can be 
found. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.14 
Multi step production function model 
Step 1: Selection equation 
Dependent variable: The probability to be an innovative firm 
 Coefficient  Std.err. 
Foreign ownership -0.281 *** 0.061 
Size 0.163 *** 0.023 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.312 *** 0.0632 
Global markets 0.517 *** 0.078 
Recently established 0.098   
Recently merged 0.363 *** 0.083 
Human capital 1.029 *** 0.134 
Investment per employee (log) 0.143 *** 0.013 
Constant -1.644 *** 0.128 
Step 2:  Innovation input equation Dependent variable  
Log innovation expenditures per employee 
D Reference 
DM 0.639 *** 0.216 
NM 0.329 ** 0.152 
ASM 0.526 *** 0.187 
EOM 0.268 * 0.143 
Size -0.480 *** 0.042 
Local markets Reference 
National markets -0.179  0.121 
Global markets 0.034  0.149 
Public funding for R&D  0.478 *** 0.106 
Process innovation 0.171 * 0.090 
Continuous R&D  1.195 *** 0.102 
Constant 5.350 *** 0.287 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-
multinational; DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-
Saxon multinational; EOM= European and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the 
regression, not reported here.  
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Table 10.15 
 Multi step production function model (continued) 
Step 3:  Innovation Output equation 
Dependent variable: The log of innovation sales per capita 
 Coefficient  Std. error 
Predicted labour productivity -0.363  0.414 
Predicted innovation input 0.677 *** 0.138 
DU Reference 
DM -0.475  0.386 
NM 0.488  0.298 
ASM -0.478  0.351 
EOM -0.018  0.273 
Size 0.027  0.108 
Inverted Mills’ ratio from the sel. equn. 0.996   
Public funding for R&D  -0.668 *** 0.222 
Collaboration diversity 2.398 *** 0.529 
Human capital 0.704  0.501 
Constant 4.769  3.949 
Step 4:  Productivity equation  
Dependent variable: Log sales per employee per employee 
Predicted innovation output 0.064  0.051 
Physical Investment per employee (log) 0.208 *** 0.019 
DU Reference 
DM -0.056  0.160 
NM 0.197 ** 0.092 
ASM 0.069  0.106 
EOM 0.085  0.085 
Process innovation -0.036  0.085 
Size 0.043 * 0.024 
Human capital 0.308  0.187 
Constant 5.991 *** 0.218 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-
multinational; DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-
Saxon multinational; EOM= European and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the 
regression, not reported here. 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Sweden 
This section reports the basic characteristics of the data and the main 
findings from a descriptive statistical analysis. The Swedish Community 
Innovation Survey is conducted by Statistics Sweden. The third generation 
of the CIS, which this analysis is based on was launched in 2001 and refers 
to the years 1998 to 2000. The survey was sent to 4, 266 firms, which 
yielded a response rate of 48% (Statistics Sweden 2002).  
11.1 Descriptive statistics for all firms 
The descriptive statistics in this section includes all firms in the sample 
regardless of their carrying out innovative activities 
Table 11.1  
 Sample distribution  
 Observations 
Total 
Innovative 
firms1
Percent 
 Total observations 1 197 694 58.0 
DU  Domestic non multinationals 752 384 51.1 
DM:  Domestic multinationals 62 62 100.0 
NM:  Nordic multinationals 138 85 61.6 
ASM:  Anglo-Saxon multinationals 105 70 66.7 
EOM:  European multinationals and other multin. 140 93 66.4 
DOM:  Domestically owned firms 814 446 54.8 
FOR:  Foreign ownership 383 248 64.8 
Note: This table reports only about firms, which are a part of a corporate group. Innovative firms are firms 
reporting a product and/or process innovation and/or report ongoing innovation activities. The innovators share 
of 100% of the domestic multinationals is due to the construction of the domestic multinational indicator. 
 
The Swedish data used in this study consists of a subsample of the 
observations from the third Community Innovation Survey. The current 
sample refers only to firms belonging to a corporate group. The total 
number of observed firms is 1, 197 of which 814 (68%) is domestically 
owned firms. See Table 11.1 
In the study the firms are grouped into five different categories; domestic 
uninational firms (752 observations), domestic multinationals (62), Nordic 
multinationals (138 firms with headquarter in Denmark, Finland, Norway or 
Iceland), Anglo-Saxon (105) and European and other multinationals (140).  
Taken as a group, the domestic and foreign owned multinationals, play a 
pronounced role in the Swedish economy. Fors and Svensson (2002) 
reported that they accounted for around 60% of industrial output and overall 
export, and almost 90% of Sweden’s industrial R&D in 1990. 
A majority of the firms (55% of the domestic firms and 65% of the foreign 
owned firms) are classified as “innovative firms”, i.e. they have launched at 
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least one process innovation or product innovation during the period 1998-
2000, or they have reported ongoing innovation activities in year 2000.   
Note the large differences in share of innovative firms among the 
domestically owned firms; while six in 10 of the observed non-
multinationals are innovative, the corresponding share for multinationals is 
ten in 10. 
Table 11.2 
Summary statistics of firm characteristics and innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=752 N=62 N=138 N=414 N=140 N=814 N=383 
Size 276 1 277 304 414 340 352 348 
Sales 11.364 13.183 12.098 12.312 12.140 11.502 12.172 
Labour prod. 5.006 5.171 5.319 5.364 5.250 5.019 5.306 
Exports 1.870 3.617 3.059 3.762 2.964 2.003 3.217 
Investment 3.497 3.782 3.461 3.751 3.608 3.519 3.594 
Innov. input 0.582 2.253 0.660 1.112 1.029 0.709 0.919 
Innov. output 0.914 2.996 1.566 1.822 1.625 1.073 1.658 
Note: The table reports the averages of the innovation activities. All categories except the size are in 
logs and in per capita terms  
 
Table 11.2 reports summary statistics of key economics and innovation 
variables.  
The firm size figures in the right part of the table show that the average 
number of employees is about 350 in domestic as well as in foreign owned 
firms. However, the left part of Table 3 reveals a large size difference 
between non-multinational and multinational domestic firms.  While the 
average firms in the first category has 276 employees the average 
multinational firms is nearly five times larger. 
Expressed in intensity terms (per capita) the right part of the table shows 
that sales, labor productivity, export, physical investments, R&D and other 
innovation input and innovation sales is larger among foreign owned firms 
than in domestic firms. With exception of labor productivity, domestic 
uninational firms can explain the relatively low domestic figures. The 
Swedish multinational firms outperform all other category of owners when 
sales, tangible and intangible investments and innovation output are 
considered. Notable is that both categories of domestic firms has, on the 
average, lower labor productivity compare to foreign owned firms. 
Comparing the three categories of foreign owned firms, we find that the 
average Anglo-Saxon firm is the largest in term of employment. It has also 
the largest figures in all the economic and innovation performance variables 
considered. Swedish, Anglo-Saxon and European and other multinational 
 
 
 
 
firm are more intensive in human capital (21-22 %) than uninational firms 
(18 %) and Nordic multinational companies (14%) 
Table 11.3 
 Sectoral distribution with ownership categories in percent 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=752 N=62 N=138 N=414 N=140 N=814 N=383 
HI M 5.7 14.5 4.4 9.5 7.1 6.4 6.8 
HM M 16.0 37.1 21.0 24.8 30.7 17.6 25.6 
LM M 19.0 21.0 13.0 24.8 20.7 19.2 19.0 
LO M 14.6 12.9 15.2 12.4 15.0 14.5 14.4 
KIS 22.7 9.7 26.1 12.4 5.7 21.7 14.9 
OS 21.9 4.8 20.3 16.2 20.7 20.6 19.3 
Note: The sectors are defined along the lines of the OECD classification of knowledge intensity: high technology 
manufacturing (HI M), high medium technology manufacturing (HM M), low medium technology manufacturing 
(LM M), low technology manufacturing (LO M), knowledge intensive services (KIS) and other services (OS). See 
Hatzichronoglou (1997). 
 
Table 11.3 shows the distribution of manufacturing and service sector firms 
across technology intensity.  Comparing first domestic and foreign owned 
firms the right part of the table shows a large similarity in distribution, with 
the exception of high medium manufacturing technology (a larger 
concentration among foreign owned firms) and knowledge intensive service 
(domestic firms have the largest concentrations).  
Considering then the two classes of domestic firms, we find that 
multinationals are especially concentrated in high medium and low medium 
manufacturing technology, while 44% of the non multinationals belong to 
the service sector.  
Looking finally at the foreign owned firms the middle section of the table it 
is shown that Nordic multinational are relatively more concentrated in 
service sectors than other foreign owned firms. 
Across all five categories of firms domestic multinationals have the largest 
concentration in high and high medium technology sectors (52%). The 
corresponding share for the other categories of firms is: European and other 
multinationals (38%), Anglo-Saxon (34%), Nordic (25%) and Swedish non 
multinationals (26%) 
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Table 11.4 
Firms' most significant market  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=752 N=62 N=138 N=414 N=140 N=814 N=383 
Local 27.4 6.5 9.4 8.6 8.6 25.8 8.9 
National 42.3 24.2 48.6 26.7 45.7 40.9 41.5 
Global 30.3 69.4 42.0 64.8 45.7 33.3 49.6 
Note: The table reports the share of firms in percentages.  
 
The right part of Table 11.4 below indicates that the most significant market 
for domestically owned firms is the national market, while the global market 
dominates the focus of foreign owned firms.  
Decomposing the two overall categories of ownership we find that that the 
domestic national market (Sweden) is the most significant market for 
domestic non-multinationals as well as for Nordic multinationals. Swedish 
multinationals and Anglo-Saxon are concentrated on the global market.   
The European and other multinationals report that they are equally focused 
on the Swedish and the global market. 
11.2 Descriptive statistics for the innovative firms 
Similar to the previously reported country studies the descriptive statistics in 
this section only focus on innovative companies as defined above. 
Table 11.5  
Innovation activities 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=384 N=62 N=47 N=40 N=32 N=396 N=119 
Innovation expenditure 95.3 96.7 92.9 94.2 98.9 95.5 95.5 
Innovation sales 57.6 85.4 72.9 71.4 69.8 61.4 71.3 
Product innovation 60.1 91.9 74.1 74.2 73.1 64.5 73.7 
Process innovation 48.4 61.2 47.0 51.4 53.7 50.2 50.8 
Continuous R&D 48.4 85.4 55.2 64.2 64.5 53.5 61.2 
Public Funding for R&D 12.2 35.4 11.7 15.7 10.7 15.4 12.5 
Note: Table gives the share of firms in percent where the respective innovation activities can be observed. 
 
Table 11.5 gives the percentage of firms where the given activity can be 
observed.  As can be expected row 1 shows that nearly all firms defined as 
innovative in this study reported innovation expenditures year 2000.  
 
 
 
 
However, when innovation sales are considered, a significant difference is 
found between the two groups of domestic firms. Only six in 10 uninational 
firms report innovation sales, compared to nearly nine in 10 multinational 
firms. On the average, 70 percent of the foreign-owned firms report 
innovation sales compare to 60 percent of the domestic firms.  
The corresponding proportions are approximately the same regarding firms 
reporting continuous R&D, i.e., the average foreign firm is somewhat more 
R&D intensive than the average domestic firm.  
About one half of the firms surveyed report that they introduced a new or 
significantly improved process into the market during the period 1998-2000. 
The share was somewhat higher among domestic multinational firms.  
The propensity to receive governmental R&D support is about the same for 
foreign owned firms and uninational firms; however this propensity is three 
times higher for Swedish multinational firms. 
Table 11.6 
Methods of protection  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=384 N=62 N=47 N=40 N=32 N=396 N=119 
Patent (Valid) 32.6 74.2 49.4 64.2 67.7 38.3 60.4 
Patent (Application ) 27.6 74.2 35.2 54.2 53.7 34.0 47.5 
Design patterns 17.2 38.7 28.2 37.1 34.4 20.2 33.0 
Trademarks 40.3 72.5 58.8 65.7 61.2 44.8 61.7 
Copyright 19.0 46.8 29.4 34.2 30.1 22.8 31.0 
Secrecy 26.8 67.7 40.0 32.8 41.9 32.5 38.7 
Complexity of design 16.1 40.3 32.9 22.8 26.8 19.5 27.8 
Lead-time advantage 39.6 74.2 55.2 40.0 54.8 44.3 50.8 
Note: The table gives the share of firms indicating the use of the respective methods of protection. 
 
 
Table 11.6 gives descriptive statistics on the methods of protecting 
intellectual properties. For every single method of protection, ranging from 
patents to lead-time advantage, we find considerable larger figures among 
domestic multinational firms and a considerable smaller protection 
propensity among domestic non multinational firms compared to Nordic, 
Anglo-Saxon and European and other multinational firms. 
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Table 11.7  
Innovation Input and Innovation Output  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Input        
Mean 8.4 15.0 3.0 7.2 8.3 9.4 6.2 
Standard dev. 19.4 25.7 4.6 20.3 18.2 20.5 14.1 
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100 100 22.6 100 100 100 100 
Output        
Mean 15.2 23.9 17.2 20.4 18.9 16.4 18.8 
Standard dev. 24.2 28.8 22.7 26.2 24.7 24.9 24.4 
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the innovation expenditure (input) as a fraction of sales and 
the fraction of turnover generated by new or significantly modified products (output). All values are percentages.  
 
Table 11.7 summarizes the innovation input and the innovation output of the 
innovating firms. The average uninational firm and the average Anglo-
Saxon owned firms and European and other multinationals invest about 7-8 
per cent of the sales in innovation activities (R&D and other innovation 
activities).  The innovation effort is considerable larger in the average 
domestic multinational firm (15%).  
The innovation input in the Nordic owned firms is only 3 per cent of sales. 
In total we find an average input ratio of 9.4 per cent among Swedish firms 
compared to 6.2 percent for foreign owned firms. 
The lower part of Table 11.7 gives the mean values for innovation output. 
We find the largest average share of sales income from innovative products 
among domestic multinationals (24%), Anglo-Saxon owned firms (20%) 
and European and other multinationals (19%).  The mean share of 
innovation output is 17 percent for Nordic multinationals. Swedish 
uninational firms have the lowest output-share with 15 percent. In aggregate 
figures innovation output is 16 percent for domestic firms and 19 percent 
among domestically owned firms. Hence, foreign owned firms are less 
innovative with respect to innovation input but more innovative in terms of 
innovation output. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.8 
Cooperation on innovation 
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
  DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
Within the group  D 18.2 64.5 15.2 11.4 21.5 24.7 16.5 
 G 0.0 -1 24.9 42.8 44.0 13.9 38.7 
Suppliers  D 17.7 69.3 23.5 20.0 21.5 24.9 21.7 
 G 9.3 69.3 21.1 27.1 24.7 17.7 24.1 
Customers D 12.5 62.9 22.3 28.5 30.1 19.5 27.0 
 G 7.5 56.4 17.6 21.4 23.7 14.3 20.9 
Competitors D 6.0 20.9 3.5 5.7 5.4 8,0 4.8 
 G 2.3 17.7 4.7 8.5 5.4 4.4 6.0 
Consultancies D 14.8 48.3 20.0 24.2 24.7 19.5 22.9 
 G 2.8 29.0 7.0 12.8 10.7 6.5 10.0 
Priv. R&D Labs D 6.5 27.4 10.5 18.5 13.9 9.4 14.1 
 G 3.3 30.6 5.9 14.2 6.4 7.1 8.4 
Universities D 14.8 64.5 21.1 31.4 32.2 21.7 28.2 
 G 3.6 32.2 9.4 15.7 9.6 7.6 11.2 
Public R&D Org. D 8.8 33.8 9.4 18.5 14.0 12.3 13.7 
 G 3.1 9.7 4.7 5.7 7.5 4.0 6.0 
Domestic          
- collaboration  32.8 93.5 40.0 50.0 47.3 41.2 45.5 
- vertical coll.  23.4 82.2 30.5 37.1 36.5 31.6 34.6 
- horizontal coll  5.9 20.9 3.5 5.7 5.3 8.0 4.8 
- scientific coll.   17.9 69.3 23.5 34.2 32.2 25.1 29.8 
Note: This table gives the fraction of companies reporting collaborative innovation efforts with the respective 
partners. D denotes domestic partners and G denotes international partners. The diversity index is the number of 
partners currently used relative to the number of potential partners. For the diversity index the table reports the 
means. 
 
Recent literature, see for example Pavitt and Patel (1999), emphasizes the 
importance of innovation systems for performance of individual firms. 
Table 11.8 gives indicators on domestic and global collaboration on 
innovation with eight different categories of partners.  
The evidence on networking, whatever partner, is unanimous as regards the 
more intense cooperation of Swedish multinationals on both the domestic 
and the global scene.  Swedish uninational firms have a lower degree of 
domestic as well as global innovation collaboration compared to foreign 
owned firms.  It is notable that foreign owned firms report closer 
cooperation with the Swedish scientific network (universities and public 
R&D organisations) than uninational Swedish firms.  
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Table 11.9  
Sources of information for innovation.  
 DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL 
 DU DM NM ASM EOM DOM FOR 
 N=384 N=62 N=47 N=40 N=32 N=396 N=119 
Within the firm 83.3 95.1 87.0 84.2 82.7 84.9 84.6 
Within the group 44.2 75.8 60.0 62.8 70.9 48.6 64.9 
Suppliers 56.5 62.9 63.5 45.7 54.8 57.3 55.2 
Customers 73.9 90.3 83.5 80.0 75.2 76.2 79.4 
Competitors 48.9 59.6 44.7 37.1 44.0 50.4 42.3 
Universities 25.2 53.2 22.3 31.4 26.9 29.1 26.6 
Government 15.1 35.4 14.1 18.6 19.3 17.9 17.3 
Prof conferences 37.7 53.2 37.6 32.8 34.4 39.9 35.0 
Fairs, exhibitions 42.1 54.8 37.6 37.1 32.2 43.9 35.4 
Note: The table report the fraction of companies reporting a high or medium importance of the information sources 
for their innovation activities. . 
 
In Table 11.9 we see that all categories of innovative firms are largely 
dependent on external sources of information for innovation activities. In 
agreement with the information on collaboration above (Table 11.8), the 
Swedish multinationals are also drawing more on external sources of 
knowledge compared to other firms. They are also relying somewhat more 
on the internal knowledge base, which presumably is a size effect.  The 
average Swedish multinational firm is considerable larger than the 
corresponding foreign and uninational firm.  
The aggregate figures in the right part of the table reveal only minor 
differences as regards use of knowledge sources between domestic and 
foreign owned firms. 
 
 
 
 
11.3 Regression results 
This section reports the results of the multivariate analysis 
11.31 Selection models  
Table 11.10  
Innovation activities, two equation selection models (selection equation) 
 Dependent variable:  
The propensity to invest in innovatio0n activities 
 Coeff Sign Std err 
Foreign ownership 0.053  0.086 
Size 0.198 *** 0.029 
Local markets Reference 
National markets 0.307 *** 0.108 
Global markets 0.585 *** 0.118 
Labor productivity 0.078  0.051 
Recently established 0.003  0.142 
Recently merged 0.216 * 0.120 
Human capital 0.579 *** 0.204 
Physical investment 0.049  0.149 
High technology manufacturing 0.833 *** 0.216 
Medium high technology manufacturing 0.190  0.126 
Medium low technology manufacturing 0.066  0.132 
Low technology manufacturing Reference 
Knowledge intensive services 0.047  0.149 
Other services -0.437 *** 0.130 
Constant -1.733 *** 0.271 
Note: This table reports the results of the selection equation for innovation activities when estimating 
equation (1) and (0) simultaneously. *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level 
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The selection equation reported in Table 11.10 gives the determinants to the 
firm’s probability to engage in innovation activities.  
First, when controlling for firms size, market orientation, productivity (as a 
proxy for internal financial resources for R&D investments), newly 
establishments and newly merged, gross investments and human capital 
(approximated by the share of employment with a university education), we 
find no evidence that foreign ownership influence the decision to engage in 
innovative activities.  
The main determinants for innovation are presence on global or national 
market and the human capital indicator. We also find some weak evidence 
(significant at the 10% level) indicating that the propensity to be innovative 
is positively correlated with profit and merger and acquisition.  
11.32 Innovation behavior 
Tables 11.11-11.13 report the result from the second step of the selection 
model. Starting with Table 11.11, (log) innovation input per worker, 
depicted in column 1, it is shown that the point estimate for Swedish 
multinational firms are highly significant and the order of magnitude of the 
estimate is 0.7.  The reference group is the uninational Swedish firms.  
The Anglo-Saxon owned firms invest significant more in R&D than the 
reference group at the 5% level of significance, and European and other 
multinationals at the 10% level of significance.  
The indicator variables for global markets, continuous R&D engagement 
and receiver of public R&D funding are all significant and positive 
associated with the size of innovation input. We also see that physical 
capital investments are positively associated with R&D investments. On the 
contrary, the amount innovation output per worker is a decreasing function 
of firm size. 
The main finding from the funding equation is that for firms classified as 
innovative, domestic multinationals have a significant larger likelihood of 
receiving public R&D subsidies than other groups of firms.   
Next we see that knowledge flow from affiliates within the group is an 
important source of information for innovation for all multinational firms. 
This characteristic separate multinational firm from uninational firms in a 
significant way. 
Looking at the aggregate indicator on embeddedness in the national 
innovation system the evidences are unanimously that domestic 
multinationals are more integrated in the national innovation system (NIS) 
than any other or the investigated firms.  See Table 11.12.When de-
composing   the embeddeddness in vertical, horizontal and scientific 
innovation systems the following results in shown:  
 
 
 
 
First, both Swedish multinationals and European and other foreign 
controlled are collaborating more closely with suppliers and customers on 
innovation than with other groups of firms.  
Second, domestic multinationals are significantly more involved in 
cooperation on innovation with competitors and suppliers compared to 
uninational firms and foreign-owned firms.  
Third, the scientific innovation system (universities, private and 
governmental R&D laboratories) seems to be the most attractive for foreign-
owned firms in Sweden.  Together with domestic multinationals both 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic controlled firms are significantly more integrated 
in the scientific innovation system than uninational firms. It is notable that 
no difference can be established between the reference group and Nordic 
multinationals. Presumably the latter group is more integrated in the 
scientific innovation system in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Iceland 
respectively. 
Column 6 indicates that knowledge flow from affiliates within the group is 
an important source of information for innovation for all multinational 
firms. This characteristic separate multinational firms from uninational 
firms in a significant way. 
Table11.13 reports the summary finding from the performance equations. 
Column 1 and Column 2 show that Swedish multinationals and European 
and other multinational have a significant larger probability to patent and to 
introduce radical innovations than other firms. The point estimate for 
Anglo-Saxon is only significant different from the reference group at the 
10% level of significance. 
Interestingly column 3 shows that the Swedish multinational firms are not 
more innovative in terms on innovation sales per employee compared to 
foreign owned multinationals. This is highly unexpected in the light of an 
extensive difference in R&D investments between Swedish multinationals 
on the one hand and Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and European and other 
multinationals on the other. I addition, we would also have expected that the 
large divergence regarding integration in national innovation system should 
have resulted in differences in innovation sales.   
At variance with most other studies reported in the literature, we do not find 
any strong evidence on productivity difference between domestically owned 
firms and foreign firm in the Swedish economy. See column 4.  The 
selection equation indicates that only Anglo-Saxon firms are more 
productive that other firms (at the 5% level of significance).  And as we will 
se below, when estimating with the multistep model the difference between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms is vanishing completely. This finding is 
not only at variance with what Modén (1998) Karpati and Lundberg (2004) 
has shown for firms in Sweden, but also with the majority of previous 
empirical studies reported in the literature. Some possible explanation to our 
divergent results are: (i) the extensive set of firm characteristics and the 
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exploitation of econometric methods appropriate for the peculiarities in the 
data set, (ii) our research methodology with a production function model 
capturing the relations between decision to invest and R&D-investments, 
between R&D investments and innovation output, and between innovation 
output and productivity, (iii) our method of distinguishing between 
uninational domestic firms and multinational domestic firms, and between 
different categories of foreign owned firms, (iv) our inclusion of small firms 
in the analysis. The lower limit is 10 employees, (v) the cross-sectional 
nature of our data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.11 
Innovation activities, two equation selection models 
 Innovation input 
per worker 
Public funding Knowledge flow 
within the company 
 Coeff Sign Std err Coeff Sign Std err Coeff Sign Std err 
Corporate ownership          
DU Reference Reference Reference 
DM 0.687 *** 0.229 0.488 *** 0.170 0.613 *** 0.179 
NM 0.009  0.193 -0.102  0.186 0.279 ** 0.136 
ASM 0.103  0.213 0.047  0.197 0.309 ** 0.155 
EOM 0.150 * 0.188 -0.187  0.190 0.525 *** 0.147 
Other determinants          
Innovation input - - - - - - 0.024  0.023 
Physical capital investments 0.190 *** 0.043 0.112 *** 0.038 -0.043  0.026 
Size (emp) -0.310 *** 0.062 0.114 *** 0.036 -0.023  0.033 
Local markets Reference Reference Reference 
National markets 0.336  0.232 0.310  0.192 -0.229 * 0.133 
Global markets 0.730 ** 0.285 0.349 * 0.204 -0.453 *** 0.146 
Product orientation 0.343 * 0.208 -0.152  0.194 0.369 *** 0.145 
Process orientation 0.131  0.243 -0.168  0.229 0.264  0.163 
Continual R&D 0.143 *** 0.137 0.306 ** 0.126 0.188 ** 0.093 
Public funding 0.425 ** 0.176 -  - -0.061  0.116 
Sector dummies Included Included Included 
Constant 0.040  0.854 -2.763 *** 0.298 0.806 *** 0.296 
Wald test 260.71 ***  72.96 ***  63.99 ***  
LR test 0.09   1.27   8.11 ***  
Note: The table gives the coefficient estimates, *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The estimation 
methods are indicated as HR (regression model with sample selection) and HP (probit model with sample selection). 
DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-
Saxon multinational; EOM= European and other multinationals. The results of the selection equation are not reported here. 
The Wald statistic tests joint significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not 
significantly different from 0, Heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit 
model for selection variable. 
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Table 11.12 
Innovation activities, two equation selection models (continued) 
 Domestic 
collaboration 
Domestic vertical 
collaboration 
Domestic horizontal 
collaboration 
Utilization of 
domestic science 
system 
 Coeff Sign St err Coeff Sign St err Coeff Sign St err Coeff Sign St err 
Corpor.ownership             
DU Reference Reference Reference Reference 
DM 1.318 *** 0.247 1.253 *** 0.213 0.584 *** 0.195 0.832 *** 0.214 
NM 0.150  0.147 0.236  0.173 0.102  0.178 0.224  0.179 
ASM 0.205  0.171 0.297  0.189 0.094  0.193 0.392 ** 0.190 
EOM 0.232  0.149 0.334 ** 0.167 0.187  0.171 0.400 ** 0.170 
Other determinants             
Innovation input 0.093 *** 0.033 0.107 *** 0.037 0.119 *** 0.042 0.125 *** 0.040 
Physical cap invest -0.027  0.032 0.001  0.035 -0.045  0.038 0.037  0.041 
Size 0.065  0.049 0.104 *** 0.034 0.104  0.086 0.271 *** 0.041 
Local markets Reference Reference Reference Reference 
National markets -0.707 *** 0.154 -0.613 *** 0.169 -0.726 *** 0.172 -0.507 ** 0.240 
Global markets -0.786 *** 0.164 -0.664 *** 0.186 -0.825 *** 0.197 -0.449  0.280 
Product orientation 0.159  0.162 0.324 * 0.185 0.117  0.184 0.186  0.186 
Process orientation -0.003  0.179 0.032  0.215 -0.019  0.209 -0.083  0.215 
Continual R&D 0.667 *** 0.135 0.757 *** 0.135 0.635 *** 0.210 0.753 *** 0.154 
Public funding 0.722 *** 0.147 0.545 *** 0.150 0.332 ** 0.141 0.743 *** 0.169 
Sector dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.054  0.470 -1.275  - -0.626  1.067 -2.88 ***  
Wald test 103.26 ***  260.20 ***  69.65 ***  188.95 ***  
LR test 2.18   0.01   0.64   0.82   
Note *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and 
other multinationals. The results of the selection equation are not reported here.  The Wald statistic tests joint 
significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 
0, Heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit model for selection 
variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.13 
Innovation activities, two equation selection models (continued) 
 Patent application Products new  
to the market 
Returns to innovation 
per worker 
Labor productivity 
 Coeff Sign St err Coeff Sign St err Coeff Sign St err Coeff Sign St err
Corpor.ownership             
DU Reference Reference Reference Reference 
DM 0.635 *** 0.219 0.674 *** 0.246 0.923 *** 0.261 0.031  0.131
NM 0.073  0.174 0.219  0.146 0.612 *** 0.222 0.143  0.110
ASM 0.370 * 0.186 0.275 * 0.157 0.587 ** 0.246 0.270 ** 0.121
EOM 0.513 *** 0.169 0.317 ** 0.149 0.476 ** 0.217 -0.007  0.107
Other determinants             
Innovation input 0.109 *** 0.039 0.036  0.029 0.145 *** 0.041 0.105 *** 0.021
Physical cap invest 0.059  0.044 0.056  0.034 0.067  0.047 0.209 *** 0.023
Size 0.126 ** 0.061 0.021  0.068 -0.210 *** 0.058 0.021  0.028
Local markets Reference Reference Reference Reference 
National markets 0.325  0.245 0.136  0.187 0.339  0.235 0.363 *** 0.118
Global markets 0.750 *** 0.290 0.157  0.258 0.244  0.257 0.382 *** 0.135
Product orientation 0.418 ** 0.191 0.864 *** 0.335 1.677 *** 0.234 -0.261 ** 0.119
Process orientation -0.108  0.216 -0.099  0.173 0.217  0.269 -0.036  0.138
Continual R&D 0.575 *** 0.131 0.366 *** 0.140 0.137  0.159 -0.037  0.081
Public funding 0.471 *** 0.162 0.075  0.139 -0.278  0.196 -0.124  0.100
Sector dummies Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Constant -2.621 *** 0.234 -1.908 *** 0.531 2.581 *** 0.559 3.960 *** 0.312
Wald test 105.34 ***  129.70 ***  165.34 ***  292.42 ***  
LR test 0.01   0.61   12.38 ***  0.06   
Note:  *** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European and 
other multinationals. The results of the selection equation are not reported here. The Wald statistic tests joint 
significance and the LR tests the correlation of the two equations. If this correlation is not significantly different from 
0, Heckman's model is equivalent to the combination of a regression for the outcome and a probit model for selection 
variable. 
 
 
11.33 Multi step production function model 
Our main interest in the multistep is to investigate the importance of 
ownership of the firms with respect to innovation and economic 
performance in an econometric framework taking both selectivity bias and 
simultaneous bias into account and controlling for factors suggested in the 
innovation literature, such as firm size, physical capital, human capital and 
various market indicators.  
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Step1: Selection equation. Dependent variable: Probability of being engaged in 
innovation 
As could be expected – and in line with the innovation literature (See Cohen 
and Klepper 1996 and Klette and Kortum 2002) – the probability of being 
innovative increases with firm size. Moreover, the firm s’ market orientation 
is an important determinant to product innovations. A firm with a global or 
national market orientation has a significantly higher probability of 
introducing new innovations compared to firms acting mainly on the local 
market.  
Not surprisingly the likelihood of being innovative is an increasing function 
of the level of human capital. Investment in R&D and other intangible 
capital is also closely associated with investment in tangible capital. The 
upper part of table 11.13 gives also weak evidence that firms with a recent 
history of mergers or acquisitions have a larger probability of being 
innovative. However the point estimate is only significant at the 10% level 
of significance.  
Step 2: Innovation input equation. Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation 
expenditure per employee. 
Whereas the occurrence of product innovations is higher the larger the firm, 
innovation input, defined as innovation expenditures per employee, 
decreases with firm size. See the lower part of Table 12. This is also 
consistent with the results presented by Janz et al (2004) and Lööf and 
Heshmati (2004).  
The estimates in Table 11.13 show that the dummy variable for Swedish 
multinational has a significant larger association with the innovation input 
variable than the reference group consisting of Swedish uninational firms.  
The estimates for all three categories of foreign owned firms are non-
significant. 
Innovation output equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm of innovation sales per 
employee. 
Confirming previous studies we find that innovation output increases 
significantly with innovation input. The coefficient of the estimate indicates 
that a 10% increase in innovation expenditure per employee by 3% for firms 
belonging to a group. Looking then at the variables capturing ownership of 
firms, with uninational owned firms as the reference group, we find a highly 
significant and positive association between innovation output and Nordic 
multinational firms. The estimate is also positive but only weakly significant 
for Swedish multinational firms. The reaming two ownership variables are 
not significant.  
Furthermore, as can be gathered from the upper part of Table 11.14 
collaboration diversity has a positive impact on innovation output whereas 
R&D funding somewhat unexpected has the opposite effect. The latter is at 
variance with the finding by Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2004) and Lööf 
 
 
 
 
and Heshmati (2004) but can be explained by the formulation of the model.  
The subsidy effect is already incorporated in the predicted innovation 
variable. Human capital has a positive but only weakly significant effect on 
innovation output. 
Productivity equation: Dependent variable: Logarithm sale per employee. 
The results from the productivity equation presented in the lower part of 
Table 11.14 show that innovation output, expressed as innovation sales per 
employee, is an important contributor to productivity after controlling for 
sector, size, capital investment, human capital, process innovation. The 
effect is highly significant. The size of the estimate is within the range of 
what previously has been found in the literature. A 10% increase in 
innovation output increases the level of productivity by about 2 percent.  
Interestingly we find no impact from the ownership variables.  
The conclusion here is that foreign-owned firms are not more or less 
productive than uninational firms or domestic multinational firms at the 
margin when using the control variables commonly used in the 
Schumpeterian literature. 
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11.34 Multi step production function model 
Table 11.14  
Multi step production function model 
Step 1: Selection equation 
Dependent variable: The probability to be an innovative firm 
 Coefficient  Std.err. 
Foreign ownership 0.070  0.085 
Size 0.190 *** 0.029 
Local markets Reference 
Regional markets 0.331 *** 0.106 
Global markets 0.607 *** 0.114 
Recently established -0.039  0.140 
Recently merged 0.228 * 0.118 
Human capital 0.581 *** 0.200 
Investment per employee (log) 0.080 *** 0.024 
Constant -1.432 *** 0.183 
Step 2:  Innovation input equation Dependent variable  
Log innovation expenditures per employee 
D Reference 
DM 0.672 *** 0.234 
NM 0.020  0.197 
ASM 0.127  0.218 
EOM 0.116  0.192 
Size -0.355 *** 0.054 
Local markets Reference 
Regional markets 0.201  0.217 
Global markets 0.624 ** 0.254 
Public funding for R&D  0.494 *** 0.178 
Process innovation 0.302 ** 0.123 
Continuous R&D  1.186 *** 0.139 
Constant 1.230 ** 0.601 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here.  
 
 
 
 
Table 11.15 
 Multi step production function model (continued) 
Step 3: Innovation Output equation 
Dependent variable: The log of innovation sales per capita 
 Coefficient  Std. error 
Predicted labour productivity 0.529 * 0.293 
Predicted innovation input 0.331 *** 0.122 
D Reference 
DM 0.524 * 0.268 
NM 0.592 *** 0.209 
ASM 0.362  0.257 
EOM 0.306  0.226 
Size -0.093  0.113 
Inverted Mills’ ratio from the sel. equn. -0.894  0.799 
Public funding for R&D  -0.545 *** 0.198 
Collaboration diversity 1.044 *** 0.385 
Human capital 0.830 * 0.469 
Constant -0.424  2.337 
Step 4:  Productivity equation  
Dependent variable: Log sales per employee  
Predicted innovation output 0.221 ** 0.087 
Physical Investment per employee (log) 0.183 *** 0.050 
D Reference 
DM -0.103  0.156 
NM 0.013  0.113 
ASM 0.160  0.131 
EOM -0.051  0.112 
Process innovation -0.021  0.075 
Size 0.006  0.026 
Human capital -0.357  0.243 
Constant 4.095 *** 0.224 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. DU= Domestic firms, non-multinational; 
DM= domestic multinational; NM= Nordic multinational, ASM= Anglo-Saxon multinational; EOM= European 
and other multinationals. 6 sector dummies included in the regression, not reported here. 
 
 
82 
 Corporate Innovation Activities Does Ownership Matter? 
 
 83
References 
Aitken, B.J. and A.E. Harrison (1999) ”Do Domestic Firms Benefit from from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela,” American Economic Review 89, 605-618. 
Analyseinstitut for Forskning (2003) ”Innovation i dansk erhvervsliv 2000 Danmarks bidrag til 
den tredje fælleseuropæiske innovationsundersøgelse,” Århus. 
Andersson, U. (1997) ”Subsidiary network embeddedness: Integration, control and influence in 
the multinational corporation.” Doctoral thesis, Department of Business Studies, 
Uppsala University, Sweden. 
Archibugi, D., and S. Iammaarino (1999) “The policy implication of the globalization of 
innovation”, Research Policy 28 2-3, 317-336. 
Balcet, G. and R. Evangelista (2004) “Global Technology: Innovative Strategies of 
Multinational Affiliates in Italy.” Paper presented at the 10th International Schumpeter 
Society Conference, Milan. 
Barrios. S., H. Görg and E. Strobl (2004), “Foreign direct investment, competition and 
industrial development in host country”, German Institute for Economic Research, 
DIW, Discussion Papers 426. 
Bartlett, C.A., and S- Ghosal (1997) “The individual corporation – a fundamentally new 
approach to management,” New York: HarperCollin.  
Blomström, M and A. Kooko (1998) ”Multinational Corporations and Spillovers,” Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 12, 247-277. 
Blomström, M., A. Kokko and  S. Globerman (2001) ” The determinants of the host country 
spillovers from foreign direct investment: a review and synthesis of the literature,”  in 
N. Pain (Ed), 34-65.  
Cantwell, J., and O. Janne (1999) “Technological globalisation and innovative centres: the role 
of corporate technological leadership and location hierarchy,” Research Policy 28 2-3, 
119-144. 
Caves, R. E. (1982) “Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis,” Cambridge, U.K.: 
Camb ridge University Press. 
Chen, C-H. (1997) “The determinants of Foreign and Domestic Merger Activities in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries.”  Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
 
Crepon B., E. Duguet. and J. Mairesse (1998)  “Research, innovation and productivity: an 
econometric analysis at the firm level.” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 
7, 115-158. 
Czarnitzki, D., B. Ebersberger and A. Fier (2004) “The Relationship between R&D 
Collaboration, Subsidies and Patenting Activity: Empirical Evidence from Finland and 
Germany.” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-, ZEW Mannheim. 
Doms, M., E and J. Brandford Jensen (1998) “Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity 
between  Domestically and Foreign- Owned Manufacturing Establishments in the 
United States,” In R., E. Baldwin, R., E. Lipsey and J., David Richardson (Eds) 
Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting, Studies  in Income and 
Wealth, 59, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 235-258. 
Dosi, G. (1988) “The nature of the innovation process,” In Dosi, G., et al (Eds.), Technical 
Change and Economic Theory. Frances Piter Publishers, London. 
Driffield, N (2001) “The Impact on Domestic Productivity of Inward Investment in the UK,” 
The Manchester School 69 1, 103-119. 
Dunning, J. H. (1993) ” Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy,” Workingham 
U.K.: Adison Wesley Publishing Co.  
Feldman, M.P. and D.B. Audretch (1995) “Science-Based Diversity, Specialization, Localized 
Competion and Innovation,” Discussion Paper. Wissenschaftscebtrum Berlin Fur 
Socialforschung, FS IV 95-123. 
Feliciano, Z., and R.E. Lipsey (2002) “Foreign entry into U:S. manufacturing by takeovers and 
the creation of new firms”, NBER Working Paper no 9122. 
Fors, G., and R. Svensson (2002) “R&D and foreign sales in Swedish multinationals: a 
simultaneous relationship?”, Research Policy 31, 95-107. 
Frenz, M., and G.Ietto-Gillies (2004) “The impact of multinationality on the propensity to 
innovate: An analysis of the  UK Community Innovation Survey 3”, paper presented at 
the 2004 Schumpeter conference in Milano.  
Furu, P. (2001) “Drivers of competence development in different types of multinational 
subsidiaries”, Scandinavian Journal of Management 17, 133-149. 
Girma, S. and K. Wakelin (2000) “Are There regional Spillovers from FDI in the UK?” 
Research Paper 2000/16, Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labor Markets, 
School of Economics, Nottingham. 
Girma, S., D. Greenway and K. Wakelin (2001) “Who Benefits from Foreign Direct Investment 
in the UK?,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 48 2, 119-133. 
84 
 Corporate Innovation Activities Does Ownership Matter? 
 
 85
Gonzales, P., G.M. Vasconcellos and R. J. Kish (1998) “Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acqusitions: Under the Valuation Hypothesis.” The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance, 38 1, 25-44 
Griffith, R and H. Simpson (2003) “Characteristics of foreign-owned firms in British 
Manufacturing”, NBER Working Paper Series 9573. 
Görg, H. and E. Strobl (2003) “Multinational Companies, Technology Spillovers and Plant 
Survival, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, 581-595.  
Götzfried, A (2003) “CIS 3 - Progress Report.” Meeting of the Working Party on Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) Statistics, Eurostat Doc.ESTAT/A4/STI/May03/2.2. 
Grossman, Gene M, Helpman  Elhanan and. Szeidl, Adam (2003) “Optimal  Integration 
Strategies for the Multinational Firm”, NBER Working Paper No. 10189. 
Hansson, G. H. (2001), “Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment,” G-24 
Discussion Paper no. 9, UNCTAD, Geneva.  
Harris, R. and C. Robinson (2002) “The Effect of Foreign Acquisitions on Total Factor 
Productivity: Plant Level Evidence from UK Manufacturing, 1987-1992, Review of 
Economic Statistics 48 3, 562-568. 
Haskel, J. E., S. C. Pereira and M. J Slaughter (2002) “Does  Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
Boost the Productivity of Domestic Firms?,” NBER Working Paper No 8724. 
Hatzichronoglou, T. (1997) “Revision of the High-Technology Sector and Product 
Classification,” Vol. 2 of STI Working Papers, OECD, Paris. 
Helpman, E., M.J. Melitz and S.R. Yeape (2003) “ Export versus FDI with Heterogenous 
Firms,” American Economic Review 
Howenstine, N., G. and J., A. Ziele (1994) “Characteristics of Foreign-Owned U.S. 
Manufacturing Establishments,“ Survey of Current Business 74 1, 34-59. 
Holm, U., and T. Pedesen (Eds.), (2000) “The emergence and impact of MNC centres of 
excellence – a subsidiary perspective,” London: Macmillan. 
Jaffe, A., M. Trajtenberg and R. Hendersson (1993) “Geographical localisation of knowledge 
spillovers as evidence by patent citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 577-
599.  
Janz, N., Lööf, H. and Peters, B., 2003 Firm Level Innovation and Productivity - Is there a 
Common Story Across Countries? Problems and Perspectives in Management 2, 184-
204. 
 
 
 
 
Kleinknecht, A., K van Montfort and E. Brouwer (2002) “The non-trivial choice between 
innovation indicators.” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 11, 109-121. 
Klevorick, A. K., R. C. Levin, R.R. Nelson and S.Winter (1995) “On the sources and 
significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities,” Research 
Policy 24, 185-205. 
Konings, J. (2001) “The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firms: Evidence 
from Firm Level Panel data in Emerging Economics,” Economics of Transitions 9, 619-
633. 
Kummerle, W (1999) “ “Foreign direct investment in industrial research in the pharmaceutical 
and electronic industries – results from a survey of multinational firms,” Research 
Policy 28 2-3, 179-193. 
Lundberg , L and P. Karpaty, P (2004) “Utländska direkinvesteringar och produktivitet I svensk 
tillverkningsindustri 1990-2000,” In Näringslivets internationalisering – effekter på 
sysselsättning, produktivitet och fou. ITPS. Stockholm. 
Le Bas, C. and C. Sierra (2002) “Location versus home country advantages in R&D activities: 
some further results on multinationals’ location strategies”,  Research Policy 31, 589-
609. 
Lipsey, R.E. (2002) “ Home and Host Country Effects of FDI,” NBER Working Paper 9293. 
Lööf H and A Heshmati (2004) “On the Relationship Between Innovation and Performance: A 
Sensitivity Analysis” Economics of Innovation and New Technology. Forthcoming  
Lundvall, B-Å. (Ed.) (1992) ”National System of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation 
and Interactive Learning,” Printer, London. 
Markusen, J. R. (1991) “The Theory of the Multinational Enterprise: A Common Analytical 
Framework,” in Eric Ramstetter, ed., Direct Foreign Investment in Asia’s Developing 
Economies and Structural Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, Boulder, Co: Westview 
Press, 11-32. 
Modén, K. (1998) “Foreign Acquisitions of Swedish Companies – effects son R&D and 
Productivity. ISA 1998/2. Stockholm. 
Nelson, R. (Ed.), (1992) ”National Innovation Systems: a Comparative Analysis.” Oxford Univ. 
Press, New York. 
Norbäck, P-J. (2001), ”Multinational firms, technology and location”, Journal of International 
Economics 54, 449-469. 
86 
 Corporate Innovation Activities Does Ownership Matter? 
 
 87
OECD (2001) “Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard,” OECD, Paris.URL: 
http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/92-2001-04-1-2987/D.5.htm 
Patel, P. (1995) “Localised production of technology for global markets”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 19 1, 141-154.  
Patel, P. and M. Vega (1999) “Patterns of internationalization of corporate technology: location 
vs. home country advantages”,  Research Policy 28 2-3, 145-155. 
Patel, P. (2004) “Internationalisation of Corporate Technology: What we know and don’t 
know?” Presentation at the 6CP Network Workshop, June 18 , Helsinki. 
Pavitt, K. and P. Patel (1999) “Global corporations and national systems of innovation who 
dominates whom?. In: D. Archiburgi, J. Howells and J. Michie (eds.), Innovation Policy 
in a Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 94-119. 
Pavitt, K., M. Robson and J. Townsend (1987) “The Size Distribution of Innovating Firms in 
the UK: 1945-1883.” The Journal of Industrial Economics 35, 297-316. 
Pol, A., and  E. Helpman (2003) “Global Sourcing,” NBER Working Paper No. 10082. 
Porter, M (1990) “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, London, Mcmillan. 
Sadowski, B.M and C. van Beers (2003) “On the Innovativeness of Foreign Affilities: Some 
Evidence from Dutch Manufacturing Firms,” (Momeo) 
Serapiro Jr.  M. G. and D.H. Dalton (1999), “Globalization of industrial R&D: an examination 
of foreign direct investment in R&D in United States”, Research Policy 28 2-3, 303-
316. 
Statistics Finland, 2002. EU Innovation Survey 2000, www.stat.fi/tk/yr/ ttinno00_en. Html 
Statistics Iceland, 2003 Final report on the work carried out under the Contract between the 
Commission of the European Communities and Statistics Iceland, dated 17 October 
2001, concerning the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS III). Statistics Iceland, 
mimeo, July 2003. 
Tether, B. S. (2000) “Who co-operates for innovation, and why? An empirical analysis,” 
Research Policy 31, 947-967. 
Tether, B. S.  (2001) Identifying Innovation, Innovators and Innovative Behaviours: A Critical 
Assessment of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), CRIC Discussion Paper 48, 
Manchester. 
United Nations (2000) “World Investment Report, 2000: Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions and Development,” United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, 
New York and Geneva, United Nations. 
 
 
 
 
Vernon, R. (1966) “International investment and international trade in the product cycle,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 2, 190-207. 
88 
  
 
 
Appendix: Determining the home countries of firms 
The grouping for the home country variable in the analysis is basically 
distilled from two variables in the CIS questionnaire. The first question asks 
whether or not the surveyed company is a part of a corporate group. We 
select only those companies answering this question positively. We drop 
companies giving no answer or a negative answer. The second variable used 
contains the information about the home country of the company. We take 
out all companies where no country code is given.  
We distinguish the domestically owned companies in companies belonging 
to domestically owned corporate groups and domestically owned domestic 
groups. As there is no variable in the CIS indicating the multi-nationality of 
domestic corporate groups we have to derive this information from other 
details in the questionnaire. In the CIS questionnaires innovative companies 
are asked about their collaboration partners for R&D by the location of the 
collaboration partner. If a domestically owned company reported innovation 
collaboration within the corporate group but outside the home country we 
regard the company to be a domestically owned multi-national company.  
This procedure clearly underestimates the number of domestically owned 
multinational companies. However, if we find significant influence of the 
multinationality on innovation activities we are on safe ground as the 
control group of domestically owned companies certainly also contains 
companies that are domestic multinationals.  
Although the procedure is rather sensitive towards differences in national 
collaboration culture, we argue that the national differences in collaboration 
culture should not be too dominating in a multinational firm, hence, we 
conjecture that the bias induced by different collaboration cultures may not 
be too large.  
 
 
 
